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ABSTRACT
Mergers are not a new phenomenon, but rather an on-going process in
the business environment. They correspond to the combination of two (or
more) firms into a unique business concern. This study is grounded on the
notion that looking at mergers from a financial point of view may provide
a valid platform for analyzing merger movements.
The fundamental development of this study is an equilibrium model for
determining the market value of a firm when the managerial team is
assumed to have better information than the market. It is shown that when
a firm with superior information does not have sufficient internal
resources (financial slack) to undertake a project, the full value of
future investment opportunities is not necessarily captured in the market
value of the firm. This conclusion is obtained because there are situa-
tions in which, by taking the project and bringing in new shareholders,
old shareholders lose (from the dilution of their holdings in the firm)
more than what they get from the extra value added by the new project.
The dependency of market value from slack availability opens the
possibility of justifying mergers via tender offers. In this context, the
merger may be understood as a way to inject resources from a "cash rich"
to a "cash poor" firm. The expected payoff of this game is positive and
equal to the loss in market value due to insufficient slack.
Finally, if it is assumed that the market value of the firm should
capture the full value of future investment opportunities, some normative
conclusions regarding the behavior of managers may be stated. The most
important of these conclusions is that the decision of a firm to issue
stock should be unconditional; that is to say, it should be determined
only by the value of the investment opportunity and not linked in any
way with the superior information that the firm holds. In this setting,
mergers may be viewed as a deterrent for managers deviating from this
desirable behavior.
Thesis Supervisor: Arnoldo C. Hax
Professor of Management ScienceTitle:
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MERGER MOVEMENTS
The number of acquisitions reported by Nelson [73] for 1895-1956
coupled with a continuation of this series compiled by the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission [92][93], have served as the starting point for this his-
torical analysis of merger movements by most authors. Though Nelson data
are taken from sources not directly comparable, the time series shows
three very distinctive peaks of activity in years 1899, 1929, and 1968
(see Table 1 and Figure 1). These years are normally used as anchors in
the distinction of three main waves of merger activity: first, the turn
of the century period; second, the late 1920's period; and third, the
post-World War II period, beginning in 1945 and with no clear termination
date yet. As Steiner [87, pp. 6-7] puts it, "We are not sure if this
period already ended after the great boom in the late 60's, or if we are
in a long trend of increasing acquisitions which has not yet settled".
The three merger waves are far from being the recurrent manifestation
of a unique phenomenon, corresponding instead to situations with a common
final response (the increase in merger activity), but a different set of
underlying causes. These sets of causes give particular characteristics
to each one of the merger cycles.
The first wave is indicated as the one with the most profound and
lasting effect on the structure of American industry, because this period
saw the emergence of powerful corporations that acquired monopoly control
and captured a substantial share of their markets. The most noticeable
Nelson's own compilation for 1895-1920, and Thorp [90] data for 1919-
1939 give substantially different numbers for 1919 and 1920 which are
the unique common years.
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TABLE 1: Mergers and Acquisitions in Manufacturing and Mining 1895-1968
Nelson Series
1895.-1919
Annual
Year Total
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
43
26
69
303
1,208
310
423
379
142
79
226
128
87
50
49
142
103
82
85
39
71
117
195
71
171
206
Thorp Series
1919-1939
Annual
Year Total
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1.937
1938
1939
FTC Series
1940-1968
Annual
Year Total
438
760
487
309
311
368
554
856
870
1,058
1,245
799
464
203
120
101
130
126
124
110
87
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
140
111
118
213
324
333
419
404
223
126
219
235
288
295
387
683
673
585
589
835
844
954
853
861
854
1,008
995
1,496
2,300
(Sources: Nelson [73], Federal Trade Commission Statistical Compilations
on mergers [92][93])
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Number
of
mergers
2,550U
2,400
2.250
2,100
1.950
1,800
1,650
1,500
1,350
1,200
1,050
900
750
600
450
300
150
18, 75
*The two series are not directly comparable.
FIGURE 1: Historical series for mergers and acquisitions of manufacturing
and mining firms. (Source: Reid [78]).
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examples are Standard Oil (which started an aggressive acquisition program
as early as 1872 to finally reach 90 percent market share of U.S. refining
capacity by the end of the last century), U.S. Steel (65 percent market
share), General Electric (virtual duopoly with Westinghouse), American Can
(70 percent market share), American Tobacco (90 percent market share),
DuPont (85 percent of the market), and many other companies still showing
large operations in present times (see Lynch [55], p. 21 and Sherer [84],
pp. 103-106). Markham [57, p. 180] has summarized the fundamental change
of American industry in this period by stating that "the conversion of
approximately 71 important oligopolistic and near-competitive industries
into near monopolies by merger between 1890 and 1904 left an imprint in
the structure of American economy that fifty years have not yet erased".
No unique factor can be cited as the cause for this first merger move-
ment dampening. Some reasons given are the exhaustion of merger opportuni-
ties at that time, the increasing number of failures in merger ventures
which concluded with some panic in the securities market, and the recession
of 1903-1904. Also, an important role is assigned in the termination of
this merger wave to the first successful challenge of a monopoly in a noto-
rious case. In fact, though the Sherman Act had been passed in 1890, it
was only in 1904 that the first antimonopoly precedent was set in the
Northern Security case."
The second merging wave, that culminated in 1929, "had a much less
dramatic effect in concentration" (Sherer [84], p. 107). Stigler [88,
p. 31] has described this period as one in which oligopolistic structures
are created rather than monopolistic ones. While horizontal concentra-
U.S. vs. Northern Securities Co., 1904 [94].
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tion was largely achieved in the first period,
... casual observation suggests that the wave of the
1920's was characterized by a much higher incidence
of vertical integration and conglomerate diversifica-
tion mergers than its predecessor... Although these
conglomerate and product line extension mergers no
doubt have some adverse effect on competition, it was
an effect qualitatively different from the predomi-
nantly horizontal mergers of the 1887-1904 era.
(Sherer [84], p. 107).
The lack of documentation on the second merger wave has conspired
against the realization of a more careful analysis, and there is some
controversy on the real proportions and characteristics it had. Eis [18]
has made a study that cast some doubt on Stigler's and Sherer's conclu-
sions when stating that:
- horizontal mergers were more important than vertical and conglomerate
mergers;
- the most active acquirers tend to be the large dominant firms, thus
suggesting a further increase in monopoly, power;
- antitrust laws were rather ineffective during this period.
Part of the difference between the first and second merger waves is
attributed to the legal climate prevailing at that time with regard to anti-
trust policy. Two legal bodies which could challenge the legality of
mergers had been passed: the already mentioned Sherman Act (1890), and the
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts (1914). They probably acted as
deterrents for some time, but a loophole was soon recognized in the Clayton
Act that made it inoperative until the dictation of the Celler-Kefauver Act
in 1950. On the other hand, the 1911 case of Standard Oil [86]
The Clayton Act is intended to prevent mergers that affect competition,
but its intial formulation banned only the acquisition of the stock of
another company, but not the direct acquisition of its assets. This is
the loophole that the Celler-Kefauver Act corrected.
-13-
interpreted the Sherman Act in terms of the rule of reason, which does
not prohibit the acquisition of monopoly power, but its exercise against
competitors. This tolerant view of monopolies was reversed only in 1945
in the Aloca case , in which it was determined that the mere existence
of monopoly power could be unlawful, though it were unexercised.
The Sherman Act is now sufficiently grounded as to make illegal any
further increase in market concentration.
As of 1972... if it is an exaggeration to say that there
is today a consensus among economists, lawyers, and
courts that horizontal acquisitions by leading firms
of genuine competitors have a strong presumption of
adverse net effect, it is not much of an exaggeration.
The Supreme Court has supported the government in
virtually every attack on a horizontal merger. To
be sure, there is disagreement on details such as how
large is a leading company, who is a genuine competitor,
what is the relevant market, etc., but these are matters
of detail, not of basic principle.
(Steiner [87], p. 51).
This view is reinforced with the 1968 dictation of merger guidelines by
the Department of Justice, indicating that the legality of any merger that
tended to increase concentration beyond well defined limits, would be
challenged in the courts. For example: in a highly concentrated market
(four-firm concentration ratio is 75 percent or more),
... the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers
between firms accounting for, approximately, the
following percentages of the market
Acqiring firm Acquired firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
(Thomson and Brady [89], pp. 186-187).
United States vs. Alcoa, 1945 [95].
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The role that antitrust laws are playing in the current merger wave is
nicely illustrated by Kraar [48, p. 192] when reporting the General
Electric-Utah International merger in Fortune. He indicates that a request
was sent to the Justice Department asking for "a review of the merger and
assurance that the government did not plan to fight it". This clearing was
obtained only after some changes were introduced in the contract between
the two merger parties. The final decision to merge was dependent on this
favorable opinion of the Justice Department. This Government clearing is a
step that has been preventively taken by many firms prior to their decision
to merge.
The increased chances of successfully challenging a merger that in
some way increases monopoly power, in all likelihood has been a powerful
incentive to favor the less discredited conglomerate route during the third
merger wave. Table 2 presents the wave of the late 1960's in the perspec-
tive of previous and later years. From this table, it may be observed that
conglomerates in general went over 80 percent during the late 1960's wave,
and unrelated conglomerates have been gaining importance continually, even
after the wave's peak.
The premises used by FTC to determine the type of a merger are worth-
while examining in more detail, because they tend to overemphasize the
level of conglomeration:
Larger mergers are classified into three basic categories:
Horizontal acquisitions involve firms that are direct com-
petitors in the same geographic market.
Vertical mergers link firms that had buyer-seller relation-
ships prior to acquisition.
Conglomerate mergers, essentially, are those mergers that are
neither horizontal nor vertical.
The conglomerate category can be subdivided into three classi-
fications:
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TABLE Z: Perspective of the Late 1960's Merger Wave (Large Acquisitions
in Manufacturing and Mining).
TYPE OF ACQUISITION
Horizontal
Vertical
Conglomerate
- Product extension
- Market extension
- Other (unrelated)
AVERAGES PER YEAR in
# of firms &
million, of dollars
AVERAGE SIZE PER
AQUISITION in
million of dollars
PRE-WAVE
1948-1962
Number of Assets
Firms (%)
25,2
14,2
60.6
38.8
6.0
15.8
34.7
(%)
25,5
16,1
57.4
36.0
5,5
15.9
1111.,5
WAVE
1966-1970
Number of
Firms (%)
7.9
9.1
83.0
53,2
2.4
27.4
142.2
32.1
Assets
(%)
11,4
6.7
81.9
40.4
6.7
34.7
8607.4
POST-WAVE
1972-1974
Number of
Firms (%)
28,3
10,9
60.9
26.1
4.9
29.9
60.5
Assets**
(%z)
26.3
8.2
65,5
23.4
8.6
33.4
.a
52.8
Large Acquisitions are those involving assets of $10 million or more
Data for 1974 are provisory.
(Sources: FTC, Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, Bureau
of Economics, Report 6-15-22, 1974 and Report 6-15-27, 1975) [26].
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Product extension mergers involve companies that are
functionally related in production and/or distribution,
but sell products which do not compete directly with one
another.
Market extension mergers link companies that manufacture the
same products, but sell them in different geographic markets.
Unrelated conglomerate mergers involve the consolidation of
two essentially unrelated firms.
(Federal Trade Commission [26], p. 15).
By defining as conglomerate any merger in which no clear horizontal or
vertical link is found, probably an upward bias in the level of conglomera-
tion is being reported. The most clear example is market extension mergers
that must be classified as horizontal when the whole country (instead of a
limited geographical region) is considered as the market place.
Nonetheless, even without considering market extension mergers, the
level of conglomeration peaked in the late 1960's, and the unrelated con-
glomerates class has been steadily rising, virtually to double its prewave
share of total mergers. To a large extent, this result is being shaped by
the enforcement of antitrust laws, because firms move on safer grounds when
the merger is of the conglomerate type, mainly when it is a pure conglo-
merate. Also, horizontal and vertical mergers being consumated do not seem
to be affecting competition in any important way. Sherer [84, p. 109]
expresses that if the tightened enforcement criterion of the antitrust law
continues, "we can confidently expect mergers to contribute virtually
nothing to the future growth of concentration within individual markets".
This expectation is corroborated by a rather limited study conducted by the
FTC [26, pp. 72-74] whose conclusion is that companies in the sample "did
not acquire substantial market position in new areas. Individual market
shares were less than 1 percent in 53.6 percent of the acquired product
classes... in 82 percent of the acquired product classes, the sample con-
-17-
glomerates had market shares of less than 5 percent" (market share is
defined as the ratio of firm shipments and industry shipments, where
industry is a 5-digit SIC sector).
If concentration is not the main concern with conglomeration, "super
concentration" is starting to be. This is the accumulation of excessive
economic power in a limited number of giant corporations, which is normally
measured as the percentage of total assets held by the largest 100 or
200 corporations. The argument is that
excessive concentration may endanger the social and political system of
the country. Steiner [87, p. 288] citing the then Attorney General of the
United States John Mitchell, writes: "I believe that the future vitality
of our free economy may be in danger because of the increasing threat of
economic concentration by corporate mergers... The danger that this super-
concentration poses to our economic, political and social structure cannot
be overestimated". Edwards [16, p. 42], in a 1965 testimony before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed this view about the
excessive competitive advantages of big firms:
A big firm has advantages over a smaller rival just
because it is big. Money is power. A big firm can
outbid, outspend, and outlose a small firm. It can
advertise more intensively, do more intensive and
extensive research, buy up the inventions of others,
defend its legal rights or alleged rights more
thoroughly, bid higher for scarce resources, acquire
the best locations and the best technicians and execu-
tives. If it overdoes its expenditures, it would absorb
losses that would bankrupt a small rival.
Galbraith [29] has devoted his book The Industrial State to the analysis
of big business power.
Despite the .inflamatory arguments against big business, the present
-18-
antitrust legislation does not appear to be mature enough to handle it.
If size per se is considered to be a problem, new legislation and new
legal precedents may be required. Size is not necessarily a problem
linked with mergers, but legislation of that sort could be a new deterrent
for merging. For the time being, superconcentration is only a speculative
subject, and does not seem to be playing an important role yet as a
deterrent of mergers.
-19-
CHAPTER 2: MOTIVES UNDERLYING MERGERS
A large number of causes have been mentioned in the literature as
potential stimuli for merging. Most of these causes have been observed
in different merger episodes playing roles of varying degrees of impor-
tance, depending on each particular set of circumstances encountered.
The multicausality of the merger phenomenon has conspired against the
development of a broadly accepted theory for their study, and has con-
fused the discussion around policy issues.
The purpose of this section is to review and briefly comment upon
the most commonly mentioned motives underlying mergers.
2.1 Acquisition of Monopoly Power
An important piece of the merger activity observed during the turn of
the century wave can be explained by the declared interest of firms in
acquiring sufficient control of the industry in which they operated. The
stabilization of revenues by avoiding price wars, and the securing of a
healthy profit margin moved firms into the merging path.
Though the acquisition of monopoly power is still a valid reason to
merge, its present importance is not easily discernible, because of the
more strict enforcement of antimonopoly laws, and the appearance of con-
glomerates as the most popular merger route. As opposed to horizontal and
vertical mergers, that can affect competition when reaching certain size,
conglomerates do not contribute significantly to increasing concentration
(Goldberg [30J).
Nonetheless, new and more subtle ways of restraining competition are
-20-
available to conglomerates, which are changing the focus of the antitrust
debate from pure concentration to bigness, subsidization (cash transfer),
reciprocity, exclusive dealings, mutual forbearence (the "live and let
live" doctrine among conglomerates that confront each other in many
markets), tied sales, discouraging de novo entrants (impact over potential
competition), macro-concentration, and economies of scale in public
relations (lobbying), litigation, access to capital markets, and research
(Steiner [87], Blair 19], Edwards [16]). Lorie and Halpern [54] discuss
these and other "allegedly harmful effects on conglomeration" taking a
different stand in the debate when concluding that "there is remarkably
little evidence that conglomerate mergers do very much harm or very much
good for that matter" (p. 165).
2.2 Attainment of Real Economies: The Synergistic Effect
Independent of the circumstancial reasons that may lead to the merging
of two firms, the presence of real economies will give to this decision a
seal of social respectability; because, from society's point of view, the
more efficient utilization of resources of the two firms combined Vill
generate a more desirable situation. Economies of scale and complementari-
ties in processes like production, distribution, marketing, administration,
and financing, may be sources for the attainment of real economies.
Horizontal and vertical mergers may be explained, in part, as a way
of getting scale economies and complementarity of operation, but two
reasons stand against this conclusion. First, the present market share of
large firms may sustain many plants of optimal scale (see the seminal
-21-
article by Bain [4] and his book [5]); and second, when two independent
plants are brought under common control, only marginal savings of 1/4
percent to 1 percent may be realized, because the design characteristics
of plants in operation are hard to modify. "All of this is very negative,
and rightly so, for there simply does not appear to be much opportunity to
realize plant scale economies through merger, unless an interaction effect
with monopoly elements exists" (Sherer [84], p. 117). Some evidence corro-
borating this conclusion has been added by many empirical studies that,
when looking at the economy from a macro perspective, have found a produc-
tion technology with constant returns to scale.
Other forms of scale economies have been recently commented upon, in
relation with the advantages of big over small business and the impact that
this assymetry may have on competition (lobbying, litigation, access to
capital market, and research). Archer and Faerber [3] have found a signi-
ficant negative relation between the cost of raising external common stock
capital and the size of the firm. (This relation is also obtained when
using size of the issue instead of size of the firm, because both
variables show a high correlation of .87). Jackson [44] finds little
support for the defense of mergers based on these kinds of efficiencies,
because the welfare loss by the increase in monopoly power is likely to
exceed the gain in efficiency.
Aside from scale considerations, complementarities in the production
and distribution process are more likely to generate real economies. This
assertion is suggested in a study conducted by Rumelt [80, pp. 150-151],
in which he concludes that:
-22-
.. the dominant-constrained and related-constrained
groups were unquestionably the best overall performers,
and both strategies are based upon the concept of
controlled diversity. Neither totally dependent upon
a single business nor true multi-industry firms, these
companies have strategies of entering only those busi-
nesses that build on, draw strength from, and enlarge
some central strength or competence. While such firms
frequently develop new products and enter new businesses,
they are loath to invest in areas that are unfamiliar to
management.
This statement is pointing at the superior performance attained by firms
that diversify in fields whose production, distribution, or marketing
activities are related with the main line of business.
Other forms of complementarity of resources usually mentioned in
relation to mergers are the following:
i) The use of managerial skills or advanced managerial technology that
a large corporation can make available to a small firm. Steiner [87,
pp. 186-187], citing a Brian Hindley study [37, pp. 185-221], advances the
conclusion that "an index of the ineffectiveness of the incumbent manage-
ments was very much higher for the targets than for the controls, and
thus provided the support for the hypothesis that mergers were transactions
in the market for corporate control". This conclusion is reinforced with
the FTC report on conglomerate mergers performance [26, p. 29], which indi-
cates that the median profit of the acquired firm was 76.5 percent of the
corresponding industry profit rate (profit is defined as net income after
taxes expressed as percent of stockholders' equity). Mandelker [56, p. 681]
also suggests that "our results for the acquired firms are consistent with
the hypothesis that mergers are a mechanism by which the market system
replaces incompetent management".
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ii) The access to sophisticated R&D, patent rights, or other exclusive
resource of the acquired firm that becomes accessible to the acquirer
through the merger.. This scarce resource gains in economic value, because
its potential commercialization can be fully realized with the capital
and general support that the acquirer makes available to
the acquired firm (Sherer [84], p. 118). The validity of this hypothesis
is strongly suggested by Mandelker [56, p. 685], when stating that:
There is no evidence to indicate that the acquiring
firms overpay and thus lose from mergers, as some
studies have previously concluded. However, the stock-
holders of acquired firms earn abnormal gains from
mergers. That is, most of the gains from mergers go
to the stockholders of the acquired firms. This
result may imply that these stockholders are operating
in a market in which they have some unique resources
whose potential gains are realized at the time of the
merger. Our results are consistent with economic gains
associated with mergers and with economic rent for the
acquired firms.
Another piece of evidence is given in the FTC study [26, p. 37], when
reporting that only 7 out of 99 R&D groups of the acquired companies were
affected by the merger. This pattern may be indicating the willingness
to make use of the exclusive knowledge, skills, and resources held by the
acquired company.
iii) The open flexibility to utilize slack resources of one firm in the
other's management or operation. Typical cases are cash transfers between
firms (from a cash-rich to a cash-hungry operation), and a more thoroughly
utilized debt capacity of the acquired firm. If these transfers in fact
generate an increased productivity of the resources, or if they are only
redistributional arrangements is something that may be debatable. None-
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theless, it is always possible to think of slack resources in one firm
being used in the other. Alternative examples are management transfers,
and joint utilization of some production, distribution, or marketing
facilities.
iv) The obsolescence of the acquiring firm, and the need for a powerful
incentive to modernize its operation has been indicated by Levinson [50,
p. 66] as a plausible reason for merger when stating:
Inevitable, organizations, like aging people, become
more stereotyped in their ways, less adaptable to
changing conditions, and less flexible in their efforts
to cope with their environments. In a word, they become
obsolescent. The executives, too, become obsolescent.
One way of obtaining enterprising new blood, they decide,
is to buy an enterprising organization.
An implication of this comment is that if a firm has decided to maintain
its main line of business, and this business reaches its maturity stage,
the firm may become obsolescent even without noticing it. All things may
be running smoothly until an aggressive new competitor comes in, the
product sold no longer has the favor of the consumer, or any other unfore-
seen event occurs that catches the firm by surprise. Unless the firm
maintains a degree of alertness, it may be thrown out of business, or its
market position been seriously damaged. Levinson is suggesting that one
way of regaining the enterprising spirit is by merging with a new organi-
zation that has it. It may be added that one way of avoiding the organi-
zation obsolescence, is to keep a changing atmosphere by adding new lines
of business.
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2.3 Other Economic Motives
Other incentives that two firms may have to merge are the realization
of private economies which are more related with an income redistribution,
than with the more efficient utilization of resources. Some examples
may serve to clarify this point.
i) The hallucination of the capital market with the acquisitive aggressive-
ness shown by the group called "go-go conglomerates", may have served the
purpose of over valuing the expectations of a merge, and increasing the
amplitude of the merger wave in the late 1960's. Lynch's [55] core argu-
ment in his thesis is the existence of a "feedback relationship" affecting
the market valuation due to the immediate impact that a merge may have on
earnings per share. This is an argument hard to support in the light of
current developments in corporate finance, though it may have played a
significant role in the late 1960's. Myers [69, pp. 638-640] calls this
result the bootstrapping effect,
ii) Changes in the capital structure of a poorly levered firm may produce
an extra revenue stemming from the tax shield of interest payments. In
the often mentioned FTC study [26, p. 40], borrowing practices are
reported to have changed in 70 out of 99 acquired companies, and partly
changed in 4 more. Whenever it was advantageous to borrow from head-
quarters (mainly for small related acquisitions), this was done.
iii) The increase in size of a firm may allow the attainment of larger
quantity discount in input prices, with the consequent cost reduction
(which may or may not be partly passed to consumers as a price reduction).
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iv) In some cases, the present structure of tax laws can generate powerful
incentives to merge. This is usually the case of small firms, closely
held by a family group, lightly traded in the market, lacking the required
managerial expertise to continue operating it, or simply short of interest
to do so. For a capitalized small firm the merger route is more convenient
than the dividend route to get the money out, because of the different tax
treatment given to capital gains. The application of inheritance laws can
give similar incentives to merger (Sherer [84], p. 115).
v) The carry over provision in the corporate tax law, can also provide
an incentive to merge under determined circumstances. This provision
allows future tax credits on losses incurred during the current accounting
period. If the cash flow of a firm can not absorb these credits, they will
be irretrievably lost. One way out of this problem is for the firm to
merge with another firm showing sufficient slack in its cash flow as to
make use of the tax credit.
Textron is often cited as the classic example of use of tax-
loss carryovers to finance a great diversification. Between
1952 and 1959 it paid only $634,000 in corporate income
taxes despite an aggregate net income of nearly $55 million:
an effective rate of 1.2 percent. During 1960 and 1961 this
rose to a rate of 21 percent, still well below the corporate
average.
(Steiner [87], p. 80).
In the very controversial acquisition of Carborundum Co. because of
the high premium paid, Kennecot cited a tax deduction as a benefit obtained
from the merger that might otherwise have been lost or deferred (The New
York Times, Friday, December 9, 1977, p. Dll).
vi) Merging with a competitor can produce important savings by the
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elimination of self cancelling promotional efforts (in addition to the
extra monopoly power that may be gained), but this is a controversial issue.
vii) The public release of accounting reports by a firm has an impact in
the capital market, because that information affects the expectations that
security holders have with regard to the firm's value. On the other hand,
it is a well known fact that firms do have certain leeway for presenting
their financial statements. Some accounting practices can generate, at
a first glance a more optimistic outlook than the real situation, and
produce wrong expectations in the market (at least in the short run).
Steiner [87, pp. 96-127] indicates that the accounting practices prevailing
in the late 1960's may have fostered the merger wave at that time. See
also the testimonies of Mueller, Turner, and Weinberger before the U.S.
Congress [91], strongly recommending the modification of existing
practices in financial reports.
2.4 Diversification of Risk
A broad spectrum of business will generate a smooth financial opera-
tion of the firm, because random fluctuations of cash streams will tend to
cancel each other. A diversified portfolio of activities will reduce the
overall risk, will make the company less vulnerable to a downturn in one
business sector, and will bring added flexibility to mobilize resources
among different units of the firm. As Forbes [27, p. 63] puts it: "And
that is the continuing appeal of conglomeration: the comforting contra-
clyclicality of a more broadly diversified earning base, and the increased
opportunity to shift capital to where the return is".
-28-
The stability thus obtained has clear benefits to the managerial team,
but the benefits derived by stockholders are not clear, because they can
get the same diversification effects by transactions in the capital market.
Therefore, financial theory in its current form predicts that div6rsifica-
tion per se has a zero market value (see for example Levy and Sarnat [51]).
The fact is that firms do diversify, and that the degree of diversi-
fication has been growing (see FTC [26, pp. 63-65]). Berry [8] makes an
empirical analysis to determine if large corporations are increasing its
degree of diversification, and if the merger activity is affecting (or
being affected by) the rate of growth. He detects an increase in diversi-
fication between 1960 and 1965, but the relative sizes of the new business
lines are small compared with the traditional activity of the firm. The
other observation made by Berry is that firms tend to diversify within
the 2-digit industry group, thus maintaining some sort of relation with
the principal activity. (He suggests that "that kind of diversification
is only one small step removed from consolidation of market through
horizontal acquisition".)
Spreading the risk of the firm is a contended reason for diversifi-
cation, as is illustrated in the Kraar [48, pp:. 187-188] report in
Fortune on the General Electric-Utah International merger:
Littlefield [Utah's chairman], his wife, and their
children held shares worth about $50 million... He
belongs to one of 'the families' - the
innumerable descendents of Utah International's founders
- who still owned 40 percent of the stock... While
Utah's mineral interests were highly varied, its dispro-
portionately large investment in Australia greatly
concentrated the risks... 90 percent of its earnings came
from a single commodity in a single country, metal-
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lurgical coal from Australia... Littlefield urgently
wanted to diversify... For several years, Littlefield
explained to the G.E. Chairman, he had hoped to diversify
by acquisition. But Utah's lean management team, superb
as it was at mining, knew practically nothing about other
industries.
It is apparent from this case that if stockholders do not hold a
diversified portfolio, they will benefit from diversification by the firm.
This is likely to be the case of managers, who normally own or control
a sizeable amount of shares on their own companies (see Table 3).
Lynch [55, p. 79] reports for his sample of acquisitive conglo-
merates that directors owned an average of 11 percent of the outstanding
shares, and chief executives an additional 4 percent. For chief executives
the market value of shares represented 17.5 years of average salary.
If trading of these important fractions of shares is not fluid in
the market, this will leave the most important decision makers of the firm
with an unbalanced portfolio, thus stimulating internal diversification.
Some reasons that may stand against free trading of these shares are:
- Loss of control in a family business (Utah's case).
- Institutional regulations by S.E.C. that forbid the use of internal
information. (Rockwell's chairman sold his shares before the decision
that turned down the B-1 bomber, and he has been accused under these
provisions.)
- The negative signal to the market when a big piece of stock is sold
will usually render a lower average price than the current price of
shares (Scholes [81]).
Another reason that will prevent stockholders in general from having
a perfectly diversified portfolio is the cost of transactions. They may
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TABLE 3: Shares Controlled by Chief Executives of Large Corporations
Big 10 industrials
Big 10 commercial banks
Big 10 retailing co.
Big 10 transportation co.
Big 10 utilities
Big 10 conglomerates
Average shares
owned/controlled
by value (1970)
16,218,000
2,075,000
1,442,000
188,000
104,000
5,639,000
Shares owned/controlled
Average salary per year
48.0
10.1
6.1
1.1
0.6
18.6
Shares owned/controlled expressed as years of average salary.
(Source: Reid [781, p. 53).
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provide an incentive for firms to diversify internally in order to
eliminate these costs to stockholders.
Other lines of reasoning to justify internal diversification are the
increased likelihood of future survivability, and the added flexibility
in conducting the firm. Survivability is a primary goal for managers and
people working in the firm, though it is not given any extra value in
the stock price according to financial theory (unless bankruptcy costs are
introduced).
With regard to flexibility in the firm conduction, additional benefits
are derived when having a diversity of business with different timing in
their cash inflows and outflows, because cash may be transferred from a
cash-generating to a cash-hungry division, without recurring to the capital
market, which may become very expensive and restrictive (brokerage fees,
interest expenses, capital shortages). The company has created a sort of
internal capital market operation, with no transaction costs, and with full
control over it. This is in itself an approach to strategic planning of
business firms, which the interested reader may further explore in Hax
and Majluf [35].
2.5 Increase the Size of the Business. The empire building motive.
Managers' objectives do not necessarily coincide with shareholders'
objectives, and instead of maximizing shareholders' wealth (equivalent to
maximizing profits in the theory of the firm), managers may be pursuing
other goals. A lot of theoretical and empirical research has been done
in this area, and it is not the purpose of this paper to review that work.
-32-
One alternative to profit maximization that has some popularity is
the assumption that firms maximize sales subject to a minimum profit con-
straint (Baumol [6]). This hypothesis corresponds to size maximization,
when size is defined as total sales revenues, as it is usually done by
business magazines (Fortune, Forbes, for example). As support of this
tentative hypothesis, it has been found that managers' compensation is more
related to total sales than to total profit, though the evidence is some-
what clouded by the difficulty in getting a stable profit measure.
Williamson's work [101, 102, 103] gives credibility to sales maximization
as a plausible objective in periods of favorable economic situations, as
a way to create a managerial slack that may be disposed of under more
stringent conditions. He assumes that managers maximize a personal
utility function in which profit and slack variables are present.
A mechanism for continuously maintaining the stockholders' interests
within the managers' perspective, is compensating managers with stock
options, for making sure that they favor themselves when trying to favor
stockholders in general. Nonetheless, managers may pursue an aggressive
pattern of growth for getting size related advantages like quantity dis-
counts, and greater negotiation capabilities to confront the government,
suppliers, competitors, and others. Also, personal reasons as prestige,
other forms of pecuniary compensation, ambition, power, showing own capa-
bilities, and other self-fulfillment needs may justify the managers look-
ing for size rather than for profit maximization.
Mergers are a way for substantially increasing the size of the firm
in a short time span, and may be an attractive strategic alternative for
accomplishing the growth target of the firm. Moreover, the initial outlay
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required for acquiring an ongoing concern may be lower than for raising a
new business; and, certainly, merging is faster than building from scratch.
The most acid critic of the managerial motivations behind the merger
activity has been Reid [74]. He presents some data for the 500 largest
industrial firms in 1961 and concludes that sales growth goes up with the
increase in merger activity, but profit growth goes down dramatically.
On the other hand, Weston and Mansingka [98] obtain a slightly superior
profit performance (measured as return on equity) of conglomerates over
a control group, thus contradicting Reid's claims. Some controversy
developed around this issue, with Reid's answer [76] and later inter-
changes (Weston and Mansinghka [99], and Reid [77]; Conn [15], and
Weston and Mansinghka [100]. Reid [78] has recently sustained his original
position in a new book.). The controversy is not settled, and Steiner
[87, p. 195] has argued that the two studies may have provided "complemen-
tary rather than conflicting evidence", if assuming a multiple attribute
objective function.
A more neutral view of the impact of conglomeration is obtained from
a Forbes (January 1976) report indicating that the median return of equity,
as well as the median sales growth for conglomerates, are identical to
the all industry medians (11.6 percent and 10.9 percent, respectively for
the five year period 1971-1975). This suggests that conglomerates behave
like a well diversified portfolio of the industries, being neither better
nor worse than the average. A similar finding is reported by Melicher and
Rush [59], in a comparison of conglomerate and non-conglomerate firms
operating in the same basic industries for the 1965-1971 period. Though
financial strategies, and risk-levels are different, operating profit is
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fully comparable between the two groups.
A prudent conclusion from this contradictory set of evidence is to
require a more careful look at the profitability of conglomerates.
2.6 Promotional and Speculative Profits
Brokerage fees and the compensation going to the promoters of a merger
have been reported to be substantial in the first merger save. In the con-
solidation of United States Steel Corporation,
... approximately 150 million of the stock of the corpora-
tion, nearly one-seventh of the total, was issued,
directly or indirectly, to promoters and underwriters.
The American Can Co. was formed with an authorized
capitalization of $82 million, and of this amount it is
estimated that promoters and underwriters received $17
million or approximately one fifth.
(Lynch [55], p. 23).
It is suggested also by Markham [57, p. 163] that in the second merger
wave, as well as in the first one, promotional profits played a fundamental
role in the rise and failure of mergers. The crude maneuvers used by that
time have been forbidden with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933,
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which regulate the disclosure of
all information related to a new securities issuing, including the promo-
ters' remuneration.
New and more sophisticated ways of reaping speculative profits can
always be invented, and the P-E ratio game of the late 1960's may be one
of them. Nevertheless, the feeling is today that people learn, and that
promotional profits should not play a major role in the future, at least
for explaining a long-run, more stable merger activity.
At present, promoters are acting as arbitrators in merger episodes.
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They buy shares at a relatively low price, and have a profit or loss
depending on how the merger consolidation develops. Vartan reports in the
New York Times (September 20, 1977) [96]
... the biggest pot at the end of the rainhow saw
arbitragers recently turn a profit estimated at $30
million to $40 million in the bidding duel for
Babcock and Wilcox [a successful merger],.. computed
on the basis of yesterday's closing price for
Gerber, potential losses for the arbitrage fraternity
could amount to as much as $10 million to $15 million,
according to several professional arbitragers
[unsuccessful merger].
In the same edition of The New York Times (September 20, 1977),
Cole [14] comments on the withdrawal of Anderson Clayton tender offer for
Gerber, and the immediate deep drop in Gerber's stock price from 34 3/8
to 28 1/4. The Wall Street community, holding "an estimated 500,000
Gerber shares on which they expected to make a profit", filed a suit
against Gerber looking for damages compensation. The stockholders charged
that Gerber officers were "motivated by interests in preserving their own
offices and emoluments, and engaged in 'deceptive, fraudulent, and
manipulative' acts in opposing the Anderson Clayton take over."
This episode seems to indicate that brokers can exercise some leverage
for successfully completing a merge once it has been announced, because
they represent an important group of stockholders at the time of negotia-
ting the merger. A more subtle question is if they can ignite a tender
offer for a company after buying a sizeable fraction of its stock at
depressed prices.
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CHAPTER 3: MODELS OF MERGER. SOME THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL WORK REVIEWED
Many attempts have been made to capture the merger phenomenon in a
simple model. A representative sample of the theoretical and empirical
work pursuing this end will be reviewed here. Some of these studies have
have been partly presented already when discussing motives for merger,
but they are now repeated within the context of this exposition.
The main objective In this chapter is to uncover the fundamental lines
of thought guiding the research on the merger subject, evaluate existing
studies under that perspective, and determine in which way they may be
complemented or modified to make them more responsive to current thinking
in the area.
To accomplish this end, the merger studies will be loosely organized
in the following classes:
- empirical determination of mergers profitability;
- mergers as a result of manageyial decisions;
- financial explanations for coriglomerates;
- studies on merger waves.
3.1 Empirical Determiniation of Mergers Profitability
The main body of research in mergers is aimed at determining their
profitability, either to prove or disprove the existence of net gains,
to understand the causes behind that result, and to evaluate the social
desirability of an unrestricted merger policy.
Different research lines have been pursued in the profitability studies
of the after World War II merger wave, some with more intensity than others.
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The basic design utilized in all of them considers the selection of the
following components:
- a study period;
- a sample of all mergers in that period;
- different profitability measures; and
- a benchmark to compare these profitability measures against it.
The profitability measures have been selected either from the firm's
financial statements, or the capital market parameters. With regard to
the benchmark selection, there are many different criteria utilized, but
they can be broadly defined as:
- merging firms before vs. after the merger (Segall [821);
- mergers vs. similar sample of non-merging firms (Kelly [47],.Hogarty [41],
Gort and Hogarty [32], Weston and Mansinghka [98], Lev and Mandelker [49],
Melicher and Rush [59][60]);
- market value of mergers vs. forecasted market value of participants
(Shick [83], Halpern [34], Mandelker [56], Ellert [181).
These works are now reviewed, highlighting those ideas that seem to
be the most relevant in them.
3.1.1 Merging firms before vs. after the merger
The Segall Study [82]
Segall discusses three popular hypotheses for merging: "firms merge
to achieve monopoly (or oligopoly) positions, to grow to an optimum size
or to reduce risk through diversification" (pp. 17-18). But, he argues,
the first two are not sufficient to explain interindustry mergers, and
diversification may not be a desirable goal to stockholders, because
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"some may prefer the possibility of a very large gain even at the risk of
exposure to a very large loss", and also because "stockholders can get
all the diversification they want at a relatively low cost through adjust-
ment of their personal portfolios without the intervention of the firm"
(p. 18).
Segall elaborates also on other reasons for merging like the notion
of idle or excess capacity ("merging may be an effective way of obtaining
output from otherwise idle or poorly utilized resources" [p. 18]), the
possibility of bargains ("stockholders may benefit because their managers
may discover undervalued or perhaps poorly managed firms which may be
acquired at bargain prices" [p. 19]), and the exhaustion of opportunities
for internal investment (the "firm tries to acquire other firms which do
have investment opportunities" [p. 191).
From examining all these reasons against existing evidence, Segall
concludes that "there is no single hypothesis which is both plausible and
general and which shows promise of explaining the current merger movement.
It may be that there are as many causes of mergers as there are mergers"
(p. 19).
Segall measures the profitability of mergers by using a sample of
58 mergers consumated during the 1950 through 1959 period, and such that
the assets of the acquired firm were at least ten percent of the assets
of the acquiring firm. The index used to measure profitability "is the
rate of discount that equates the present value of cash dividends plus the
price of the stock at the end of the period in question to the price of
the stock at the beginning of the period" (p. 24).
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By comparing profitability in different time periods before and after
the merging date, Segall concludes that "a policy of merging does not
yield substantial profits for the acquiring firms".
3.1.2 Mergers vs. a similar sample of non-merging firms
The main problem with Segall's study is that the impact of mergers
is confounded with any environmental or internal changes occuring after
the merging date. In the group of studies to be exposed, this condition
is controlled by choosing as benchmark a sample of non-merging firms
similar to the merging ones.
The Kelly Study [47] Paited comparison of large merging
vs. non-merging firms.
In order to uncover the relative advantages of merger, if any, Kelly
makes a paired comparison of 20 "merging", and 20 "non-merging" firms
selected from the 500 largest industrial firms and the 50 largest merchan-
dising firms as ranked by sales volume in the period of 1946-1960.
A merging firm is defined as one with over 20 percent increase in sales due
to merging activities. A non-merging firm has less than 5 percent increase.
The parameters chosen to perform the paired comparisons are:
- market price
- price-earning ratio (as a percentage of Standard and Poor price-earning
ratio for 425 industrial corporations)
- earnings per share
- rate of return
- capital turnover
- profit margin.
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The conclusions obtained may be summarized as follows:
(1) The form of investment, external expansions (via
mergers) versus internal expansion, does not have a
significant impact on profitability, whether judged
in terms of market valuation or rate of return.
(2) Merger-acquired earnings are accorded higher
price-earnings ratios by the market than the earn-
ings of nonmerging companies [not a clean conclusion
because of sampling problems].
(3) Merging companies are superior in improving
capital turnover.
(4) The form of expansion does not have a significant
impact on the profit margin. That is, there is no
evidence of increased economies or diseconomies in
the route of growth via mergers. This, however, may
not be true for conglomerate merger companies.
([47], pp. 4636-4637).
These conclusions should be tempered by the fact that internal data,
based on accounting procedures of firms, are not fully consistent and com-
parable, and it is hard to get reliable information beyond the published
financial statements. Also, Kelly's pairing procedure is somewhat subjec-
tive and liable to criticism. Finally, in the analysis of market prices,
he doesn't make corrections for different dividend policies being followed.
The Hogarty Study [41) Merging firms vs. corresponding
industry average.
The two most immediate objectives in this study are: to determine if
acquiring corporations are more or less profitable than non-merging firms,
and if there is synergy in mergers.
Hogarty examines the performance of 43 active acquirers drawn from
the 1965 edition of Moody's Industrial Manual, and compares it with the
average observed for the industry to which the acquirer belongs. Firms
included in the sample "have experienced at least a 20 percent growth in
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sales and assets due to merger, must have made acquisitions of publicly
held firms, and must have completed most of its acquisitions by 1962"
([42], p. 4647), The sample contained firms spread over many different
industries and assets from $2 to $700 million.
To measure the "actual increase in the wealth of the shareholders",
he defines an "investment performance index" including capital gains and
cash dividends paid. Comparing these indices with the corresponding
average for the 3-digit SIC industry, he concludes that
... only 14 of the 43 acquiring firms had an invest-
ment performance superior to that of their respective
industries. Clearly, active acquirers are less
profitable than ordinary firms, at least in the long
run. This result implies that stockholders do not
generally benefit from active acquisition programs;
in fact, relative to similar opportunities, they lose
on the average.
([42], pp. 4648-4649).
To determine the presence of synergy in a merger formation, Hogarthy
compares the profit of the combined firms with the aggregated profits
separately forecasted for each of the firms entering the combination. He
assumes that profit growth for the individual firms follows the average
growth in its particular industry. Profit is measured as net income before
taxes,
With this procedure one could say that if actual
postmerger profits exceeded predicted postmerger
profits, then the combined firm had attained synergy.
Similarly, if predicted profits exceeded actual
profits, then the merger (series of acquisitions)
was unsuccessful.., only 20 of the 43 firms obtained
synergy from their acquisition programs. This sort
of result is hardly indicative of widespread opportunity
for synergy. Since these 43 firms were, prior to
merger, healthy, typical representatives of their
respective industries, it seems fair to conclude that
synergy through merger is beyond the reach of the
ordinary industrial firm.
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([42], pp. 4649-4650).
A similar conclusion is obtained when synergy is measured in terms
of sales increases versus expected sales increases.
The Gort and Hogarty Study [32] Distribution of gain and
losses between buyers and sellers.
In an extension of the Hogarthy study recently discussed, Gort and
Hogarthy "examine the distribution of gain and losses from merger between
buyers and sellers".
They conclude that:
(1) Mergers, on the average, have an approximately
neutral effect on the aggregate worth of firms that
participate in them;
(2) the owners of acquiring firms lose on the average;
and
(3) the owners of acquired firms gain on the average.
([32], p. 175).
The key variable explaining this distribution of costs and benefits is the
"premium over the market price that sellers received in the terms of the
merger" ([32], p. 177).
From examining these results, Gort and Hogarthy suggest three plausi-
ble reasons to explain the merger activity. First, mergers are a form of
high risk investment that can yield a substantial premium for the buyer.
Second, discrepancies in valuation may exist between buyers and sellers,
with buyers having the more optimisitic expectations. And third,
the separation of ownership and managerial control, allows managers to
take decisions not always directed toward improving the shareholders'
well being.
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The Weston and Mansinghka Study [98] Conglomerates vs.
non-conglomerates.
The main objective of this study is to determine the performance of
conglomerate firms. The period covered by the study is from 1958 to 1968.
A firm is defined as conglomerate if it satisfies two requirements; first,
20 percent or more of its increase in assets during 1960-1968 is accounted
for by external acquisitions, and second, it is broadly diversified (it
participates in either 10 or more 3-digit SIC industry categories or 5 or
more 2-digit SIC categories).
The performance of conglomerates is compared with two control samples
randomly selected from the Fortune 500 Industrial Companies list, and
the combined directory of large corporations (500 industrial, 250 non-
industrial, published in Fortune 1968) respectively.
They compare growth, earnings, and economic performance of conglo-
merates and control firms, concluding that:
(1) The conglomerate firms out-performed samples of
other firms or broader groups of firms on all of the
growth measures.
(2) The earnings performance measured by the ratio of
net income to net worth is somewhat higher for conglo-
merate firms, but the difference is not statistically
significant. This somewhat higher return on net worth did
not result from the differentially higher price/earnings
ratio of conglomerate firms in mergers, because on average
price/earnings ratios of conglomerate firms were not
significantly different from the price/earnings ratio
of other samples of firms. The higher return or net
worth of the conglomerate firms resulted from the larger
and increasing percentage of leverage employed by them
duting the decade of the 1960's.
(3) The earnings rates of the conglomerate firms in the
late 1950's or the early 1960's were significantly lower
than the earnings on total assets or net worth-plus-long
term debt for other groups of firms. However, by 1968
no significant differences in earnings performance were
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observed. It appears, therefore, that an important economic
function of conglomerate firms has been the raising of the
profitability of firms with depressed earnings to the
average of industry generally... Therefore, the most appro-
priate test of the earnings performance of conglomerate firms
is not superior earnings performance, but whether they were
able to achieve at least average earnings performance.
The distinctive conclusion from this study is the suggestion that
conglomerate may provide a viable alternative to raise the poorly
performing firms to the industry average.
The Lev and Mandelker Study [49] Pairing merging and non-
merging firms in the same 4-digit SIC-industry.
Lev and Mandelker try to determine the profit performance of firms
engaged in mergers exceeding 10 percent of its size in the period 1952-
1963. A sample of 69 acquiring firms has been selected, and each of them
has been paired with a firm of similar size in the same 4-digit SIC
industry.
Several profitability measures are used for the 5 years prior to the
merge and the 5 years following it. They show that acquiring firms were
somewhat more profitable than non-merging firms, but the extent of this
difference is subject to considerable uncertainty.
The examination of other alledged consequences of mergers is also
negative:
... within the limits of our sample size we cannot point
to any clear direction of effect of merger on riski-
ness of the acquiring firm, on its growth rate in the
postmerger years, or on the financial structure, percentage
of income taxes paid, and liquidity position of the
acquiring firms
([49], p. 102).
This direct pairing technique has the difficulty of being virtually
impossible to find a truly matching pair by controlling all variables
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except merger activity. For this reason, the results may be distorted
by the influence of unnoticed hidden factors.
The Melicher and Rush Studies [59], [60] Conglomerates vs.
non-conglomerates.
In these papers, the performance of conglomerates is examined under
a wide array of indices related with profitability, leverage, and market
characteristics.
A sample of 45 conglomerate firms for which data are available, is
selected from the Fortune's list of the 1000 largest industrial firms
during 1971. A conglomerate is defined as a broadly diversified firm with
a large percentage of growth attained by acquisition.
A comparable sample of 45 non-conglomerate firms is also selected,
matching the main field of activity of conglomerates in 1960 and 1971.
By comparing the performance of conglomerate and non-conglomerate
samples in the 1965-1971 period, Melicher and Rush conclude that:
(1) While the conglomerate firms achieved a level of
performance comparable to the considered non-conglomerate
firms, their performance was not at all outstanding.
(2) The two groups of firms were found to be highly
comparable in terms of their operating profitability
characteristics. [However, conglomerates are more highly
levered, and have a lower price-earnings ratio.]
(3) The analysis of market performance characteristics
also indicates substantial comparability between
the two groups of companies.
The basic conclusion is that "conglomerates were shown to be no
better or worse off than those firms that remained in the basic industries
that the conglomerates abandoned".
-46-
3.1.3 Market value of merger vs. forecasted market value of participants
An implicit assumption is being made when comparing the performance
of mergers or conglomerates against a group of firms that has not engaged
in diversification or acquisition plans. The assumption is that if the
firms linked to the merger had continued as independent companies, their
performance would be identical (or at least similar) to the firms in the
reference group.
The set of studies to be presented next consider the value of the
firms in the capital market as an unbiased estimate of their worth. The
impact of merging is determined by comparing the market value of the
merger against the forecasted market values of the participant firms as
independent companies. The time of comparison has to be chosen as to
fully capture the reflection of the merger decision in the firms' market
values. An important consideration in these studies is the inclusion
of risk differences in the valuation of firms.
The Shick Study [83] Return to acquiring firms in the
capital market.
Shick tries to determine if mergers increase the return on invest-
ment to shareholders of acquiring firms. He observes that many studies
presented in the literature "yield the general conclusion that mergers
do not increase the returns to shareholders" ([83], p. 496), but these
studies are distorted by two factors: random fluctuations affecting the
valuation of the firm at the time of the merger, and the procedure
selected to forecast returns had the merger not occurred.
Shitk proposes the following relation to measure the change in
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returns produced by a merger:
N N
P + Z D P' + Z D'N t N t
t=O t=0
P0 P0
where:
ARN = change in return N years after the merger
P0 = price of stock in year 0 (before the merger)
PN = price of stock in year N (after the merger)
Dt = dividend in year t (after the merger)
PN,D' = similar meaning to PN' Dt , but if the merger had not
occurred.
An important assumption in this model is that the capital market registers
the impact of the merger after its realization. This implies that in
year 0 no information related to the merger is reflected in the stock price.
The following considerations are made for evaluating this change in
return:
(1) Prices at any time t may be affected by an unbiased random error:
Pt = PtCt
where:
Pt = actual price of a share
Pt = "calculated" price
Ct = random error with expected value of 1
(2) This "calculated" price is obtained from dividends, growth expecta-
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tions, and special investment opportunities according to the following
three relations:
A DOp = k-br L
1 1+br 2, 1 s 20 0  (l+brL
1 3 84 aT5kbr 0(l+br 3 (+h) (1+ ) 5A 6
L 0 L
where:
A
P = calculated price
D0 = estimated dividends
D0 = actual dividends
k = investors' required rate of return
brL = dividends growth rate
rL = return on normal investment opporunities
rS = return on special investment opportunities
h = leverage
a/A = earnings variability
A = firm size
=i  empirical coefficients.
By applying this proposed methodology to only four cases in the chemical
industry, Shick finds two successful and two unsuccessful mergers, but he
is unable to generalize his results to all the population of mergers.
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The Halpern Stfudy 341 Merger returns vs. capital market
returns. Existence and distribution of premiums in a merger.
The objective in Halpern's study is to determine the premiums obtained
by the two parties involved in a merger.
The gain to a company in a merger can be estimated as
the change in the total value of the equity between the
date the merger was first considered (the base date) and
the actual merger date; the measured premium is this gain
divided by the total value of the equity at the base date.
([34], p. 554).
There are two problems to get these values; first defining a base date in
which no merger related information has affected prices yet, and second,
discounting changes in value due to general market influence rather than
to the merger.
If the merger date is defined as time 0 and the base date as t
months prior to it, the total gain for the merger may be obtained as:
Total gain = Gain to buyer + Gain to seller
= (Change in market price of buyer between t
and 0) + (Change in market price of seller
between t and 0).
In algebraic terms:
GT = GB + GS
GB = SB,0 - SB,t*
= nB (PB,O-PB,t*)
GS = SS,0 - SS,t*
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= s(Ps,o0 Ps,t*)
= ns(RSPB,0 -P,t*)
where:
GT = total gain from the merger
GB = gain to buyers
GS = gain to sellers
SBO,;SB,t* = market value of buyers at times 0 and t
SS,0;SS,t* = market value of sellers at times 0 and t
nB,nS = number of shares of buyers, sellers
PB,0;PB,t* = price per share of buyers at times 0 and t
PS,0 ;P,t, = price per share of sellers at times 0 and t
RS = exchange rate = number of shares of B exchanged for
each share of S.
To determine these gains involved in a merger episode, it is necessary
to estimate the price changes between 0 and t . But, in order to separate
solely the impact of the merger, Halpern discounts price fluctuations
explainable by the general movement of prices in the market or in the
A A
industry. He defines PBt* and PSt* at the base date, which are a fore-
cast of the prices for buyers' and sellers' shares respectively, condi-
tioned on the general economic and industrial conditions prevailing at the
time of the merger (time 0).
Using the same nomenclature as before, he adjusts the gains defined
as follows:
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A A A
GT GB + GS
A A
G = nB (PB,-PB,t)
A A
GS= nS(RSPB,O0 S,t*)
The premiums for buyers and sellers are defined as total gain over
total equity at the base date. These premiums are:
P -P *
^ B,O B,t
B P Bt*
A RS B 0 -Pst*
S P St*
The empirical problem is now reduced to find a proper definition of
* A
t , and an unbiased estimate of the adjusted prices PB t* and PSt*. To
get t , Halpern uses the "residual technique" of Fama, Fisher, Jensen,
and Roll [24], and he finds that around the 7th month prior to the merger,
some influence on residuals is detected, therefore t is chosen equal to 8,
but a sensitivity analysis is done to determine the influence of this
choice in the conclusions. Adjusted prices are obtained through regres-
sions relating the relative change in prices of a given security for a
period of k-months with the correspQnding changes in the market and
industry prices. The parameter k is chosen equal to the base date for
each merger case.
Halpern finds a total gain of $27.35 million for an average merger,
distributed in $14.73 million for the larger company and $12.62 for the
smaller one. The number of situations in which a negative gain is detected
is 24 out of 77 (31%), this fraction being higher for larger firms (29
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out of 77 or 38%) than for smaller ones (17 out of 77 or 22%). In any
case, "the gain to both larger and smaller firms (and the total adjusted
gains) appear to be significantly positive. Therefore, as measured by
market price behavior, the larger company does not give away everything
in a merger" ([34], p. 570).
When dividing these total gains by the size of the companies to get
the premiums, large firms appear to receive a substantially smaller premium
than small firms. Nonetheless, this difference is only the reflection of
size in the almost even distribution of total gains generated by the
merger.
Halpern's two suggestions to explain merger gains are: "first, it is
possible that both larger and smaller companies have some unique factors,
but the rents cannot be captured in a merger with any company", but in
a merger of two companies that "fit" together (synergy). "Second, it is
possible that the management of one of the companies is very poor and a
merger would replace the inferior management" ([34], p. 573).
The Mandelker Study [56] Merger returns vs. capital market
returns. Existence and distribution of premiums in a merger.
As many other empirical studies, Mandelker's constitutes an attempt
to determine if abnormal positive or negative gains are associated with
mergers, and the way in which they are shared between the acquiring and
acquired firm in case they exist. As in the Halpern study recently dis-
cussed [34], the fundamental difference in this effort is that the analysis
is done from the perspective of capital market theory, thus associating to
each return generated in the merger operation its corresponding risk.
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Under this framework, a return is considered normal (or fair) if it is
in agreement with the return in the capital market for an investment of
similar risk.
A second objective in Mandelker's study is to determine if the capital
market is efficient with respect to mergers; that is to say, if the infor-
mation on mergers is reflected immediately in the stock prices of the
merging firms.
The study includes all mergers consumated during the November 1941
to August 1962 period, for which data on price of securities were available.
More extensive periods were used to estimate the relevant market variables
(February 1926 to June 1968). The empirical model used is consistent with
the capital-assets pricing model.
The conclusions derived are the following:
- There are economic gains associated with mergers.
- Most of the gains from mergers go to stockholders of acquired firms.
They earn, on the average, a total abnormal return of 14% in the seven
months prior to the merger consumation.
- Acquiring firm seems to gain normal returns from the merger. There is
no indication "that the acquiring firms overpay and thus lose from
mergers"; on the contrary, "there is some indication that the stock-
holders of the acquiring firms may be gaining somewhat from mergers"
([56], p. 685).
- The results observed are consistent with an efficient capital market,
because "anticipating price movements preceding the effective date of
merger exhaust all valuable information in mergers. Thus, the stock
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prices of the constituent firms at the time of merger already reflect
all economic gains expected from the acquisition" ([56], pp. 685-686).
The Ellert Study [18] Return of mergers challenged by Government
"This paper examines the risk and return characteristics of 205 large
corporations whose merger activities were challenged by the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice of the Federal Trade Commission over
the period 1950-1972". Also, "comparisons are made of the returns realized
by stockholders in companies whose merger activity was not challenged
under the antitrust law" ([18], p. 715).
The objective in Ellert's study is to determine if the market recog-
nizes some abnormal profits prior to the merger due to expected mono-
polistic gains. If this is the case, the successful prevention of the
merger by the Government should lower the market price of the company;
otherwise, the merger is supposed to be relatively benign in its anti-
competitive effects.
The methodology used is the analysis of the time series of residuals
from a two-factor market model, which is the same one used by Halpern [34],
and Mandelker [56], and that has been suggested and applied in Fama,
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll [24], and in Fama and MacBeth [23]. Under this
methodology, abnormal profit (or losses) correspond to the residual return
that cannot be explained by the two-factor asset pricing model. The
monthly return should oscillate around 0 if no abnormal profits (or
losses) are obtained, or be consistently above (or below) it otherwise.
This drift out of 0 is empirically measured as the cumulative average
residual, whose statistical significance can be appropriately tested.
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The results obtained indicate that firms whose merger activity is
challenged have an abnormal return of 23.3 percent in the 100 months (8+
years) prior to the month in which the complaint is filed. The interest-
ing thing is that 16.6 percent of this return already has been obtained
4 years prior to the month of challenge. At the month of complaint there
is a significant loss of 1.83 percent. During the period of litigation,
which lasts for 34.1 months on average, there is a loss of 1.9 percent,
which is not significant. After the settlement, there is a loss of 1.6
percent in four years, which is not significant either. This adjustment
takes place in the 5 months after the settlement.
Ellert finds also that, after the month of complaint, there is no
significant difference between the returns of firms that were ordered
to divest assets, and those that were not. Before the antimerger com-
plaint, companies ordered to divest did experience larger abnormal
returns, particularly in the 4 years prior to the complaint filing.
When comparing these results with other companies involved in merger
activity during the same period that were not challenged by the government,
Ellert concludes that for all samples of acquiring firms (indicted under
merger law, not indicted under merger law, and single acquisition firms),
we "observe positive and statistically significant abnormal returns, the
largest accumulations occuring at least four years before the merger...
The timing of these gains suggests that the large positive residuals
experienced by Section 7 defendants before the filing of antimerger com-
plaintsmay reflect something other than capitalization associated with the
specific mergers challenged" ([18], p. 727).
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Ellert finalizes suggesting that it is
... unlikely that abnormal gains realized in this period
are related to specific mergers to be conceived and
negotiated at such distant future dates. The abnormal
gains of the early period may simply reflect a proven
capacity for operational efficiency in the management
of assets which motivates merger activity without being
an anti-competitive consequence of the specific mergers
undertaken later.
([18], pp. 727-728).
When looking at the returns on acquired companies, Ellert finds that
there is an abnormal loss of 9.5 percent between months 100 and 49 prior
to the merger (between 8+ and 4 years before the merger). This loss
increases by 2.2 percent up to 11.7 percent between months 48 and 8
prior to the merger, and then it is overcompensated by a net gain of 14.6
percent in the 7 months prior to the merger. Ellert suggests that this
behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that mergers are a mechanism
for replacing inefficient managements in the acquired company.
The reason for reviewing this work with certain detail is because it
states empirically two important facts which are consistent with the
merger's rational to be exposed later in this study. First, the acquiring
firm gets an abnormal gain about four years prior to the merger
realization; that is to say, there is some important internal trans-
formation in the firm which is most likely unrelated with a specific
merger episode occuring at a distant future date. And second, the
acquired firm suffers an abnormal loss in the 8 years prior to the
merger which is quickly compensated for in the 7 months prior to the
merger realization. This suggests the existence of a potential source
of value in the acquired firm, that regains market recognition with
the merger completion.
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Therefore, the potential source of value is in the acquired firm,
and the recognition of this value is made possible by the participation
of the acquiring firm.
3.1.4 Summary of the Empirical Determination of Mergers Profitability
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the impact
of mergers in the firms' profitability. The final conclusion is rather
mixed, but the most recent research is reporting some net gains in
mergers.
The works reviewed in this section and the main conclusions reached
in them are the following:
Segall [82]: Unclear impact of mergers in the profitability
of the acquiring firm.
Kelly [47]: There is no significant difference between the
profitability of merging and non-merging firms.
Hogarty [41]: Shareholders of acquiring firms do not
generally benefit from the acquisition. There is no
synergy in the merger.
Lev and Mandelker [49]: There is a neutral impact of mergers
on the acquiring firm characteristics.
A different interpretation for this neutrality of mergers is given by
Weston-Mansinghka [98] when stating that, in general, conglomerates raise
the profitability of firms with depressed earnings to the average of indus-
try. Therefore, the adequate test for conglomerate earnings is not the
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achievement of superior, but average performance.
This theory of defensive diversification of conglomerates to get
protection for poorly performing firms is reinforced in the conclusions
of Melicher and Rush [59][60], who found no difference between the profit-
ability of conglomerates and those firms that remained in the basic indus-
tries that conglomerates abandoned.
Gort and Hogarty [32] suggest that, on average, mergers have an
approximately neutral effect on the aggregate worth of firms, but there is
a redistribution that produces a net gain to the owners of the acquired
firm, and a net loss to the owners of the acquiring firm.
The redistributional impact of mergers can be found also in Shick's
work [83], who concludes that mergers may or may not be profitable.
A more recent, and more careful measure of the impact of mergers in
the market value of firms has been done by Halpern [34]. He detects that,
on average, there is a net creation of value that is split almost evenly
between the acquired and acquiring firms. Nonethelss, by relating these
gains to the size of firms, the average premium for the acquired firm is
positive, and for the acquiring firm is not significantly different from
zero.
Halpern's conclusions are also obtained in an independent study con-
ducted by Mandelker [56]. He finds economic gains associated with mergers,
whose distribution generates a premium for the acquired firm and a fair
return for the acquiring firm. That is to say, the acquiring firm invest-
ment is producing a return similar to investments in the capital market
with a similar risk level.
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Ellertts [18] study is similar to Halpern's and Mandelker's, but
it spans more than 8 years prior to the merger realization. Though the
main concern is with firms whose merger is challenged by the Government
due to antitrust considerations, Ellert establishes two important conclu-
sions applicable to mergers in general. First, the acquiring firm does
have an abnormal gain about four years prior to the merger realization,
and the actual completion of the merger, or its challenge by the Govern-
ment, do not affect in a substantial way this extra value. And second,
the acquired firm has an abnormal loss in the 7 years prior to the
merger realization, which is slightly overcompensated in a period of just
seven months before the actual materialization of the merger.
Both results are consistent withMandelker's conclusions (a fair
deal to the acqutring firm, and a gain to the acquired firm are induced
by the merger); but, by exploring deeper into the past, Ellert is able
to find an abnormal gain for the acquiring firm which is most likely
unrelated to the merger, and an abnormal loss for the acquired firm which
is recouped with the merger completion.
3.2 Mergers as a Result of Managerial Decisions
A different line for justifying mergers is based on the separation
of managers and owners of firms. The argument is that managers pursue
their own objectives independent of owners' preferences. Therefore, goals
like growth maximization, size maximization (sales, number of employees,
assets), and managers' personal objectives, become important explanatory
variables.
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The works in this area are classified for the purpose of exposition
in terms of:
- Empirical studies on managerial reasons for merger: Reid [74], Fahy [19].
- Managerial models for merger: Williamson [101], Mueller [68], Melnik and
Pollatschek [61].
3.2.1 Empirical studies on managerial reasons for merger
The Reid Study [74] Managers pursue their own objectives
damaging the shareholders' position.
Reid bases his analysis on two propositions made by Berle and Means [7].
In the first place, they "emphasized progressive separation of control
from ownership and foresaw a growing independence of management from stock-
holder influence and classical market constraints. The other proposition
related this growing independence to changing managerial behavior and
performance" ([74], p. 132).
In more operational terms, Reid states: "The more actively that large,
publicly held firms merge, the more they tend to be oriented to furthering
managers' interests rather than stockholders' interests" ([74], p. 154).
His hypothesis is that "the more actively firms have merged during the
period, the larger their relative increases in sales, assets, and number
of employees tend to be; similarly, there will be a tendency for their
relative increases in market price per share and profits attributable to
the original stockholders to be smaller" ([74], p. 156).
To test this hypothesis, he takes a sample of 478 of the 500 largest
industrial firms in 1961, and examines their merger activity during the
1951-1961 period. Then he classifies these firms according to their
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merging propensity in four groups:
48 firms that did not have any merge in the period,
214 firms with 1 to 5 mergers,
142 firms with 6 to 10 mergers, and
74 firms with 11 or more mergers.
He concludes that "managers' interest variables" (sales growth, assets
growth, and number of employees growth) significantly increase during the
period; while "stockholders' interest variables" (dividends and capital
gains per share, growth in return on assets, growth in profit margin)
significantly deteriorate in the same period.
These results make Reid conclude that "the interest of managers and
stockholders in these large publicly held firms tended to be more indepen-
dent or conflicting rather than complementary" (Reid [74], p. 103).
The Fahy Study [19] Controlling the impact of the managerial
strategy followed by the firm.
Fahy tries to shed new light on the rather controversial studies
contrasting profitability of growth by mergers vis-a-vis internal growth.
He adds a new dimension to the problem by including as explanatory
variables goals other than profit maximization that the firm may be follow-
ing. His main caveat is that studies like Kelly's, Reid's, and Hogarty's
may not be measuring the impact of mergers on profitability, because the
profit level is dependent on the strategy being followed by the firm.
Therefore, if most of the growth maximizing firms follow a merging
strategy, and the profit maximizing ones do not merge, any difference in
profitability detected between them can be explained as coming from the
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merging activity or from the objective adopted. The two factors are being
confounded in the empirical design.
Consequently with this analysis, Fahey tries to single out the impact
of merger activity in the profit performance of a firm by controlling
two variables: goals being pursued, and industry to which the firm belongs.
Two different measures of profitability are used: return on the firm's
equity, and return on shares when including dividends and price changes.
Merger activity is defined as the amount paid for the merger expressed
as a percentage of the firm's total increase in assets over the period
1960-1965.
A dummy variable is defined to signal if a firm is pursuing profit
maximization, or if it is deviating from this objective. This variable
is subjectively defined in terms of the level of competition in the indus-
try as measured by the height of the industry's barrier to entry, and the
degree of managerial control experienced by the firm. A firm is considered
to deviate from profit maximization if it is managerially controlled (no
external group own 10% of shares), and competition is weak in the industry.
The conclusion obtained is that no difference exists between the
profitability of merger vis-a-vis internal expansion.
When testing if the managerially controlled firms are related to the
degree of merger activity, Fahy does not find any discernible relationship.
Finally, some indication is found confirming that managerially
controlled firms have lower levels of profit than owner controlled firms.
3.2.2 Managerial models for mergers
In the exposition to follow, a brief review of some ideas in
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Williamson's book have been included [101]. This book is not related to
mergers in a specific way, but with the process of managerial decision
making in general. This process is characterized in a way that is useful
for the model proposed later in this study concerning the explanation of
the merger phenomenon.
The Williamson Model [101] The trade-off between profit and
managerial slack.
Williamson's book rests in the hypothesis that there are many reasons
to think that managers will not follow strictly a profit meaximization
objective. Based on reasons like the actual separation of management and
control, the degree of managerial discretion that may be exercised with
imperfectly competitive markets, and certain behavioral considerations,
he argues that a better representation of a firm's objective is the maximi-
zation of a multi-attribute utility function (in which profit in one of the
components), subject to a constraint on minimum reported profit.
Essentially two parameters are included in the utility function and
the manager has to define the trade-off among them. These factors are
profit and managerial slack. Managerial slack is a proxy measure to
account for motivations other than profit being pursued by the managerial
team. Williamson suggests three specific alternatives for this slack:
staff expenses (roughly speaking, generally administrative and selling
expenses), emoluments (the portion of management salaries and prerequi-
sites that is discretionary), and discretionary profit (which is the amount
by which earnings exceed a minimum performance constraint).
The value of this model is the formal introduction of the slack
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concept, and the added power it has to explain the characteristics of
firm's reactions to a sudden adverse change in the environment. For
example, in a case study reported by Williamson of a company that was
forced to engage in a "cost reduction program", after two years, without
changing production, the company attained:
(1) Return on investment: increased by 125 percent,
(2) Breakeven point: reduced from 95 to 74 percent.
(3) Total employment: decreased by 25 percent;
salaried employees reduced by 32 percent,
hourly by 20 percent.
(4) Payrolls: reduced by 16 percent or 12 million
dollars.
(5) Overhead: reduced from 14 million dollars to 12
million dollars and scheduled to go to 8 million
dollars.
(6) Headquarters employment: reduced from 782 to 462
(with plans to decrease it to 362).
([101], p. 95).
Unfortunately, this kind of reaction does not prove that the model is
correct, but rather that it is an acceptable explanation. Also, if a
strictly profit maximizing behavior is considered, this reaction can be
predicted if expectations of the firm with regard to future investments
plummet. This is in fact what happened in this case, in which it was made
"evident that the condition of excess capacity that had developed in the
industry would be a continuing one" ([101], p. 94).
The Mueller Model _681 The growth maximization hypothesis.
Mueller develops three lines of reasoning for explaining mergers in
trying to formulate plausible causes for describing the conglomerate pheno-
menon of the late 1960's.
In the first place he mentions synergistic effects as an important
reason for merging when managers are trying to maximize the stockholders'
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welfare. Three kinds of synergy are indicated: managerial, financial, and
risk reduction through diversification.
A second model is based on separation of ownership and control in the
acquired firm, and on different expectations between acquirer and acquired
firms with regard to future earnings.
Finally, mergers are justified by assuming growth maximization. Even
without synergy, and with the same expectations on future cash flows,
growth maximizers will discount cash streams at a lower rate than stock-
holders' wealth maximizers. Therefore, they will tend to engage in a
heavy acquiring activity. Under this hypothesis, all firms are attrac-
tive buys at the stock market price, therefore,
... if the desire to grow through acquisitions is to
continue to be met during a period of high merger volume,
it will have to be satisfied more and more by acqui-
sitions through the stock takeover route. This is
precisely what has happened. Between 1962 and 1965 the
ratio of stock takeovers to the total number of mergers
more than doubled.
The other expectation derived from this model is that "the largest
firms in the economy will also be the most mature and, therefore, are
likely to have the lowest internal rates of return". Consequently,
... these will be the firms which have to make the
greatest resort to outside investment opportunities
to achieve growth, Hence John McGowan's finding
that the proportion of a firm's growth which stems
from mergers is positively related to the size of
the firm seems to be consistent with the growth
maximization hypothesis.
([68], pp. 658-659).
A general comment on Mueller's paper is that the model formulation
is rather tentative and crude, and the empirical substantiation of the
growth hypothesis is rather inconclusive.
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The Melnik and Pollatschek Model [61]. Diversification and
synergistic effects in the managers' utility function.
Melnik and Pollatschek propose a financial model to explain conglomerate
mergers based on synergistic and diversification motives. The model is
based on a utility function that managers are trying to maximize, which
is increasing with the fraction of shares of another firm controlled by
the acquirer (the diversification effect), and it has a jump at a level
of shares that allows the full control of the firm (the synergistic effect
stemming from increased debt capacity).
The managers' decision problem is to maximize this utility subject
to a budget constraint. The fact that conglomerates exist make the authors
advance the hypothesis that controlling another firm is an important
objective; therefore, the synergistic effects tend to be more important
than the diversification effects.
3.2.3 Summary of mergers as a result of managerial decisions
The wide latitude that managers have in the conduction of firms is
a recognized fact. But it is not clear if they can deviate in a signifi-
cant way from a profit maximizing behavior, or if there are efficient insti-
tutional mechanisms that will prevent strategies not pursuing the maximi-
zation of shareholders' wealth.
In this section, studies are reviewed that favor the thesis of a
managerially controlled firm. Mergers are justified as a way of attaining
managers' rather than stockholders' objectives. The general conclusion
from the studies presented are the following:
Reid [74]: The degree of merger activity of a firm is posi-
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tively associated with the achievement of managers'
objectives, and negatively associated with the achieve-
ment of shareholders' objectives.
Fahy [19]: Some firms are managerially controlled and others
are owner controlled. There are positive indications that
profit is higher in owner controlled firms. The degree
of merger activity is not significantly different between
these two groups. No difference is detected, either,
between the profitability of growth by merger vis-a-vis
internal expansion, when the impact of firm control is
taken out.
Williamson [101]: The managerial decision making process may be
explained in terms of a utility function in which profit
and the degree of managerial discretion are traded off.
Mueller [68]: Managers that pursue growth maximization are
prone to engaging in merger activity.
Melnik and Pollatschek [61]: Managers engage in mergers
because they maximize a utility function that growths with
assets diversification, and jumps up with the control
of another firm.
3.3 Financial Explanations for Mergers and Conglomerates
Generally speaking, the reasonability of conglomerates is not explain-
able by resurring to arguments like monopoly power acquisition, or synergy
creation. There is nothing in the operation of divisions that is being -
changed, except for the centralization of financial activities at the head-
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quarters level. The benefits derived from this form of organization are
not clear, and many financial explanations have been explored for sharpen-
ing this point. This section will review some works in this area, classi-
fying them, according to the nature of the rationale being pursued, in
the following categories:
- Increasing diversification: Levy and Sarnat [51], Smith and Schreiner
[85], Westerfield [97], Mason and Goudzwaard [58].
- Increasing debt capacity: Lewellen [52], Higgins and Schall [36].
- Imperfections in the capital market: Lintner [53], Lynch [55], Steiner
[87].
3.3.1 Increasing diversification
One of the justifications most usually given to explain conglomerates
is the achievement of diversification and, through it, superior performance.
The works to be presented explore some theoretical and empirical aspects
of the problem and cast some doubts on the validity of this argument.
The Levyy and Sarnat Study [51] Diversification of conglomerates
does not create any economic advantage.
Levy and Sarnat show that in a perfect capital market there is no
economic advantage achieved by a purely conglomerate merger because
"despite the stabilizing diversification effect, a conglomerate merger per
se does not necessarily create opportunities for risk diversification
over and beyond what was possible to individual (and institutional) inves-
tors prior to the merger" ([51], p. 796).
When turning to an imperfect capital market, by assuming that inves-
tors only hold a limited number of securities, the conclusion is more
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pessimistic, because investors may lose from the merger due to the reduc-
tion of opportunities available for him.
True economic advantages from merging may be derived from economies
in capital costs by increasing its size,
... firms have better access to the capital markets,
and also enjoy significant cost savings when securing
their financing needs... Diversification can be
expected to create a true economic gain owing to the
fact that the combination of the financial resources
of the two firms making up the merger reduces lenders'
risk while combining each of the individual shares of
the two companies in investors' portfolios does not.
([51], p. 80).
These final considerations are only enunciated but not explored
in the Levy and Sarnat paper.
The Smith and Schreiner Study [85], and the Westerfield
Reply [97] Conglomerates vs. mutual funds.
Smith and Schreiner produce an ex-ante measure to determine empiri-
cally the degree of diversification achieved by conglomerates. They
define as diversification index a ratio with the difference between the
portfolio expected return and the risk free return in the numerator, and
the standard deviation of the portfolio return in the denominator.
Comparing the diversification attained by 19 conglomerates and 8
mutual funds, it is concluded that
... with few exceptions, the mutual funds have attained
more efficient diversification than the conglomerates.
And they have done so at a relatively lower level of
risk as measured by the standard deviation of portfolio
return... Conversely, some of the conglomerates appear
to have done a commendable job of selecting unrelated
industries so as to take advantage of low correlations.
([97], p. 424).
The results of Smith and Schreiner have been challenged by Westerfield
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who argues that their measure of diversification is confounding the effects
of management as well as diversification. When correcting for this problem,
Westerfield finds that "as one would expect, conglomerates are far inferior
to mutual funds in effective diversification" ([97], p. 912), although "many
have been successful at reducing unsystematic risk between the sample
periods July 1954-June 1961 and July 1961-June 1968" ([97], p. 914).
The Mason and Goudzwaard Study [58 1 Conglomerates vs. random
portfolio matching their asset diversification.
Mason and Goudzwaard did an empirical study to determine if the asset
diversification of conglomerates generate any benefit to the firm or
stockholders. They select a sample of 22 conglomerates for which data
could be obtained, and compare their performance with an equivalent sample
of portfolios. All these portfolios are constructed from randomly
selected stocks of undiversified firms, in order to reproduce exactly the
asset composition of each one of the conglomerates in the sample. The
period covered by this study is 1962 to 1967.
The conclusion of this study is that "randomly selected portfolios
offered superior earnings performance and shareholder returns than did the
conglomerates in our sample ([ 58], P. 39). This conclusion holds "despite
the fact that our hypothetical stockholder was forced to incur transaction
costs, taxes, and fees associated with buying and selling stocks" ([ 58],
p. 45).
3.3.2 Increasing debt capacity
There is no satisfactory theoretical model to explain a firm's debt
capacity. One line of thought is to assume that at a debt level sufficient-
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ly high, lenders deny any additional loan to the firm. This idea is
explored by Lewellen to justify mergers, but his conclusions are
challenged by Higgins and Schall. These two works are now reviewed.
The Lewellen Model 152] By reducing lenders' risk, mergers
can increase debt capacity.
Lewellen tries to determine if mergers with no operating advantages
(scale economies, monopoly power, complementarity of resources) can be
justified in terms of pure financial reasons (transient errors in market
valuation, unused debt capacity, diversification).
A merger is justifiable to "the extent to which corporations can
achieve a result by merging that investors cannot achieve for themselves
by commensurate manipulations of their personal securities portfolios"
([52], p. 522). This consideration leads Lewellen to disregard three
popular reasons to explain mergers. First, transient valuation errors in
the market "of the scale and frequency required to explain the level of
conglomerate activity during the 1960's would connote a degree of market
imperfection, or a pattern of continuing investor perversity, that most
investigators nowadays would be unwilling to grant" ([52], p. 523).
Second, "to count very heavily on justifying mergers by attributing
incremental benefits to the simple internalization of a process, like diver-
sification, which is so widely practiced externally by investors, does not
at this writing have the look of a singularly promising line of inquiry"
([521, p. 524).
And third, if the firm to be acquired is not using its debt capacity
in full, a net gain may be obtained by merging and using this latent debt
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capacity. But, there is nothing peculiar to the act of merging in the
realization of these gains. It is rather "the result of a kind of manage-
ment ineptitude in capital structure planning that can be undone without
the necessity for the joining of two companies". It is enough "to improve
their finances independently" ([52], p. 525).
Lewellen suggests that there is a net advantage exclusive to mergers
arising from the lower relative variability exhibited by the combination
of two cash streams that are not perfectly correlated. This advantage is
the product of an increased debt capacity in a world of taxes.
He argues that lenders impose a limit on the idrirowing capacity of
a corporation by defining the maximum probability of defaulting on the
loan. Therefore, by combining the two cash streams and maintaining
constant the probability of default required by lenders, the total amount
that can be borrowed by the merger goes up, because there are situations
in which the cash generated by one firm can be used to compensate for a
weak cash flow in the other.
The Higgins and Schall Model [36] Lenders' risk reduction
by merger has two counterbalancing effects whose net impact
on stockholders is not clear.
Higgins and Schall argue that Alberts [1 ] and Levy-Sarnat arguments
for the lack of impact of a merger in the value of a firm are implicitly
assuming that the firm never goes broke; that is to say, bondholders will
always receive the amount they are expecting. They show that the total
firm value is in fact unaffected by the merger under the assumptions of
costless bankruptcy and no taxes; but, "merger reduces shareholders' wealth
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and raises bondhblder wealth" unless certain conditions are satisfied.
This result is originated in Lewellen's idea of co-insurance between
the two merging firms that in some situations allows the use of the
excess cash flow of one of the firms to solve the cash needs of the other.
Therefore, without a change in leverage, the value additivity principle re-
quires that the total value after merging remains unchanged. On the other
hand, bondholders are facing now a lower risk, implying a higher market
value for the same bonds. The consequence of these two conditions is that
the total value of the stock has to go down.
The conclusion from here is that, in fact, there is a co-insurance
effect, but that the premium is paid by shareholders for the benefit of
bondholders. There is a counterbalancing effect in the extra debt capacity
created (if the Lewellen theory is correct), but the net impact on share-
holders will not be clear as it is suggested in the Lewellen paper.
The above conclusions are valid without bankruptcy costs, without
transaction costs, and with or without taxes. When adding the impact of
bankruptcy cost, the whole situation becomes dependent on the way in which
this cost is affected by the merger, making the generalization of any con-
clusion impossible.
3.3.3 Imperfections in the capital market
A clear rationale for mergers under conditions of perfect capital
markets has not been found. The case for diversification is yet to be made,
and the increase in debt capacity may not be sufficient to compensate
stockholders for other los6es they incur in the merger. The works to be
presented depart from the assumptions of perfect and efficient capital
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markets, and build an argument on things like use of internal information,
speculative gains, tax laws, accounting manipulation, and capital market
expectations based on P/E.
The Lintner Model [53] By increasing the number of holders
of a security, its market value goes up.
Lintner observes that market power and cost reduction opportunities
are strong incentives to induce merging, even with sizeable promoter's
"cuts", and that these elements played an important role in the first two
merger waves. But these arguments are not useful for explaining pure con-
glomerates, because they are not present in that case. The focus is then
"on whether the aggregate market value of firms can be raised by merging
them, even when there are no gains in combined operating profits antici-
pated from increments of (product) market power, economies of scale, or
other improvements in efficiency" ([53], p. 106).
According to Lintner, under the assumption of purely competitive
equilibrium in the security market, the market value of the two firms may
increase as a consequence of merger due to one of the following five
reasons: (1) tax laws, (2) greater leverage, (3) risk reduction, (4)
accounting manipulations, and (5) instantaneous gains in earnings per
share.
For risk reduction to take place, it is assumed that all investors
act in an optimal way, but with a limited amount of information, since
"getting information involves economic costs, and there is an opportunity-
value to the time devoted to security appraisal" ([53], p. 109). This
practical restriction will stand for investors having but a few securities
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in their portfolios. "And under conditions where different securities
are held by different subsets of investors, the market price of risk
for the ith stock varies inversely with the summation of the
risk-tolerances (reciprocal of risk aversion coefficients) of investors
who have it in their portfolio (long or short)." ([53], p. 108). In
following his argument, Lintner shows that by just increasing the number
of holders of a security, its market price of risk goes down and its
market value goes up. What is yet to be shown, in case this gain really
exists, is its significance.
The Lynch Model [551 The "feed-back" relationship between
price-earnings ratio, and the rate of growth of earnings
per share and dividends per share.
Lynch focuses his research in those conglomerates that in the 1962-
1967 period engaged in a rapid growth by acquisition, showed fairly
diversified activities, and performed in a superior way for their share-
holders. His main objective is to look for the reasons behind this
superior performance, and two broad kinds of reasons are suggested: "those
which depend on improvement of operations through acquisitions, and those
which depend on the various financial characteristics of acquisition".
The analysis of these incentives for merging make Lynch draw two main con-
clusions from his study; first in the category of operating economies
through merger
... improved performance is less likely to result
from the traditionally discussed economies in the
combined use of physical resources than from the
more effective use of specialized human resources,
specifically managerial and technical expertise.
Second, within the category of financial effects of
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mergers, the interdependence of market value and
shareholder performance appers to have played a major
role in the performance achieved by acquisitive
conglomerates.
The Lynch study is, by its initial design, biased toward conglomerates
showing superior financial performance in 1962-1967 as measured by market
price appreciation and dividend yields. In his sample are included
corporations like Litton and LTV that, in the 1970's have showed a rather
poor performance, and they are at present in deep financial troubles.
Lynch explains the superior financial performance of these conglo-
merates by means of a "feed-back" relationship between price-earnings
ratio, and the rate of growth of earnings per share and dividends per
share. He suggests a mechanism of expectations formation such that when
the growth in earnings per share (translated into an equivalent growth
in dividends per share) goes up, the price per share also rises. This
is the result of higher expectations on future firm returns. By selling
new shares at this inflated price, and inventing the money in activities
yielding a return enough to maintain the growth in earnings per share,
it is possible to validate the expectations of the firm held in the market.
(See figure on next page.)
This elaborate argument can explain a continuously accelerating merger
movement, but it is unable to explain the decay stage in a merger cycle.
The main flaw is the assumption that all future expectations are formed
based exclusively in past performance, without analyzing the real return
expected from assets in general, and new investments in particular.
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The Steiner Model [87] Synergy, insider benefits, and
premiums as inducement for merging.
Steiner's purpose is to present a framework that may encompass all
plausible reasons for merger, and then determine empirically their relative
importance. In his view, "a multiple-cause framework can capture the
diversity of probable outcomes", and one may be able "to explain the
changing role of different forces and empirically to wonder what attributes
of a particular data set led one predictor to appear dominant" ([87], p.32).
The two actors in the deal are the buyer and the seller, and "the
merger is assumed to occur when the benefits to each of the parties making
the decisions are sufficiently large to outweigh the costs, deterrents,
and inertia that may exist" ([87], p. 30). Participating parties "do what
promises to advance their own best interests" ([87], p. 32).
The model to be presented is based on rational and unitary behavior
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of both buyers and sellers, though later in his book Steiner expands
qualitatively his model to include some internal conflict between owners
and managers in each participating group ([87], Chap. 6, pp. 128-150).
The basic elements in Steiner's model may be summarized in five
points:
(1) External synergies (a), real or pecuniary, may make
the stock of a combined company worth more than the sum
of its premerger parts. These may embrace among many
other possibilities such things as economies of large-
scale production or a chance to exploit a monopoly posi-
tion. Because such synergies benefit both buyers and
sellers, they appear symmetrically in the relationships
and a high enough synergy, other things equal, can
motivate both parties to merge.
(2) External deterrents (y), such as the transaction
costs of effecting a merger or the likelihood of anti-
trust prosecution, play an opposite role to synergies.
They too enter symmetrically and large enough deterrents
can cool the ardor of both sides of a potential merger.
(3) "Insider" benefits (AS ) and deterrents (DS) may exist
to the stockholders of the selling company. Included here
are all the potential sources of gain or loss to the selling
company's owners that are not adequately reflected in the
stock market prices of the stocks before and after merger.
The ratio of benefits to deterrents may be thought of as
an insider benefit/cost ratio and may be greater or less
than unity according to whether the selling companies'
owners see greater or lesser advantages to them in the new
company than in retaining the independence of Company S.
(4) Insider benefits (AB) and deterrents (DB) to the stock-
holders of the buying company also may exist. While formally
similar to those of the seller, insider gains or losses need
not be the same for buyers and sellers, and indeed will
typically not be the same.
(5) The premium paid by buyers to sellers to induce them
to accept the tender offer (k). The premium is the
"price" that persuades reluctant sellers to agree to a
merger and that thus determines the allocation of advan-
tages accruing from the merger between the parties. In
my formulation of the problem, the premium paid takes
the form of giving sellers a disproportionate share of
the new company by issuing more shares of stock in the
new company than the sum of the shares in the buying and
selling companies. Buyers pay the premium via the dilution
in their holdings.
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([87], pp. 42-43),
For the merger to be possible, both buyers and sellers must be bene-
fited, The two equations stating these conditions are;
For sellers:
A n +n(n-)k ) > 11+Y DS n +kn S
For buyers:
a , nBt+n(f,-) --H) " ) >B B S
where nB and nS are the number of shares of buyers and sellers, respective-
ly, and the other parameters are defined above (price of shares for buyers
and sellers in normalized and assumed = 1).
What these equations produce is a range of values of k that makes the
merger profitable to both parties. The only decision variable in the
model is k and it includes the premium that the seller is willing to offer
for each share of the buyer.
33.34 Summary on financial explanations for general mergers and
conglomerates
The most popular argument to justify conglomerates is the increased
asset diversification. Nonetheless, the works of Levy and Sarnat [51],
Smith and Shreiner [85], Westerfield [97], and Mason and Goudzwaard [58],
suggest that conglomerates are less efficient than direct diversification
in the capital market.
The other argument is the increased debt capacity created through
merger, whose plausibility is shown in Lewellen's model [52]. But Higgins
Complete derivation may be seen in Steiner book.
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and Schall [36] cast some doubt on the ability of stockholders to reap
a net gain from this transaction.
Finally, by considering imperfections in the capital market it is
possible to find many arguments for merger. The problem is that the real
extent of the incentive provided by these imperfections has not been
measured empirically.
Some of the models suggested are:
Lintner [53]: Increasing the number of holders of a security
raises its market value.
Lynch [55]: A high P/E leads to increased acquisition propensity.
Steiner [87]: The main elements considered by buyers and
sellers in a merger are synergy, external deterrents,
insider benefits and deterrents,- and the premium paid.
3.4 Studies on Merger Waves
One of the puzzles in the study of merger movements has been the
periodical outburst of activity that generated the three merger waves at
the turn of the century, the late 1920's, and the late 1960's. This
section presents some papers exploring the reasons that may be behind this
phenomenon. The theories presented in those papers give proper considera-
tion to the strong positive correlation between merger activity and stock
market prices, observed by Nelson in his early empirical study [731].
The Jacoby Theory [45] Merger waves as result of the
conjuncture of accumulated technical and social changes,
and a buoyant capital market.
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In this study, Jacoby advances an hypothesis to explain the uprising
of merger movements each 30 to 40 years, arguing that the usual "monopoly",
"stock promotion", and "efficiency" explanations given to justify mergers,
are insufficent to explain these suddent outbursts of activity.
The conjecture is made that long-term merger waves in
the United States are explained by the infrequent
conjuncture of two preconditions: (1) an accumulation
of perceived and unexploited profit making opportu-
nities for enlarging the scale of enterprises, arising
from basic technological and social changes, and (2)
a buoyant capital market with strong demand for new
securities.
([45], p. 4950).
This conjecture raises efficiency as well as stock market condition
arguments, reasoning that "the predominant motives for mergers are the
drive of businessmen to realize larger profits by capitalizing upon newly
perceived economies of scale, and the ability of bankers to sell new
securities to the public on profitable terms" ([45], p. 4951).
To explain a merger wave, Jacoby makes a distinction between tactical
(small, superficial) and strategic (salient, structural) changes in the
environment.
Most tactical changes cancel or offset each other through
time. A few cumulate into strategic shifts in the
structure of technology and society. Not only do
strategic changes take many years to accomplish, but
there is a time lag between their occurrence and their
general perception by people. Many strategic changes
create opportunities for profit by enlarging enterprises.
In the pervasive optimism of a stock market boom, once
overlooked opportunities, or known opportunities previously
non financeable, are acted upon. Given the rapidity of
communication in financial markets, such perceptions
multiply and build up to a climax... Later, the pool
of profit-making opportunities for business combina-
tions is drained. Concurrently, financial expecta-
tions deteriorate. Merger activity falls of as
quickly as it previously mounted.
([45], p. 4951).
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The structural changes listed by Jacoby as potential stimulus of
the late 1960's merger wave are: management science and computer evolu-
tion, research and development explosion, rise of the service economy,
quantum leap in taxation, and doubled price of capital.
The Gort Theory [31] Economic disturbances create uncer-
tainties that make buyers and sellers differe in their
valuations.
Gort presents what he calls the "economic disturbance theory of
mergers", which is based on the different expectations held by buyers and
sellers with regard to the earnings stream of the firm being acquired.
Discrepancies in valuations are generated by economic disturbances, the
most common of them being rapid changes in the technology and movements
in security prices.
The economic disturbance increases the variance
in valuations mainly because information about the
past becomes less effective in predicting the
future. Since the record of the past represents
information common to all investors, the common
base of assumptions of different investors is
narrowed, with the result that the range of
alternative predictions increases.
([31], p. 627).
Gort tests his hypothesis using data on acquisitions for the period
January 1951 through June 1959, classified according to the 3-digit SIC.
He presents regression equations between merger rate and different measures
of economic disturbance, concluding that the results "support the valuation
discrepancies hypothesis". Alternative explanations like monopoly power
gaining, attainment of scale economies, and securities of sellers being
more undervalued than securities of buyers (the "bargain theory"), are
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not supported by the analysis performed.
The later work by Gort and Hogarty [32] explains merger waves in
terms of three elements: First, mergers are a form of high risk invest-
ment, with less than even probability of success, but with high prizes
whten winning. This is an ingredient in speculative activity. Second,
due to "economic disturbances", expectations between buyers and sellers
differ, buyers being more optimistic. And third, mergers result from
decisions pursuing managerial rather than owners' objectives.
3.4.1 Summary on studies on merger waves
Merger waves, as most of the merger phenomenon, are not clearly
understood. An early empirical fact stated by Nelson [73] is a strong
correlation between merger activity and stock prices. The following
two theories reviewed make use of this fact:
Jacoby [45]: Merger waves result from the conjuncture of two preconditions:
an accumulation of perceived and unexploited profit making opportunities,
and a buoyant capital market.
Gort [31]: A divergence in the valuation of buyers and sellers is created
as a consequence of economic disturbances, because these disturbances make
past history less relevant in the projection of the future, thus creating
uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCISE EXPOSITION OF FINANCIAL THEORY
The review of previous studies on mergers and conglomerates shows the
lack of an underlying theory supporting them. Major efforts have been
made in measuring the merger phenomenon, assessing profitability of mergers,
and formulating and testing plausible hypotheses. But there is still
substantial controversy on mergers, indicating that an acceptable paradigm
of this phenomenon is not yet available. The objective in this and the
following chapters is to unify some of the existing merger knowledge, to
produce an analytic model for the study of mergers.
If a merger opens the possibility of exercising monopoly power,
realizing production or distribution synergies, or getting important tax
savings, then there are clear incentives favoring the merger materiali-
zation. In general, if the net cash flow of two firms combined is
greater than the sum of the independent cash flows (without deterioration
on other dimensions, risk for example), then there is a positive reward
in completing the merger.
Net additions to cash flow are sufficient reasons for merging;
nonetheless, the bibliographic review displays in a very forceful way the
idea that the case for mergers cannot be built on reasons like scale
economies, monopoly power, or production synergies. These were important
causes underlying the first merger wave, and probably the second one
too, but they are not important in the present expression of the merger
phenomenon.
The presence of synergies is not denied, but the general attitude is
to assume they do not exist when evaluating the decision to merge. If,
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at the end, there are some synergies, they are well taken, but the point
is that there are no prior expectations of their existence. For example,
R. Ames of Textron [2] indicates that the contribution that Textron makes
in the deal with the acquired company does not require the existence of
synergies or economies of scale, and the decision to merge is independent
of them. Another example of the attitude that senior executives of con-
glomerate firms have on the issue of synergy is presented in a Forbes
report on United Technologies' Harry Gray [28]. The report states that
"Gray has avoided what Roy Ash used to aim at, synergism. Gray has
simply taken in big companies with strong market positions in hard-to-
enter industries".
There are other forms of increasing the net cash flow by merger, like
changing the incumbent managers in the acquired firm, using tax incentives,
or recurring to complementarities of resources (R&D for example). These
explanations of merger activity seem to attract less opposition in the
literature, but the importance of their role is not yet well understood.
The point is that a model of mergers would not be powerful enough
if based solely on the changes expected in cash flows as a consequence of
the consolidation. This is especially true when trying to interpret the
growing drive towards conglomeration. The standpoint in this study is
to assume that sufficient incentives for merging still can exist, even
when the cash flows are not affected by the merger.
An immediate conflict with actual financial theory is created by the
last assertion; because, broadly speaking, if the cash flows of individual
firms are not changed, the total value of the combined cash flow can not
exceed the sum of the values of individual cash flows. Therefore, there
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is no way to justify the merger.
The usual way out of this dilemma is to revise the strong assumptions
underlying financial theory. In the first place, financial models are
based on the assumption that managers, in their concern for the well
being of shareholders, maximize the value of the firm. Those who attack
this premise argue that managers may be after the satisfaction of personal
objectives like growth maximization or empire building.
Another controversial basic hypothesis in financial theory is the
assumption that capital markets are perfect, efficient, and complete. Many
models have been proposed, and reasons given to explain mergers in terms
of market imperfections. Insiders' information, transaction costs, taxes,
and the malicious use of public information (like financial statements)
are some of the issues raised.
Financial scholars' answers to these criticisms follow the following
lines, more or less:
First, they recognize the market value maximization as unique objec-
tives is a simplification, but it has given coherence to the theory,
it has increased its predictive potential, and there are not yet impor-
tant reasons impelling its modification. As Miller indicated in his
presidential address ([65], p. 21)
Why then do economists keep trying to develop models
that assume rational behavior by firms? They are not,
I insist, merely hoping to con their business school
deans into thinking they are working on problems of
business management. Rather they have found from
experience - not only in finance, but across the board
- that the rational behavior models generally lead to
better predictions and descriptions at the level of the
industry, the market, and the whole economy than any
alternatives available to them. Their experience, at
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those levels, moreover, need involve no inconsistency
with the heuristic, rule-of-thumb, intuitive kind of
decision making they actually observe in firms. It
suggests rather that evolutionary mechanisms are at
work to give survival value to those heuristics that
are compatible with rational market equilibrium,
however far from rational they may appear to be when
examined up close and in isolation.
Second, they accept that markets may be imperfect, but they have a
very strong stand against accepting any major, permanent activity ex-
plained by market imperfections. The classic work in this area is the
random walk hypothesis of Fama and his comprehensive review study on
the efficient market hypothesis [21], [22]. Fama states that market
values represent at any moment all available information related to a
stock. Bias may exist at any given time, but the probability is the
same for positive or negative deviations, the extent of these deviations
not being predictable on a priori grounds.
And third, they acknowledge that the current theoretical develop-
ment is far from satisfactory yet, because there are some conclusions that
are not corroborated in practice. The most clear example is the debate
on the optimal level of debt, whose existence cannot be clearly under-
stood in terms of the Modigliani-Miller Theorems.
As a summary of the ideas exposed, it is possible to give a more
complete description now of the characteristics that are guiding the
approach to the merger phenomenon in this study.
First, incentives for merging may exist even when the cash flow of
the two firms involved remains unchanged after the consolidation.
Fama does not reject the possibility of market imperfections in the
strong form tests, when corporate insiders or specialists of major secu-
rities exchanges have monopolistic access to information.
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Second, this incentive cannot be explained under the current state
of financial theory.
Third, to solve this dilemma, some authors challenge some of the
assumptions in finance theory (firm value maximization, perfect markets).
And fourth, finance scholars support present assumptions and conclu-
sions derived from them. They are not willing to accept results based
on violation of these assumptions, unless strong empirical and theoretical
antecedents point to the need to do so.
Consequently, a model has been built within the actual financial
framework. The main idea in the construction of this model is to look
for a minimum change in the premises or interpretation of financial theory,
in order to gain enough explanatory power of the merger phenomenon.
To facilitate the introduction of the model for studying mergers, a
summary of the main ideas in financial theory is presented in this chapter.
Concise exposition of financial theory
This section is not intended to be a comprehensive review of finance
theory topics, but a selective and informal exposition of those issues
which are relevant to the formulation of a model for mergers.
The theory that is of interest in this study is centered around the
firm and two important groups linked to it: managers and shareholders
(the owners). The two groups interact via the capital market.
It is assumed that managers make decisions to maximize the well being
of the firm's shareholders. But, there is no need for managers to investi-
gate each shareholder's preferences, because by maximizing the market
value of the firm they are assured that shareholders can reach their maxi-
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mum benefit. This important property is known as the Separation Theorem,
whose implication is that owners never need to go in the nitty-gritty of
firm conduct, as long as managers pursue the stated objective. There is
a true specialization of functions between owners and managers of a firm.
(See for example, Haley and Schall [33, pp. 125-129], and Hirshleifer [38],
[39, pp. 421-422]).
The capital market, being the common ground for managers and share-
holders, presents a different face to each one of them. For managers,
the market is an evaluation mechanism of the decisions they make; it acts
as a barometer of the firm's actions based on the cash streams that the
firm is expected to distribute to shareholders. On the other hand, for
shareholders, the market is an immense pool of alternative investments,
and they show their opinion with regard to a firm by bidding for the
firm's shares. On the whole, the market must balance continually the
total demand and supply of the firms' shares generated by the investors'
decisions to buy or sell their holdings.
This description leads to the definition of four basic financial
issues that have been schematically represented in Figure 2:
First, the investor's decision problem, which is the object of
Portfolio Theory.
Second, capital market equilibrium and pricing mechanism, which are
obtained from the Capital Asset Pricing Model.
Third, valuation of cash-streams in the market, which is studied
under Valuation Theory.
And fourth, managers' financial decisions, which are covered in
Corporate Finance.
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Each one of these subjects is now presented in a compact way, to lay
the foundation for a merger model. As general references for the sections
to come, see Boudreaux and Long [11], Fama and Miller [25], Haley and
Schall [33], Hirshleifer [38],[39], and Merton [62].
4.1 Portfolio Theory
Portfolio theory deals with the problem of an investor confronted with
the capital market. The market displays a wide variety of alternatives
(securities of shares) for the investor to distribute his budget. The
investor is assumed to be a price-taker; that is to say, whatever his
decisions are, they will not affect the market price of shares.
Securities in the market may be characterized in terms of the return
one period later for $1 invested today in it. In general, this return
will be a random variable (for risky securities), but also, it may be
well known in advance (for the risk-free asset). A security return is
related to security prices according to the following relation:
-1P
= -_ (4.1)
i
where:
.
= Random return of $1 invested in security i
1
Po = Price of security i today
i = Random price of security i one period later (includes any
cash dividend or other cash distribution).
A portfolio is any combination of securities in the hands of an
investor. At the extremes, a portfolio may contain only one security,
or a sample of all available securities. A portfolio may be described
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in terms of all securities in the market, by indicating the fraction
contributed by each of them to $1 invested in the portfolio. The return
on a portfolio can then be found as:
r = i wiri (4.2)
where:
r = Random return of $1 invested in portfolio p
r = Random return of $1 invested in security i
wi = Fraction contributed by security i to the portfolio
value (dollar vAlue of security i holdings for a
portfolio of $1).
The investor's problem is to find the weights w. in order to distri-
bute his budget in an optimal way for him. The investor is assumed to
be risk-averse, to prefer more to less, and to have preferences which can
be described by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Therefore,
his problem is one of maximizing a utility subject to a budget constraint.
An important assumption is usually introduced for solving the inves-
tor's problem. His utility function is supposed to depend exclusively on
the expected value and variance of the portfolio's return. Therefore:
U = U(portfolio mean, portfolio variance) =
= U(Brp, B2a 2) (4.3)
where:
U = Investor's utility function
- 2r ,a = Expected value and variance of $1 invested in the portfolio
Sp
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B = Total investor's budget
U1 = aU/a mean > O0. Utility goes up if the expected return
goes up
U2 = aU/avariance < 0. Utility is reduced with an increase
in variance.
If the expected value, variance, and covariances of individual
securities can be found, then the portfolio's parameters can be determined
as follows:
r = E wir (4.4)
P i
ao = E E wiwjij (4.5)p i j
where:
r ,a2 = Expected return and variance of $1 invested in the portfolio
Pp
ri = Expected return of $1 invested in security i
Oij = Covariance between ri and r. (returns to $1 invested in
securities i and j), (aii F = variance of security i's
return)
wi = Fraction contributed by security i to the portfolio value.
The investor's problem can now be written in terms of the decision
variables wi by having the expressions for rp and a2p [Equations (4.4),
(4.5)] replaced in the utility function [Equation (4.3)]:
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max U(B wiri, B2  wi j ii){w.i  i i j
s.t. B = constant.
C w = 1wi
The problem is now solvable without any major difficulty for the indi-
vidual investor, but instead of blindly applying differential calculus to
it, some general properties of this solution may be derived by
defining the efficient portfolio frontier. This is the set of all port-
folios with minimum variance for a given expected value, and with maximum
expected value for a given variance. Given that the investor is assumed
to prefer a smaller variance for a given expected value, and a larger
expected value for a given variance, his optimal choice must lie in this
frontier. It may be shown that, when all assets are risky, the efficient
portfolio frontier is, in general, the upper branch of a parabola in the
plane (0 , r p), as indicated in Figure 3 (Merton [63]).
When one risk-free asset is added to the picture, the efficient port-
folio frontier becomes a straight line representing all possible combina-
tions between the risk-free asset and a unique risky-asset called the
optimal combination of risky assets (Merton [63]) (see Figure 4). The
fraction in which all existing risky securities participate in this optimal
risky asset may be derived from the market information according to the
following relation:
d.1
w = d (4.6)
There is no need to restrict wi to non-negative values, because a nega-
tive wi corresponds to a short sale of security i.
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-1
where: di = Z a l(rIj-rF)
-1
Fij = (i,j) term in the inverse of the variance covariance matrixij
rj = Expected return of $1 invested in security j
rF = Expected return of $1 invested in the risk-free asset.
This is a very powerful result, because it indicates that all the
market information can be summarized in just the following few parameters:
rF = Return of $1 invested in the risk-free asset
rM,aM = Mean and standard deviation for the return of $1
invested in M. (Optimal combination of risky assets).
With these parameters, the efficient portfolio frontier may be written as:
r = rF + ap (~MM (4.7)
where:
r ,p = Mean and standard deviation for the return of $1 invested
in any efficient portfolio P.
The investor's problem can be simply solved now by selecting from
this efficient frontier the point with maximum utility (see Figure 5 ).
His choice is just deciding in what proportion he wants to hold the
risk-free asset and the optimal portfolio M.
4.2 Capital-Asset Pricing Model
Portfolio theory allows the individual investor to solve his budget
distribution problem by assuming that prices for securities are given
A good review on the assumptions and limitations of the theory may be
found in Jensen [46].
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-98-
ier
on
ont
ati
s
-99-
in the market, and that his actions will not affect them. But, there
is a global equilibrium constraint that must be satisfied for validating
the assumed set of prices. It is required that the market clears for
all securities at the given prices; that is to say, for all securities
demand and supply must be equal.
The capital-asset pricing model states a relation for determining
the price of securities under equilibrium. By the nature of its assump-
tions, it also provides a simple way of finding the efficient portfolio
frontier, without going through the computations of relation (4.6), that
requires the inversion of a huge variance-covariance matrix.
In addition to assuming market equilibrium, the capital-asset
pricing model considers that all investors participating in the market
hold homogeneous expectations. That is to say, when assessing expected
values, variances, and covariances among securities, all come out with
the same numbers. Therefore, the optimal combination of risky assets will
be the same for everybody, because all investors will use the same rela-
tion and the same parameters.
By requiring the market to be in equilibrium, this unique optimal
combination of risky-assets may be shown to be equal to the market
portfolio; that is to say, to a portfolio in which all risky securities
participate in the same proportion of their value in the market.
Consequently, the fraction in which security i particpates in the market
portfolio may be found from:
V.M iwi = (4.8)
u
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where:
wi = Fraction contributed by security i to the market portfolio
Vi = Market value of all risky securities i (number of
securities x price).
The efficient portfolio frontier is known in this case as the capital
market line, whose equation is still (4.7), but interpreting M as the
market portoflio (Figure 4 is also the same).
The fact that the capital market line holds all efficient portfolios
may be used to derive a relation that any individual security must satisfy
(see Haley and Schall [33], pp. 146-148). Because of the linear nature
of this relation, it is known as the security market line, its equation
being:
r M-rF
ri = rF + (rMF (4.9)
where:
rF = Return of $1 invested in the risk-free asset
ri = Expected return of $1 invested in security i
rM,c = Mean and standard deviation for the return of $1 invested
in the market portfolio
a = Covariance between Fi and rM (returns to $1 invested in
security i and the market portfolio).
The constant (CM-rF)/aM is known as the market price of risk and it is
designated by X. By simple substitution, the security market line may be
written as:
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r. = rF +  a Oi (4.10)
This relation is a straight line in the plane (CiM,ri) as shown in
Figure 6 .
The market equilibrium captured in the security market line implies
that the expected return for $1 invested in a security should go up when
the covariance between the security and the market returns goes up. This
is a very interesting conclusion because it contradicts the a priori
notion that the return of a security (and as a consequence its price),
should be related with the total risk taken for holding that security,
which is measured by its variance and not by its covariance with the
market.
To further comment on this point, it is convenient to determine what
part of the variance is being compensated in the market. With that
purpose, consider the following relation that may be derived from the
security market line equation:
rM-rM
ri ri + ai + Ei (4.11)
where:
Pi = Random return of $1 invested in security i
r. = Expected value of r.
rM = Random return of $1 invested in the market portfolio
rM' M = Expected value and standard deviation of rM
IM := Covariance between 'i and rM
Market Portfolio
M
iarket
IL
FIGURE 6: The Security Market Line
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2i = Random fluctuation, with expected value 0, standard
deviation a, and uncorrelated with the market.
The variance of 'i, may then be found as:
o 2
ai2 = + C44 2 (4.12)i -r +  EN
This equation provides a decoupling of total risk in two components
that are usually called non-diversifiable risk and diversifiable risk,
respectively. The reason for this is that for any efficient portfolio,
the diversifiable risk is 0; that is to say, an investor following an
optimal strategy only needs to be concerned with the non-diversifiable
part of risk, because the other component is supressed in the process of
diversification.
This is the rationale underlying the pricing mechanism in the market
that is reflected in the security market line. According to it, only
non-diversifiable risk needs to be compensated because diversifiable risk
may be eliminated by holding an efficient portfolio. Also, this is
the reason for having the covariance instead of the total variance of
a security as a measure of risk in the pricing equation [see relation
(4.9)]. Sometimes, this risk is expressed in terms of an adimensional
coefficient called beta or volatility of a security, defined as:
i =_ 
.(4.13)
OR
where:
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Bi = Volatility of security i (the volatility of the market
portfolio is 1)
iM = Covariance between ri and .M (random returns of $1
invested in security i and in the market portfolio,
respectively).
CM = Standard deviation of the return of $1 invested in the
market portfolio.
The non-diversifiable risk needs to be compensated because it is
beyond the investor's possibilities to control it. This risk is related
to uncertainties in the overall economic activities and cannot be avoided
by anyone. Examples are economic cycles and general economic policy
followed by the government. For an individual investor to take this risk,
a premium over the risk-free rate is required. The size of this premium
is given by the security market line.
4.3 Valuation Theory
A security is a financial instrument that represents for their
holders a promise of future payments to be made to them. The market value
of a security is a consensus on the actual value that those future
payments may have for investors in the market.
Valuation theory is concerned with determining a fair market value
for a cash stream of future payments under conditions of market equili-
brium. More formally speaking, valuation theory is focused on the trans-
formation of a cash stream into a unique scalar that represents a
generally accepted appraisal for the value of that stream. Figure 7
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illustrates this idea.
When the cash flow is fully deterministic and well known in advance,
it is possible to show that its market value must be given by relation
(4.14) in order to satisfy the condition of market equilibrium.
0o c
MV =t (4.14)
t=l
T rFj
j=l
where:
MV = Market value of the cash stream {c1 ,c2.20}
ct = Cash payment to security holders in period t
r = Risk-free rate of return for period j (an investor is
indifferent between $1 in period (j-l) and rFj dollars
for sure in period j).
The usual relation employed to get the market value of a security
is obtained from here when all risk-free rates are assumed constant
through time, and equal to rF = (l+i):
oo c o C
MV = E -- t (4.15)
t=l F t=l (l+i)t
When future cash flows become random, these relations are no longer
applicable. Nevertheless, there is an heuristic extrapolation of
formula (4.15) to extend its use to the case of uncertainty. This is
given as relation (4.16):
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00 c
MV= t
t=1 (l+i+p)t
where:
MV = Market value of the random cash stream {1 c2..
ct = Expected value of Et = Payment that security holders
forecast for period t
(l+i) = Risk-free rate of return in an investment of $1, for
one period, under conditions of certainty (an investor
is indifferent between $1 in period (t-1) and (l+i)
for sure in period t, for all t)
(l+i+p) = Rate of return in an investment of $1, for one period,
under conditions of uncertainty. It includes the risk-
premium p as compensation for the risk involved.
This formula assumes a very peculiar structure of certainty equiva-
lents when used for random cash streams. Robichek-Myers [79] show that
this formula implies a ratio between the certainty equivalent and the
expected value geometrically decreasing with time. There is no a priori
reason to expect this kind of behavior.
Some justification for this heuristic may be found in the work of
Myers and Turnbull [72, p.332] when asserting that "... conventional valua-
tion formulas based on discounting expected cash flows give a good approxi-
mation to assets values derived from rigorous analysis of equilibrium
market values. We have uncovered no evidence that conventional valuation
models are unsafe for management consumption." Valuation formulae that
can be better justified from a theoretical point of view may be derived
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from a multi-period extension of the Capital-Asset Pricing Model (Bogue
and Roll [10], Brennan [12], Fama [20], Merton [64]). The problem with
those relations is the difficulty in estimating an appropriate set of para-
meters, and the restrictive nature of the assumptions used in their deriva-
tion.
4.4 Corporate Finance
A firm is evaluated in the market according to the characteristics
of the cash stream of future payments generated by it. Firms' managers
have certain discretion on financial decisions (most importantly in
relation to dividends, debt, and investment) that may alter the market
value of the firm. This section is intended to review in a succinct way
some fundamental propositions in corporate finance, dealing with the way
in which the market value of a firm is expected to vary due to dividend
payments, changes in the capital structure, and investment decisions.
(A good collection of papers on these issues have been put together by
Myers [69].)
4.4.1 Dividend payments
The firm's earnings are partly distributed to stockholders in the
form of dividend payments. The firm's managers have to determine how
much of earnings they want to distribute, and how much they want to
retain for future investments. According to financial theory, this
decision should be taken to maximize the shareholders' wealth. But, it
has been shown that if shareholders are indifferent between cash payments
and capital gains, and capital markets are perfect, then their wealth
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is unaffected by the dividend decision (Miller and Modigliani [66]).
To arrive at this conclusion, future operations and investments
undertaken by the firm must be kept unchanged, for isolating the exclusive
impact of the dividend policy on market value. This independence between
the firm's activities and dividend payments, guarantees that all future
cash flows received or paid out by the firm remain the same whatever the
dividend paid, thus leaving the firm's market value unaffected by dividend
policy.
The firm's decision is just the replacement of internal foi external
funds; instead of retained earnings, they will be using new equity to
finance future activities. Old shareholders will receive a cash payment,
and give away a share in future cash flows generated by the firm. But
due to the hypothesis of perfect markets, the value of the stream they
are giving away matches exactly the cash they receive as dividends.
Consequently, their wealth is unaffected by the dividend decision taken
by the firm.
Most of the arguments running against this conclusion of dividend
policy neutrality, are drawn from market imperfections (see Boudreaux and
Long [11], pp. 271-279). Among them are the different tax treatments
given to dividend payments and capital gains, as well as transaction costs.
Both of them favor retention of earnings rather than distribution via divi-
dends. On the other hand, the fact that firms try to pay dividends at
whatever cost, expresses a certain tendency favoring dividend payments.
Two reasons are usually given to explain the stability of dividend payments:
the clientele effect, and the information content of dividends. These
reasons do not provide a clue for the selection of a particular payout level.
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According to the clientele effect, all firms have a certain composi-
tion of shareholders that may be badly damaged if the firm abruptly changes
its dividend policy. Therefore, there is a definitive incentive for sta-
bilizing dividends, because the turnover of shareholders provoked by a
change in dividend policy, may negatively affect the price of shares for
a long time.
The other argument given to explain the stability of dividend policy
is the information content of it. Basically, the idea is that a change
in dividend policy may be a signal of a change in the firm activities;
this having an adverse repercussion on prices.
In summary, some effects on market value are expected as a conse-
quence of dividend policy, though theoretical arguments predict its
neutrality.
4.4.2 Capital structure
Capital structure has to do with the fraction of total market value
that is contributed by debt and equity. Two fundamental propositions
have been presented (Modigliani and Miller [67]):
First, with perfect capital markets, and no taxes, the capital
structure does not affect the value of a firm. This is because any
equity dollar replaced by debt (or vice-versa) will be equivalent to the
cash stream of future payments generated by it. For the firm, neither
cash flow nor risk have been changed.
And second, if interest tax deductability is added, the total value
of the firm increases with debt, because the net cash flow is augmented
by the tax shield generated by interest deductability. Therefore, firms
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should increase its debt as much as they can.
It is not clear why firms have a rather stable capital structure,
and why they do not tend to go to higher leverage ratios. One hypothesis
is that debt-capital is made unavailable, or that the expected value of
bankruptcy costs become very important over certain D/E ratio. Another
is that future investment opportunities may be lost as a consequence of
outstanding debt, a situation which becomes more likely with high
leverage (Myers [70]). Still other is the incidence of personal taxes,
which may substantially lessen the advantage of debt financing under
equilibrium (Miller [65]).
In summary, capital structure does matter with interest tax deduct-
ability, but it is not clear why firms have not used more debt.
4.4.3 Investment decisions
If a manager is presented with an investment opportunity, he has
to decide if it is convenient to take it or not. By accepting the
commitment of managers to the shareholders' well being, an investment
is convenient whenever the net change in the market value of the firm
is positive.
This proposition may be formally stated in terms of the market value
of a cash stream. Consider a project with an investment IO0 today,
producing a cash stream of {E 91 2,...} in future periods. This project
is convenient if
-Io + MV0{,cc 2, . 0} > o
By using an acceptable valuation formula for obtaining the market
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value of the random cash stream, this problem is not fundamentally
different from the valuation theory previously discussed.
Summary of the Main Financial Concepts
There are many concepts in the theory of finance that have evolved
in recent years, and that provide a solid foundation for the on-going
research in the area. The main purpose in this chapter has been to
present some of these basic coneepts, in order to establish the theore-
tical framework for this study. The propositions that are most relevant
in the ensuing chapters are summarized in this section.
Managers are assumed to be rational decision makers who pursue
the well being of their shareholders. As a consequence of the separation
principle, they can assure that this objective is attained by maximizing
the market value of the firm.
The market value reflects, at any time, the aggregate value of
cash payments to be generated by the firm in the foreseeable future,
properly discounted for the time and risk involved. By virtue of the
efficient market assumption, each new piece of information is instantly
reflected in the market value of the firm; therefore, this value
reflects at any time all public expectations regarding the firm's
future performance.
A surprising conclusion derived from the theory of valuation is
that only systematic risk is compensated in the market. There is no
risk premium attached to the undertaking of unsystematic risk, because
by holding an adequately diversified portfolio, the total unsystematic
risk can be reduced to zero.
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In the analysis of the firm's financial decisions, the most impor-
tant result of the Modigliani-Miller proposition for the firm's capital
structure. Briefly, they indicate that the debt-equity ratio does not
affect the market value of the firm when corporate taxes are ignored; and
that debt is preferred over equity financing when corporate taxes are
considered. The puzzling aspect of this proposition is the inability to
explain the actual behavior of firms, which use an intermediate mix of
debt and equity financing.
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CHAPTER 5: MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM WITH PURE EQUITY FINANCING
The primary purpose in this study is to find a rationale for
mergers. When reviewing the perspectives that different authors have
employed in the analysis of this phenomenon, a promising area of
inquiry appears to be the exploration of financial incentives that may
trigger a merger, though the current state of financial theory indicates
that no such incentives exist.
It is apparent that the generation of a financial rationale for
mergers requires some change in the actual conclusions of financial
theory. This chapter and the next present an extension of the theory
that opens the possibility of explaining mergers in Chapter 7. The
main conclusion to be derived (that contradicts existing notions) is
that there are situations in which the market value of an investment
opportunity is not fully reflected in the market value of the firm.
5.1 Market Value of the Firm: An Extension
Firms are valued in the market according to the expectations of
future cash payments to be made to the market participants. The market
discounts this cash stream for the timing and risk of these payments,
and produces a present value which is equivalent to the cash stream of
future payments, conditioned on all publicly known information.
Usual channels employed to convey information to the market are
This chapter and the next are based on a paper that Prof. Myers and
myself have written together (Myers and Majluf [71]). I have to acknow-
ledge the fundamental contribution that Prof. Myers made to the ideas
to be exposed, and thank his personal dedication to many long discussion
sessions.
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annual reports, quarterly financial statements, earning figures, and
investment prospectuses. More interestingly, some common financial
decisions may be interpreted as good or bad signals in the market, and
affect the price accordingly. For example, the decision of firms to
split their stock has been found to correspond to expectations of
increased earnings and dividend payments that firms believe they can
maintain in the long run (see Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll [24]).
Also, secondary offerings of common stock carry a negative information
about earnings, which depresses the stock price between one and two
percent on average. This is especially true when corporate executives
sell their stock (Scholes [81]).
The cash stream that reaches the market is an aggregation of the
net cash generated by the different activities to be developed under
the firm's umbrella. Some of these activities may correspond to a very
natural projection of the main line of business, while others may depart
from it in an important way. Some will be based on existing capacity
and equipment, and others on new potential additions to them. Some
activities will be using skills and knowledge currently available in
the firm, while others will need additional skills and qualifications.
A simple way of interpreting the cash stream reaching the market,
is assuming that it subsumes three important pieces of information:
First, a random but relatively safe cash stream that the firm will be
able to generate as a natural development of its present activities and
current situation. The only uncertainties in it are due to the general
outlook and movement of the economy as a whole, and to random distur-
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bances that all business operations face. Second, a random cash stream
contingent on the development of a new investment opportunity, whose
undertaking is still to be decided by the firm on the basis of future
conditions. And third, an assessment of the firm's willingness to under-
take this new investment. In sum, the firm is represented as normally
operating an existing line of business, and at the same time owning the
exclusive option of taking a new project for a limited time period.
Assuming that the new investment opportunity has a positive net
present value, the actual thinking is that there are no contingencies that
may prevent the firm from taking the new project. Under these circum-
stances, the market value of the firm reflects the total value of the
new project immediately after the information reaches the market, as
shown in relation (5.1).
currentcurrent investment
MV{firml)} = MV line of + V opportunity
opportunity (5.1)business
where:
( = all public information available.
The extension to be proposed in this study does not support this
statement. What is suggested instead is that there are situations in
which the current group of shareholders is benefited by rejecting a
good investment opportunity. In this case, a fair market value for the
firm is given by relation (5.2), which recognizes the contribution of
the current line of business, as well as the contribution of the invest-
ment opportunity if the firm goes ahead with it.
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current investment
MV{firml)} = MV line of 4 + Pr(M'J)) MV investment
(business opportunity
where:
4= all public information available
M' = Event representing the firm's decision to go ahead with
the new investment opportunity
Pr(M'J1) = Probability of going ahead with the new investment oppor-
tunity.
The argument is built on two basic premises which are totally consis-
tent with perfect markets and other assumptions in the theory of finance.
First, managers act in the benefit of current shareholders; and second,
managers get, prior to the market, some inforation on the characteristics
of the new project. With this information, managers can determine if
current shareholders are better off by undertaking the realization of the
new project, or by dropping the idea and staying solely with the actual
line of business.
An important consequence of the difference in information is that
there is some room for managers to manipulate the public delivery of
internal information. Throughout this study, the implicit assumption is
that managers are acting in the best long run interest of shareholders.
This assumption clearly determines the best strategy for the firm to
follow, but there is a potential conflict of this objective with a short
run maximization of the firm's market value. As a consequence of this,
the separation principle, that guarantees that shareholders are getting
the most for their shares at all times, need to be reinterpreted. This
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is done later in this chapter.
The difference between public and insider's information is a very
natural thing to expect when considering that managers are "living" with
the business, and that they ought to know more about it. More important
than this is the fact that managers are trying to gain some decisive,
strategic advantages over competitors, and this normally requires holding
from the public some fundamental information until the firm can securely
appropriate all abnormal profits generated in a new venture.
This difference in information plays an important role in the valua-
tion of the firm only when the firm does not have sufficient slack
resources to undertake the investment opportunity. Slack may be inter-
preted as the holding of resources over and above what is needed for
the firm's current operation. In this study, slack is defined as the
internal cash that the firm can make readily available for investing in
a new project. Clearly, cash on-hand and marketable securities are a
form of slack; but also, some form of expenses that are normally incurred
but can be readily dropped, may be considered as slack. The essential
characteristic of slack resources is that the firm can recurr to them
without going to the market. Though cash can be made available on very
short notice in the form of a new debt or equity issue, that cash cannot
be equated with slack even if the firm can issue risk-free debt.
When the internal availability of resources is sufficient to take
Campbell [13] argues very convincingly for the existence of insider-
managers with better information than the market as a whole, because
information is not free and managers specialize in the acquisition of
information related to the firm. He also argues for the strategic
value of this information.
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the new project, the difference between public and insider's information
does not affect the market value of the firm. In fact, given the assump-
tion that the net present value of the new project is positive, and consi-
dering that the firm has the money required for the investment, it is
apparent that shareholders are better off by going ahead with the new
project. Therefore, the market value of the firm is given by (5.1) which
fully captures the value of the new project.
A different situation arises when slack is insufficient to under-
take the new investment opportunity. In this case, the firm is forced
to go to the market if the new project is to be taken. With this decision,
the firm involuntarily gives away some of its exclusive internal infor-
mation; because, under the assumption that managers are acting rationally
on behalf of current shareholders, going to the market must imply that
this group of shareholders cannot be made worse off.
The informational content of the investment decision is not considered
in existing financial theory, because it is taken for granted that current
shareholders are always benefited by investing in a project with positive
net present value. This notion is shown to be incorrect when the
difference between insiders and public information is present in conjunc-
tion with insufficient slack. Broadly speaking, if slack is large enough,
the firm will be always willing to take an investment opportunity with
positive net present value, and the market will recognize its full
worth [as indicated in relation (5.1)]. But, if slack is insufficient,
it may be in the benefit of current shareholders to reject some good
opportunities, this implying that the value of the project is only partly
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reflected in the market value of the firm [as indicated in relation (5.2)].
The loss due to insufficient slack is the difference between
the full value of the project being considered, and the portion actually
reflected in the market value of the firm, as indicated below.
O ~{investmentj P(M ) MVinvestmentMl}
(• = opportunityi -P(M') M opportunity
where:
A(Q) = Market value loss due to insufficient slack
resources.
This expression can be simplified by noticing that the market value
of the new investment opportunity may be represented in terms of the
two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states M and M', where:
M' = Event representing the firm's decision of going ahead
with the new investment opportunity
M = Event representing the firm's decision of not going ahead.
MV investment PrM') * MV investment M, +
M opportunity (M'I) opportunity
investment (5.3)
+ Pr(MI) " MV (opportunity (53)
From here,it may be seen that the loss in market value due to
insufficient slack is equal to the market value of opportunities
that are not taken times the probability of being in that situation.
A() = Pr( ) MV invesopportunityM, (5.4)lopportunity
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This loss is always greater than or equal to zero, because neither
terms in that expression can be negative.
This study considers that a firm may raise new funds by issuing new
equity or new debt in the market. The following analysis is done in two
steps, by considering first that only equity is available to the firm
(this chapter), and then that both debt and equity are available (next
chapter).
To make the exposition of the subject somewhat easier, two simple
examples are developed prior to the more formal analysis in a pure equity
situation.
5.2 Market Value of the Firm with Pure Equity Financing: Two Simple
Examples
This section presents two examples of a firm with insufficient slack,
that is confronted with a good investment opportunity. The only source
of funds is to raise new equity. In one case, current shareholders are
always benefited by undertaking the new project, independent of the pre-
vailing situation. In the other case, there is one state in which it
is better to drop the new project, though its net present value is posi-
tive. As a consequence of this, the total value of the new opportunity
is fully reflected in the first case, but only partly reflected in the
second one.
Example 1. Insufficient slack is inconsequential.
Consider a firm that is operating in a line of business whose market
value one period from now is a random variable A. This firm is suddently
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forced to a new investment opportunity with a net present value B one
period from now. Assume that A and B are uncorrelated with the market,
the risk-free rate is 0, and their joint probability distribution is:
1(5,6) with probability 1/2
1(15,10) with probability 1/2
Assume also that the investment required to undertake this project is
I = 20, and that the firm has no cash available. Therefore, if managers
decide to go ahead with the project, they have to raise new equity total-
ing E = 20.
The immediate reaction to this information (which is designated by
•), is that the market value of the firm today has to be equal to the
value of current and future opportunities. Therefore:
V(ý) . A + B = 10 + 8 = 18
In this case, this value happens to be right, because even if managers
get to know the true outcome prior to the market (which is one of two
basic assumptions made in this study), it is always convenient to issue
new shares and undertake the project. In fact, the pay-offs for current
shareholders under the two possible outcomes, given that shares are not
issued, are the following:
The source of randomness that is of concern in this presentation stems
from unsystematic risk only. Assuming that the risk-free rate is 0
is only a change in the scale of measurement that simplifies the expo-
sition and it is inconsequential for the analysis.
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old - 1V [ ,no-issue,(A,B)=(5,6)] - 5
V old[,no-issue,(A,B)=(15,10)] = 15
If shares are issued, the corresponding payoffs may be computed as:
Fraction of the firm ( The market value of
owned by current shareholders x the firm after the true
after issuing shares for 20 1 outcome is known
Therefore:
old 18V [0,issue,(A,B)=(5,6)] =18+20 (20+5+6) 14.68
old 18
V [#,issue,(A,B)=(l5,l0)] 18+20 (20+15+10) = 21.32
Arranging these results in a tabular way, it may be appreciated that
issuing shares is always a preferred strategy, independent of the outcome,
and that the extra value obtained is 8, which is the value of the new
opportunity.
Market Value of Old Shareholders' Shares
(A,B) = (5,6)
(AB) = (15,10)
Expected value
Do not issue
5
15
10
optimum strategy
Example 2. Insufficient slack is detrimental.
Consider a situation similar to the one described in Example 1, but
with the following parameters:
Issue
14.68
21.32
18.00
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S(5,1) with probability 1/2
1(15,3) with probability 1/2
E = 20
In this case, an equilibrium situation cannot exist with a market value
equal to:
V(M) T A + B 10 + 2 = 12
To see the reason for this, consider the payoffs obtained by old
shareholders when the firm does and does not issue shares after getting
information on the exact (A,B) outcome.
old iV ld,no-issue,(A,B)=(5,1)] =
V old [,no-issue,(A,9)=(15,3)]
old
V [4,issue,(A,B)=(5,1) =
old
V [0,issue,(A,B)=(l15,3)]
5
15
12
12+20 (20+5+1) 9.75
12
12+20 (20+15+3)= 14.25
The tabular representation of these results is:
Market Value of Old Shareholders' Shares
(assuming a market value of 12)
Do not issue
(AB) = (5,1) 5
(A,B) = (15,3) 15*
Issue
9.75
14.25
optimum strategy
The fundamental difference shown by these results is that old share-
holders are better off by not issuing shares when the outcome is (A,B) =
(AB) -- (5,)
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(15,3), even if they do not take project B with a positive net present
value of 3. The other interesting difference is that the decision to issue
shares carries to the market the information that the outcome is (A,B)
(5,1). Similarly, not issuing shares implies (A,B) = (15,3). Therefore,
the value of old shareholderst shares after the firm announces its deci-
sion not to issue shares is:
Vold(4,no-issue) = old[,no-issue,(A,B)=(15,3)] 15
If the firm decides to issue shares, the market knows that the outcome
is (5,1). Therefore, the market value of the firm must go to (5+1) = 6.
After issuing shares, the fraction owned by old shareholders is:
6
6+20 (20+5+1) = 6. This implies that:6+20
old oldV (4,issue) V [B,issue,(A,B)=(5,1)] = 6
The equilibrium market value has to be:
V old = V ol(,no-issue) * Pr(no-issue) + V old(,issue) * Pr(issue)
1 1
= 15 a - + 6 * - = 10.52 2
It may be seen that this value falls 1.5 units short of A+B (which
is 12). This difference corresponds to the loss of a good project when
the outcome is (A,B) = (15,3). The value of the loss is 3 with probabi-
lity 1/2; that is to say, its expected value is precisely the 1.5 units
lost in the market value of the firm under equilibrium.
The whole problem arises from the inability of managers to communi-
cate in an effective way that their true state is (15,3), when that is
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the case. Thuy are impeded from making public all internal information,
because that would disclose strategic characteristics of the investment,
and would offset the value of the opportunity.
With this course of action closed, managers may turn to a "public
image polishing" campaign. They may disclose only partial information,
and indicate the outstanding situation of the firm. But, why should the
market believe them? They can engage in a similar campaign when the
true state is (5,1). Managers are always trying to give an optimistic
view of their companies, and it does not cost anything to distort reality
by presenting a rosier picture. The ptoper market reaction is to believe
in managers only when they make a decision, rather than when they explain
the situation of the firm: "Actions speak louder than words".
Another alternative that managers can think of is to direct the
market valuation with two sequential decisions. In the first place,
they indicate that the new project is not going to be pursued. The
market reaction must drive the price to 15, because the implicit state
of the world is (15,3). Then, the firm can reverse its initial decision
and issue shares at this high value to undertake the new project.
This is perfectly logical if the two sequential decisions narrow down
the states of the world to (15,3). But, what prevents the firm from
using the same strategy when the true state is (5,1)? If this strategy
were to work, it is a better course of action for the firm. Subsequently,
by reverting the initial decision that the project is not going to be
taken, the information in the market is not narrowed down, but it goes
back to its very first state. Two contradictory decisions in sequence
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do not reinforce, but cancel, each other.
It is still possible for managers to have a "private line" with
stockholders, and communicate to them the true value of the firm without
revealing any information to competitors. This is perfectly reasonable
when thinking of a private business, in which managers and owners are
pretty much the same group of people. But in a public company, giving
internal information to shareholders may be forbidden by law. Also,
there is no guarantee that secrecy is kept with such a large number of
people, thus nullifying the initial reason for having a private communi-
cation.
In conclusion, the assumption made in this study is that managers
have only one opportunity to indicate if they take the new project, and
that the announcement of this decision transfers to the market some
internal information. In this simple example, by taking the project
the firm makes clear that the state is (5,1), and by not taking it, that
it is (15,3).
5.3 Market Value of the Firm with Pure Equity Financing: The General Case
Consider a firm that is normally operating its existing line of
business. This firm is confronted with a good project, but does not have
the amount of resources required for the investment. The only source of
funds, in addition to the funds internally available, is raising new
equity.
The firm's decision to use this mode of financing has to be dictated
by the benefit that current shareholders will derive from it. The firm
-128-
is supposed to have better information than the market on the charac-
teristics of the investment option, at the time the decision to go ahead
with the project or drop it is taken, and this information cannot be
revealed, because that would destroy the nature of the project.
The relation between the firm and the market evolves around three
time instants, which are designated by -1, 0, and +1 (the present
corresponds to time 0). This relation is now carefully stated, and it
is summarized in Figure 8.
At time -1, both the firm and the market have the same information
with respect to the firm's value, which is designated by 0. This
information is that the firm owns an existing line of businesses and
a new investment opportunity whose market value at time +1 are repre-
sented by the random variables (A,B) , with a joint probability distri-
bution f(a,b). Also the firm is known to have an amount S of slack which
is less than the total investment I required by the new project. The
market value of the current line of business (which is designated by
A) is defined excluding the slack available. Therefore, the actual
market value of the firm at time +1 (without considering the new project)
is (S+A). The market value of the firm at time -1 is designated by
V old(). The word old is added to indicate that all of it is owned by
old shareholders.
At time 0, the firm gets to know (prior to the market), the updated
value of (A,B), which is designated by Ca,b). According to this infor-
These values are discounted to the present (time 0), for time and
risk. The only source of randomness in them is assumed to
be unsystematic variation.
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mation, the managers of the firm may decide to forget the project, or
to issue an amount E of new equity and undertake it (with E = I-S).
The market, without knowing the exact outcome (a,b), will react to
the firm's decision by adjusting the value of the firm. If the firm does
not take the project, its market value becomes Vold (,no-issue); while,
if the project is taken, this value is V old(,issue). For simplicity,
these market values are designated by P and P1, respectively. Then:
Vold (V,no-issue) fmarket value of old stockholders' shares (5.5)R = V ( ,no-issue) lat time 0, when new shares are not issued
old (Imarket value of old stockholders' shares
P' d(,issue) = at time 0, when new shares for a total (5.6)
,value E are issued.
These adjustments in market value are fully borne by current share-
holders, and they are a consequence of the information contained in the
firm's decision. When adding the contribution of new shareholders to
the market value of the firm, if stock is issued, the firm value at
time 0 becomes:
V( ,no-issue) = V ( ,no-issue) = P (5.7)
V( ,issue) = V old(,issue) + E = P'+E (5.8)
When new shares are issued, the claims that old and new shareholders
have over the market value of the firm, are the following:
P'Old shareholders own a fraction e of the firm
E
New shareholders own a fraction - of the firm.P'+E
At time +1, the market gets full information on the updated value
(a,b), and the market value adjusts accordingly. If the project is not
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taken, the market value of the firm becomes V[ý,no-issue,(a,b)], while
if the project is taken, this value is V[L,issue,(a,b)]. The part of
these totals that is taken by current shareholders is designated by
Vold [,no-issue,(a,b)] and V oldI,issue,(a,b)], respectively. Similarly,
Vnewt[,issue,(a,b)] may be defined for new shareholders when shares are
issued.
It is clear that if no equity is issued, the full value of the
firm is taken by current shareholders, and that this value is equal
to the existing line of business with the slack included. Then:
V[P,no-issue,(a,b)] = V old[,no-issue,(a,b)] = S +.a (5.9)
On the other hand, if the project is taken, the total value of the
firm (which is I+a+b) must be subdivided between old and new shareholders,
in proportion to the value of their claims [which are P'/(P'+E) and
E/(P'+E), respectively]. Then:
V[ ,issue,(a,b)] = Vold [,issue,(a,b)] + Vnew[4 ,issue,(a,b)] =
=I + a + b (5.10)
with:
V old[,issue,(a,b)] P C(I+a+b) (5.11)
Vnew[ ,issue,(a,b)] - (I+a+b) (5.12)
Equilibrium conditions in a pure equity situation
The possibility of managers to get, prior to the market, information
on the firm's current business and future opportunities, allows them to
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know in advance the market reaction at time +1, under each one of the
two alternative settings: when the project is taken, or when it is not
taken. Managers must act on the basis of this information to decide
whether shares should be issued for undertaking the project, or if it is
better to put the project aside.
If managers decide not to issue shares, old shareholders get
V old[,no issue,(a,b)] given by relation (5.9). If they issue shares
instead, old shareholders obtain V old[,issue,(a,b)] given by (5.11).
Old shareholders will be better off by not issuing shares, whenever the
following relation is true:
V old[,issue,(a,b)] < V old[,no issue,(a,b)]
By substituting the expressions given by (5.9) and (5.11) for these two
quantities, the following relation may be stated:
P'
P+E(I + a + b) < (S + a)P'+E
By recalling that I must be equal to (E+S), this relation may be
rewritten as:
P' EP1 (E+b) < E (S+a) (5.13)1r+E PI+E
The term on the left is old shareholders' share in the new project, and
the term on the right is what they give up of the existing business to
new shareholders. The condition implied by (5.13) is that the new
project should not be taken whenever the benefit derived by old share-
holders is less than the cost of the decision.
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A simpler way to write condition (5.13) for not issuing stock is
as indicated below:
E+b < - (S+a) (5.14)
Consider a plane (a,b) of all possible outcomes of the process (A,B).
Equation (5.14) defines a region to the right of line
E + b = (S+a)
In Figure 9 , this region is designated by M and its aomplement by M',
Formally stated:
M = {(a,b) > 0 (E+b) < E (S+a)} (5.15)
M' = {(a,b) > 0 (E+b) > E (S+a)} (5.16)
Notice that a and b have been restricted to be positive, because
if a is negative, the firm is better off by liquidating the business,
and if b is negative, the new project is not attractive. Therefore,
even if there is a positive likelihood for A, B, or both to become
negative, the manager's reaction to this situation will prevent this
event from happening.
After updating the information on the values (a,b) that existing and
new businesses will take in period 1, and having considered the impact
that the decision to issue or not to issue shares will render to old
It is possible to find situations in which non-positive values for (a,b)
make sense; for example, when the new project realization requires the
continued operation of the current business. These cases are not
included in this study.
(E+b) = -7 (S-ta)P'
FIGURE 9: Regions M and M' in the Pure Equity Case
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shareholders, managers will adopt the following decision rule when acting
on behalf of their shareholders. If the pair (a,b) belongs in M, it is
disadvantageous to issue shares and undertake the project. If the pair
Ca,b) belongs to M', shares should be issued and the project undertaken.
The decision to issue or not to issue shares conveys to the market
the information that (a,b) is in M' or in M, respectively, and this
information must be reflected in the market value of the firm. Therefore,
after the firm's announcement of its decision, the market value will
adjust to the new expectations, which are contingent upon the firm issuing
or not issuing shares.
If the firm does not issue shares, the value of old shareholders'
shares must go to Vold (, no-issue), which is the expectation of the
market value at time +1, contingent on (A,B) being in M. Consequently:
V old(,no-issue) = Ex {V ld[,no-issue,(;,B)]I (X,) in M}
By using relation (5.9) for the case in which (a,b) is known to be
in M, it is possible to write this expression as:
V (old,no-issue) = S + A(M) (5.17)
where:
A(M) = Expected value of A contingent upon (A,B) being in M.
On the other hand, if the firm does issue shares, the value of old
shareholders' shares must go to V old (,issue), which is the expectation
of the market value of time +1, contingent on (A,B) being in M'. Conse-
Ex is used for Expected value.
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quently:
V old(,issue) = Ex {Vo [l,issue,(A,B)]I(A,B) in M'}
The use of relation (5.11) for the case in which (a,b) is known
to be in M', allows writing the expression above as:
old P'
v (O,issue) = p+E[I + A(M') + B(M')]
where:
A(M') = Expected value of A contingent upon (A,B) being in M'
B(M') = Similar but for B.
The expression above can be simplified to (5.18) by recalling that
V old(,issue) has been defined as -P', and that I is equal to (E+S):
V (,old issue) = P' = S + A(M') + B(M') (5.18)
The importance of this formula is that it provides an equation for com-
puting the value of P' under equilibrium. In general, it will not be a
simple equationu to solve, because P1 participates in the definition of
regions M-M', making X(M') and B(M') dependent on P'. But this equation
can always be solOed when the joint probability distribution of (A,B)
lies entirely in the positive quadrant, as is the case here. (The proof
of this statement is given in Appendix 1.)
Given that the market can determine the value that the firm should
attain after the announcement of issuing or not issuing shares, the
market value of the firm at time -1, prior to that announcement, must
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be the expected value of these two outcomes:
V old) V old(,no-issue) * Pr(no-issue) + Vold(,issue) * Pr(issue)
Replacing the values recently obtained in (5.17) and (5.18) for
V old(,no-issue), and V old(,issue), the market value of the firm becomes:
V old () = [S+A(M)] * Pr(M) + [S+A((M')+B(M')] * Pr(M')
where:
Pr(M) = Pr(no-issue) = Pr{(A,B) belongs in M}
Pr(M') = Pr(issue) = Pr{(A,B) belongs in M'}.
This relation can be further simplified by noticing that:
Pr(M) + Pr(M') = 1
and
A(M) - Pr(M) + A(M') * Pr(M') = A
where:
A = Unconditional expected value of A (the market value of
the current line of business).
Using these two equalities, it is possible to express the market value
of the firm prior to any announcement as:
oldV d() = (S + A) + B(M') - Pr(M') (5.19)
This expression is identical to relation (5,2), in which the market value
of the firm corresponds to the contribution of the current line of
business plus the contribution of the investment opportunity when the
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firm undertakes it (that is to say, when (a,b) belongs in M').
Another useful way of expressing the market value of the firm at
time -1 may be derived by using the following identity:
B(M) * Pr(M) + B(M') * Pr(M') = B
where:
B = Unconditional expected value of B (the market value of
the investment opportunity).
Replacing in (5.19) the value for B(M').PtIM'.) given by this relation
allows writing V old() as:
oldV S + A + B - B(M) * Pr(M) (5.20)
This formula shows that the amount B(M)'Pr(M) is being subtracted
from the total market value of both the current line of business and the
investment opportunity. This amount corresponds to the loss in market
value due to insufficient slack, and it is defined as:
A(#) = B(M) * Pr(M) (5.21)
This loss is exactly equal to relation (5.4), and it is greater than
zero whenever a project with a positive net present value must be dis-
regarded, because when going to the market for the equity needed, old
shareholders lose from the dilution more than what they get from the
new project. (The outcome (a,b) is in region M.)
A final way of writing the market value of the firm at time -1
provides a new interpretation of this value. Relation (5.19) may also
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be expressed as:
V (ld() = (S+A) + lrB (5.22)
where:
Tr B(M) * Pr(M') B(M') Pr(M') (5.23)
B B(M) * Pr(M) + B(M') * Pr(M')
In these two expressions the market value of the firm is interpreted
as capturing the full value of the current line of business plus a
fraction of the value of the new project which goes to 100 percent when
slack awailable approaches the total investment required.
A summary of the equilibrium conditions derived for a pure equity
situation is provided in Figure 10.
5.4 General Implications of Market Equilibrium in the Pure Equity Case
Many general conclusions can be advanced from the relations derived
under market equilibrium in the pure equity case. Some of them are
presented in this section to dig into the qualitative behavior of the
model proposed.
5.4.1 Issuing shares always drives down the market value of the firm
Before the firm announcement of issuing or not issuing shares,
the market value of the firm corresponds to the weighted average of the
values under each one of those two situations:
V ld(4) = V (old,issue).Pr(issue) + Vold (,no-issue)*Pr(no-issue)
-140-
TIME
FIRM TAKES NEW PROJECT
Sold[4,ýssue,(a,b)] = p-- (I+a+b) ...(5.11)
TIME
Definition of Region M1' - ISSUE
M' - {(a,b) > 0 I(E+b) > E (S+a)} ... (5.16) M
Vold( ,issue) = P' = S+A(M')+B(M') ... (5,18)
FIRM DOES NOT TAKE NEW PROJECT
V old[,no-issue,(a,b)] = S+a ...(5.9)
Definition of Region M E DO NOT ISSUE
= (a,b)> 01 (E+b) < E,(S+a)} ...(5.15)
V old(,no-issue) = P = S+A(M) ... (5.17)
TIMEQ
vold(,) = (S+A) + B(M')-Pr(M') ... (5.19)
= S+A+B-B(M)*Pr(M) ... (5.20)
- (S+A) + TB ... (5.22)
where 7r = B(M')Pr(M') (5.23)
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If shares are issued, the market value becomes V old(,issue) = P';
while if shares are not issued, the market value goes to V old(,no-issue),
which is greater than P' [because S+a < P' for all (a,b) in M]. There-
fore, the following relation has to be true given that Vold (4) is a
weighted average of these two numbers:
V (old,issue) < Vo(ld < ol (d,no-issue)
If the loss for insufficient slack is zero, V old() would be equal to
V (old,issue). Then, the general relation between these two market values
is:
V old (,issue) < Vold () (5.24)
It may be concluded that the firm decision to issue shares cannot be inter-
preted as "good news" in the market. This may explain, at least in part,
the reluctance to raise funds via new equity issues.
The unexpected conclusion from this analysis is that the positive
action of taking the new project drives the market value of the firm down-
wards, while the negative action of not taking it, drives this value
upwards. There is a clear incentive for managers "to lie". By not
taking the project, they are making shareholders better off in the short
run (at time 0). The problem is that, in the long run (at time +1), when
the updated information is received in the market, the market value of
current shares goes below the value they could have with the new project.
This opportunity to fool the market appears because the firm deviates
from its presupposed behavior. The model presented in this chapter consi-
ders that the firm pursue in a consistent way the policy of maximizing the
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long run market value of the firm, though at time 0 this policy may depress
the market value. Alternative equilibrium models may be constructed for
different policies. The important conclusions from these observations is
that the separation theorem needs a more careful statement. The current
formulation only says that market value of the firm must be maximized; but,
the consideration of internal information exceeding public information
leads to the need to specify the time span.
5.4.2 The market value of the firm goes down when investment required goes
up (for a fixed amount of slack)
The money required by the firm to undertake the new project is I. The
firm has an amount S of slack available (S < I), and it has to get the
remaining E = (I-S) in the market. The claim being made is that if the
investment required goes up, the market value of the firm goes down. The
proposition is proven in Appendix 2. This is an expected result, because
for a smaller firm reliance on external equity financing, the share of the
current business that has to be given up to new shareholders goes down,
and the overall situation becomes more attractive for the undertaking of
the new project.
This is reflected in a greater market value of old shareholders'
shares (a smaller loss due to insufficient slack).
5.4.3 The market value of the firm goes up when slack available goes up
(for a fixed investment)
The arguments behind this statement are similar to the previous case.
Basically, a greater slack availability reduces the firm's reliance on
external equity financing. This improves the position of old shareholders,
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because what they have to give up of the current business goes down.
5.4.4 Cases in which slack unavailability does not hurt
There are some extreme situations in which slack unavailability is not
detrimental for the firm's market value. In the first place, assume that
the market values of current business and future opportunity at time +1 can
be known by both the firm and the market at time 0 [(A,B) = (A,B)]; that is
to say, there is no difference between public and insider information.
In this case, the loss due to insufficient slack is 0, independent of
the slack available. This conclusion is perfectly consistent with actual
propositions in finance theory, showing that the loss in market value
results from the joint impact of slack unavailability, and difference of
information.
To prove that the loss due to insufficient slack is 0, it is suffi-
cient to show that P' = (S+A+B) is always an equilibrium solution, and the
probability of being in region M is 0 (see Figure 11). In fact, given that
all mass is concentrated in region M', the following relations are satis-
fied:
B(M') =B
P' = S + X(M') + R(M') = + 1 + E
Pr(M) = 0
A = Pr(M) * B(M) = 0
A formal proof of this statement is not included, because the arguments
are similar to the ones given in Appendix 2. In addition, this case can
be reduced to a case in which slack is the same and the equity required
is smaller (as in Appendix 2), allowing the extension of all conclusions
drawn in there to this case.
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1. (m-h~
F' = +A·
Region M'
(AB)
FIGURE 11: Equilibrium Situation with No Difference in Information
,'
I
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A similar conclusion can be drawn if there is some uncertainty, but
all mass is concentrated in a "small" neighborhood of (A,B). The idea is
that the entire probability distribution lies in region M' when P'=(S+A+B).
An interesting situation in which this condition is satisfied is when
only B is a random variable, A being always equal to A (see Figure 12).
This means that the firm is always willing to issue shares when the exist-
ing business is a very stable one, and the amount of this business they
give up to new shareholders is a constant independent of the outcome B.
[lt is ------ (S+A).]
I+A+B
5.4.5 Cases in which slack unavailability does hurt
In general, when the distribution of (A,B) is spread all over the
positive quadrant of space (a,b), there is a positive loss for insuffi-
cient slack that dppends on all the parameters of the problem. This case
is analyzed in some detail in the next section for some special probabi-
lity distributions.
This section presents a particular case in which slack is valuable.
Assume that the market value of the new project is well known in advance
(and equal to B), while the current business has a random market value
(see Figure 13).
It may be appreciated that P1 = (S+A+B) cannot be an equilibrium
solution in this case, because:
A(MI) < A
B(M') = B
Then: S + A(MT) + B(Mt) < S + A + B
or S + A(' ) + B(MC ) < P'
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)/
(A,B)
FIGURE 12: Equilibrium Situation When the Market Value on the Current
Business is Known
CYry
+· . · r . · r ~· rr~ ·I· r
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S
Region M'
(E+b) = E(S+a)
P' = S+47+ A
S(A,B)
FIGURE 13: Equilibrium Situation When the Market Value of the New Project
is Known
P' = (S+A+B) is not an equilibrium solution.
E
of
re
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The actual P' of equilibrium is less than (S+A+B), and there is always
a positive loss due to insufficient slack, because region M is nonempty,
and the expected value of B in region M is equal to B > 0. The reason for
this is that when the existing business has a very high market value, old
shareholders prefer to discard the new project rather than sharing the
existing business with new shareholders.
If the net present value of the new project goes to 0 (B = 0), the
equilibrium value for P' is
P' = S + a .
min
where:
a M. inimum value of A.
min
This is because for P1 = S+a0 with ao > amin , the expected value of
[S + A(M') + B(M')] is less than P'; therefore, it cannot be an equilibrium
solution. In fact, take P' = S+a0 ; then, the following relations follow:
B(MI ) = 0 (b=B=0 by assumption)
(because no value a > ao can
A(MI) < ao be in M1, and at least a . < a*
is in M'). min
Then: S + A(M') + B(M') < S + ao
or S + A(M') + B(M') < P'
The conclusion from this result is that when a firm in a risky
business (A is random) is confronted with a fair project (b=B=0 for sure),
this project can be taken only in the worst possible scenario for the
existing business (A = amin). If the probability distribution of A is
assumed to be continuous, the probability of this event is 0; that is to
say, the new project should never be taken.
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5.4.6 General case of perfect correlation between (A,B)
Consider that A and B are perfectly correlated; that is to say, their
probability distribution lies in a straight line. In this case, the
following relation is satisfied:
B- B m(A-A)
where:
11B
m AB aA
PAB = ±1
It may be seen graphically in Figure 14 that P1 = (S+A+B) is an equili-
brium value (slack is not valuable), when m < -1 or m > E/(S+A+B).
In the range -1 < m < E/(S-+A+B) there is a positive loss for slack unavail-
ability. Under this analysis, a positive correlation [m > E/(S+A+B)] is
better than a negative one in some cases (-I < m < 0), because the loss
due to insufficient slack is zero in the first case and positive in the
second one. This contradicts the notion that countercyclicality per se
is a good thing to have.
5.4.7 Uniqueness of the equilibrium solution
There are situations in which more than one stable equilibrium solu-
tion exists. An example of one of those cases is given in Figures 15 and 16.
There are two equilibrium situations for Pý = 30 and 40, respectively.
If P! = 30, the firm is unable to take the new project when the outcome
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4-
Distribution of (A,B) lies
in the line B - B = M(A-A).
FIGURE 14: Perfect Correlation Between Market Value of the Firm and New
Project
SP (S+A+B) is an equilibrium value only for m< - or m > EP= 
(S+A+B) 
is an 
equilibrium 
value 
only for m< 
or 
> 
.
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a)
= 30
s= 0
i = 100
2
2
FIGURKE 15: Example of a Situation with More tkan One Stable Equilibrium
Solution
_ E . . .
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S + ACM') + B(M')
P't30
lZf 436-11
FIGURE 16: Example of a Situation with More Than One Stable Equilibrium
Solution; The P' vs. S+A(M!)+B(M') Graph.
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is (a2 ,b2), this implying a net loss due to insufficient slack of
1
f b2 = 5. On the other hand, if P' = 40, the firm can always take the
new project, and the loss due to insufficient slack is zero.
The market value of the firm goes up when the value of PV goes up;
therefore, for shareholders, it is always better to have the maximum
value of P'. But the choice of the equilibrium Pý in the model presented
in this study is an exogenous decision. There is no argument to justify
the selection of one or other stable equilibrium; it is a genuine "degree
of freedom".
The way in which the market reaches a consensus when more than one
stable equilibrium is possible, is an open question in this study. A
tentative explanation is that it depends on the "mood" of the market;
when the level of optimism is high, and the market is in an upswing,
the choice goes to the maximum P'; while, if the opposite is true,
another Pt is chosen. Another explanation is that P' is selected in
accordance to the "image of the firm"; if the firm appears as a "solid"
and "serious" organization, the market may pick the high P', while a firm
with a history of troubles will be assigned a low P', this aggravating
the already difficult situation of the firm.
For the purposes of this study, the selection of P' under these
circumstances is arbitrarily taken as the maximum equilibrium value. No
attempt has been made in this study to determine the frequency of this
multiple equilibrium situation, but some isolated numerical explorations
done with a well behaved continuous distribution showed a unique value
for P'.
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5.5 Sensitivity Analysis in the Pure Equity Case
This section presents an algorithm for finding the equilibrium market
value of a firm when the joint probability distribution f(a,b) is speci-
fied in fairly general terms. The algorithm is applied to a bivariate
log-normal distribution and to some cases of a truncated bivariate normal
distribution.
5.5.1 Algorithm for finding_ P
The value of P' corresponds to the solution of equation (5.18),
which is:
P! = S + A(M') + B(M')
where:
M' = {(a,b) > 0 (E+b) _> -- (S+a)}
The parameters considered fixed in this equation are S, E (with
S+E = I), and the probability distribution f(a,b). This distribution
is assumed to be discrete, and it is fully specified by the-parameters
{Pij, a., b.}, where:
ij = Pr{A = a., B =b (i=b,...,Ni ) , ( j =1 31 , . , Nj ) .
The algorithm for finding PT is a common procedure for solving an
equation. It is summarized in Figure 17, and it is described below:
The probability of having a < 0 or b < 0 is concentrated in a = 0 and
b = 0, respectively, where the bivariate normal distribution is used.
The probability distribution thus obtained is mixed discrete-continuous,
with a non-zero probability of having a or b equal 0.
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FIGURE 17: Algorithm for Finding P' in the Pure Equity Case
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Step 1: Get Data:
S, E, Distribution f(a,b) : {ai, bj, pij}.
Step 2: Initialize the value of P' as:
P' = S +A+ B
old
Ni N
= S + E E (a.+b.)pij
i=l j=1
Step 3: Find region M' defined by Pold'
Define:
ij
6 =
ij =
Step 4: Get th
P'
new
1 if (ai,bj ) belongs in M'; that is to say:
(E+bj) > E-r(S+a.)
0 otherwise.
ie new value for P':
= S + A(M') + B(M')
[ Ni N. N N.
= S + E E 6ij(a.+bj)Pij] 6ji=l j=1 / i=l j=l
Step 5: Check if P' and P' are equal:
old new
- If P' = P' , then PRINT results and STOP.
new old
- If P' # P' then define:
new old'
P' = P'
old new
and go back to Step 3.
There are two technical points about this algorithm that are
discussed in Appendix 3: Convergence and uniqueness. The algorithm is
proven to converge always, and to give the highest solution for P' in
case more than one exists.
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5.5.2 Generation of a truncated bivariate normal distribution
To generate the truncated distribution and, later, the bivariate log-
normal, it is necessary to have a bivariate normal distribution. Consider
that (A,B) follows a bivariate normal distribution with means (A,B),
standard deviations (GaA,aB), and correlation coefficient Pab. This
section presents an algorithm for generating this probability distri-
bution with a standard table for the normal distribution. This is impor-
tant for computer efficiency in terms of time for data input and cost
of running each trial. The algorithm is based on the generation of
(A,B) from two independent, identically distributed standardized normal
random variables (i,i). (Expected values of ' and ' are 0, and their
standard deviation is 1.)
Define (A,B) as follows:
A = + CU * cos iu - a siný V (5.25)
B = B+ aU e sin* ' "+ cosI * (5.26)
A and B are the linear combination of two independent random variables.
Therefore, they are also normal. Their parameters are:
Ex(A) = A, Ex(B) = B (5.27)
Var(A) = a2 cos 2 J + 012 sin2ý (5.28)
u v
Var(B) = G sin+ c.2 COS 2 i (5.29)
u v
Cov(A,B) = (a2 - a2 ) siný . cos* (5.39)
u v
Selecting cu, v, and ý to make Var(A) = Gl, Var(B) = a2, and
Cov(A,B) = PAB ACB, allows having (A,B) expressed in terms of (i",^).
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These three equations are equivalent to:
(2 + 02 = 2 + 2
u v A B
(02  a ) cos 2 = 2  2
u v A B
(a2 - a 2 ) sin 2 = 2pABaB
The general solution of this system (obtained squaring the last two
equations and adding them) is:
1a 2 2 1 2 22 2 2(531)
cru ( A+B) + 2 (- a) + 4pA (5J31)
1 2 2 1 2 a2) + 2 2_2T = a +a ) - ( A-4 P+42  (5o32)
v 2 A B B AB
2 22 p-2
(A- aar -c - + 4osy33
An equivalent way of expressing this solution is the following one:
For a • # B 
1 2PABaAaB
2 = -arctg a- c- 2A BG 2 --r 2
2 12 1 A
u 2 A+B 2 cos24
2 = i(a2+ 2) 1 A-0B
v 2 AB) 2 cos21
For 2 A= 2 = 2'A B
2/4
CFa = 2 (l+p)
u
2a = 2 (1-p)
V
-159-
The algorithm to generate the distribution of (A,B) is the following
(see Figure 18):
Step 1: Get parameters of distribution f(a,b):
A, B, A' O'B PAB
Step 2: Get table for standard normal random variable Z:
pi = Pr{Z= Zi i1. ..
Step 3: Compute values of u' ov, P from relations (5.31), (5.32), and
(5.33), respectively.
Step 4: Generate values (a1 , bj) with relations (5.25) and (5.26)
applipd to a pair (u.,vj) (see below) and pij = Pi'Pj for all
13 ij J J
combinations i,j = 1,...,Nz
.
ai = A + cosi u. - a sinP v. (5.34)u 1 v 3
b. = B + u sinO ui + av cosý v. (5.35)
Step 5: When any one of A and B goes negative, the firm is supposed to
react for making this value 0 (liquidation of A < 0, or not
taking the project if B < 0). Therefore, the actual distri-
bution of (A,B) is truncated at 0:
For all (ai,b j redefine:
a i = max(0, ai)
b = max(0, b.)
1) Only positive values need to be given, because distribution is
symmetric.
2) The selection of values Z. (their number and distance) is deter-
minant of the closeness that this discrete distribution has with
the normal.
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Generate:
ai (5.34)
b . (5.35)
Pij =  i-P j
Redefine:
a i = max(0,a,)
b j = max(0,bj)
FIGURE 18 Algorithm for Generating a Bivariate Normal Distributionop
FIGURE 18: Algorithm for Generating a Bivariate Normal Distribution
Truncated at 0
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5.5.3 Generation of a bivariate log normal distribution
Assume for this case that (A,B) follows a bivariate lognormal distri-
bution; that is to say, (tn A, kn E) follows a bivariate normal one.
Define the following terms:
x = n
Y = Zn B
(A,B) = Expetted values of (A,t)
(X,Y) = Expected values of (X,Y)
(UAGB) = Standard deviations of (AA,)
(CX,Uy) = Standard deviations of (MY)
PAB = Correlation coefficient of (A,B)
PY = Correlation coefficient of (jX)
The problem is finding an algorithm for generating the joint distri-
bution of (A,B) with a standard table for the normal distribution. This
is done in two steps: first, finding the equivalence between the two
sets of parameters (A,B,'AaB'PAB) and (X2YXCt,%Y pXy ); and second,
having the random variables (X,Y) expressed in terms of two independent,
standard, normal random variables (uv). This second step corresponds
to the previous algorithmn, so the attention is focused in passing from
(A,B) to (X,Y).
The distribution of (A,B) is completely determined by the parameters
(A,B, A,0BPAB). Assuming that all these parameters are known, the
problem is to determine (XY•7X y ,pXY). It may be proven that the
following system of equations links these two sets of parameters (see
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Appendix 4):
" 2
A = e (5,36)
2
B e y  (5,37)
2+a 2  2
2a = e x (e - (5,38)
2-2 2
aB = e -e; y (5,39)
Pxyx~ ype 
- (5.40)
-AB 2 
-2
Solving for (X,Y,x,ay,pXy)
, 
the following relations are obtained:
X n AK (5.41)
1 + cv2
a
Y= n B (5,42)
b
ax = n(i + cv 2) (5.43)
y =  /2,n(1 + c2) (5.44)
a bRn(1 + PABCVaCVb )PxY a (5.45)
If parameters (A,B,aA,aB,PAB) are picked arbitrarily, it has to be
checked that -1 <PXY < 1 to test their consistency. If this relation is
not satisfied, a lognormal distribution with those parameters cannot
exist.
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where:
A
cv -- = coefficient of variation of A (5.46)
a A
Cv b = coefficient of variation of B (5.47)
The algorithm for generating the bivariate log normal distribution,
can be summarized in the following steps (see Figure 19)a
Step 1: Get parameters of distribution f(a,b):
A, B, CA2 B" PAB
Step 2: G-at table for standard normal random variable Z:
pi = Pr{Z = Zi  il,...,N Z
Step 3: Compute X, Y, Cr, 5 y, PXY with relations (5.41) through (5.45).
Step 4: Compute ~,u' av, i with relations (5.31), (5.32), (5.33)
(replace aA for (X,  B for •y, and pAB for py), as indicated
below:
a 2X + 2 (2 412
fu XA + 2)p X + y (5.48)/(2+ 2 1 _L
y 2= y) )2 -4+ 4PxyaU (5.49)
(2 2
1 X Y(5 501=1 arc cos (5.50)
a2 22+4p 2 -2 a2
Step 5: Generate values of (ai,bj) and Pij with the following
relations:
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FIGURE 19: Algorithm for Generating a Bivariate Log-Normal Distribution
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x. x + cos u. - & sin$ v.
a. = e = e (5,51)
yj y + c sini u. + y cos@ v.
b. = e = e U 1 v J (5,52)
pij = Pi * Pj
5,5,4 Results obtained
Previous sections have presented well defined algorithms to generate
the bivarate log-normal and truncated normal probability distribution,
and to find the equilibrium value P1 . It should be stressed that these
algorithms are in no way unique, and that different procedures can be
devised to accomplish these same ends.
The numerical analysis done in the pure equity case is intended to
explore the importance of slack availability under many different combina-
tions of the situational parameters. Most of the analysis is done for
(A,B) assumed to be bivariate log-normal, but some conclusions from this
analysis, that may appear controversial, have been established also with
the truncated normal.
The set of parameters that fully describe the situation is: I, S
(S < I, E = I-S), , B, A' B' AB To determine the importance of
slack under rather extreme situations, the problem has been solved for
the following combinations of parameters:
A = 100 (taken as a reference value)
I = 10 and 100
S =0% of I, 50% of I, 100% of I
Computer program has been written in APL language and a copy is
presented in Appendix 5.
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B = 1% of I, 10% of I
CrA 10% of A, 100% of A
rB = 10% of B, 100% of B
PAB = minimum negative value allowed, 0, maximum negative value
allowed.
The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 4
through 15.
The following conclusions may be advanced from the tables presented:
i. Increasing the slack (S) always reduces the loss in market value
(A/B) [and increases the probability of undertaking the new project:
P(M')].
ii. Increasing the expected return on the new project (B/I) always
reduces the loss in market value (A/B).
iii. Increasing the investment required (I) always increases the loss
in market value (A/B) when the expected net addition to the market
value brought in by the new project is constant (B constant)
(compare I = 10, B/I = 10% with I = 100, i/I = 1%).
iv. Reducing the variance of the existing business (equivalent to
reducing the coefficient of variation while other parameters are
constant) always reduces the loss in market value (A/B) (compare
cases in which cv = i, cv = 1 with cv = .1, ev = 1, and cv = 1,
,a b a b a
cvb = .1 with cv = .1, cvb = .1).
v. Reducing the variance of the new business (Cb = B cvb) has an
The maximum and minimum value of pAB are obtained by making pXy m +1
and -1 respectively [relation (6.22)].
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TABLE 4: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
I = 10
S B(%) -=1%I I
A = 100
Pab = 0
ev = 1
a
cvb 1=
B 1
-- = 10%I
(Reference value)
(p = 0)xy O
I = 100
B 1%
I
0 100-
0+
50 100-
0+1
90 97.0
1.9
100
97.8 A/B
1.6 Pr(MI)
84.4 A/B
11.2 Pr(M')
18.7 A/B
70.5 Pr(M')
0 A/l
100 Pr(M') 100
-- = 10%I
99.9
0.1
97.1
2.1
65.0
25.9
68.8
28.0
39.4
51.7
5.1
89.6
100 100
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TABLE 5: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B)(%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100
Pab = 0
(Reference value)
(P = 0)
cv = .1
a
cvbb
I = 10
S B() = 1%I I
I = 100
- = 10%I - = 1%I
B
- = 10%I
0 100-
0+
50 100-
0+
90 25.8
73.9
100
25.0 A/E
74.7 Pr(M')
0.2 A/B
97.6 Pr(M')
0 A/B
100 Pr(M'.)
0 A/l
100 Pr(M') 100
3.0
97.0
99.9
0.1
91.0
8.9
3.6
96.2
100-
100
100 100
-169-
TABLE 6: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analyis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100
Pab = 0
(Reference value)
(PY = 0)
cv = .1
a
cvb = 1
I = 10 I = 100
S B(%) = 1%I I
0 99.8
0.1
50 94.1
3.2
- = 10%I
17.8
68.4
5.1
87.0
0.1
99.5
90 19.9
65.2
100
A/B
Pr(M')
A/B
B
- = 1%I
98.5
1.2
68.7
Pr(M') 21.7
A/B 5.7
Pr(M') 85.8
0 A/B
100 Pr (M') 100
B
- = 10%
I
2.8
94.1
0.4
98.6
100-
100 100
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TABLE 7: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100
Pab = 0
cv = 1
a
cvb 
= 
.1
I = 10
S (%) = 1%I I
0 100-
0+
50 99.9
0.1
90 98.8
1.2
= 10%I
98.8
1.2
92.0
8.0
21.9
77.9
0
(Reference value)
(P = 0)
I = 100
B1%
--= 1%I
A/B
Pr(M')
A/B
Pr (M')
A/B
99.5
0.5
98.8
1.2
78.7
Pr(M') 21.3
A/B 0
100 Pr(M') 100
B
- = 10%I
72.6
27.4
49.9
50.0
5.1
94.8
100
100 100
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TABLE 8: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
= 100 (Reference value)
pab = 1 (py = 1)
cv = 1
a
cvb = 1
I = 10
S B(%) = 1%I I
0 100-
I = 100
10%
100-
B
- = 1%
I
A/B
- = 10%I
100- 100-
50 100-
0+ Pr(M')
100- A/B
0+ Pr(M')
90 100-
0+
100
0 A/B
100
0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100
100- 99.6
3.6
100-
Pr(M') 100
100 100
-172-
TABLE 9: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100
Pab = 1
(Reference value)
(P, = 1)
cv = .1
a
cvb 
=
I = 10
S B
_ (%) _ 1 = 1%I I
0 99.9
0.1
50 99.6
0.5
I = 100
B10%
I
24.2
78.8
0.6
99,5
B
-= 1%I
A/B
Pr (M')
A/B
Pr(M')
- 10%I
99.6
0.5
93.3
8.1
1.6
98.8
100
90 24.2
78.8
100
0 A/B
100
1.6
Pr(M') 98.8 100
0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100100 100
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TABLE 10: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100 (Reference value)
pab = 0.86594 (pXy = 1)
cv = .1
a
cvb
I = 10
S BS() = 1%I I
I = 100
= 10%
- = 1%I - = 10%I
0 100-
0+
50 100-
0+
0 A/IB
100
100-
0 A/B0
100
100 0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100
0 a/I
100
100-
Pr (M')
100 Pr(M')
100
100
Pr(M') 100 100
100 100
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TABLE 11: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A 100 (Reference value)
Pab
cv
a
cvb
I = 10
S B
I I BI
I
= 0.86594 (py = 1)
= 1
= .1
I = 100
10% B %I
B
-- = 10%I
0 100- 99.1
1,2
50 100- 95,5
5.5
18.4
84.1
90 99.1
1.2
100
A/B
Pr(M')
A/B
Pr(M')
A/B
99.6
0.5
99.1
1.2
81.6
Pr(M') 21.2
0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100
75.8
27.4
54.0
50.0
4.4
96,4
100 100
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TABLE 12 : Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100 (Reference Value)
Pab = -. 5 (p• =-l)
cv = 1
cvb
I = 10
S B
- (%)I I
= 1
I = 100
10% B- = 10%B - 1%
0 96.1
0.5
50 92.1
1.2
90 64.3
11.5
100
64.3
11.5
48.6
21.2
15.1
57.9
A/B
Pr(M')
A/B
77.8
5.5
64.3
Pr(M') 11.5
A/B 33.2
Pr(M') 34.5
0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100
26.3
42.1
20.2
50.0
5.2
78.8
100 100
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TABLE 13: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Anslysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100 (Reference value)
Pab -. 9901 (Py= -1)
a
cvb = .1
cvb .1
I = 10 I = 100
S B(%) = 1%I I
0 99.3
0.5
50 97.1
2.3
90 24.2
72.6
100
B
I 10%
24.2
72.6
4.4
94.5
B
--= 1%I
A/B
Pr(M')
A/iB
97.1
2.3
75.8
Pr(M') 21.2
0 A/B
100
4.4
Pr(M') 94.5
0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100
-= 10%
I
2.9
96.4
0.1
99.9
100
100 100
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TABLE 14: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100 (Reference value)
Pab = -.79693 (P = -1)
cv = .1a
cvb 1
I = 10
S B(%) - = 1%I I BI
I = 100
10% B1- = 1%I
- 10%I
0 77.8
5.5
50 64.3
11.5
90 20.2
50.0
100
15.1
57.9
7.6
72.6
0.4
96.4
A/B 56.6
Pr(M') 15.9
A/B 40.7
Pr(M') ,27.4
A/B 7.6
Pr(M') 72.6
0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100
21.0
88.5
0.7
94.5
99.5
100 100
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TABLE 15: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100 (Reference value)
pab = -.79693 (pXY = -1)
ev =
cv =aevb
I = 10
S B(%) = 1%I I B _I-
I = 100
10% B1-= 1%
I
- = 10%I
0 100-
50 99.8
0.1
90 97.1
2.3
100
97.1
2,3
86.4
11.5
18.4
78.8
A/B
Pr(M')
A/i
Pr(M')
A/B
98.4
1.2
97.1
2.3
69.1
61.8
34,5
38.2
57.9
4.4
94.5Pr(M') 27.4
0 A/B
100 Pr(M') 100100 100
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ambiguous effect on the loss in market value (A/B). Depending on
the set of parameters for each specific situation, the loss may
increase or decrease.
vi. The correlation coefficient between the market values of existing
and new business (Pab) also has an ambiguous effect on the loss in
market value (A/B). But, in general, when slack is high, a positive
correlation is more favorable, because it tends to reduce this loss;
while if slack is low, a negative correlation tends to be more
favorable.
In conclusion, the policy that seems to emerge from this numerical
analysis reinforces the ideas that firms should try to increase their
slack, reduce the variance of the existing business, and look for new
investment opportunities which have both a high return on investment and
a low investment requirement. What is somewhat surprising is that there
are no clear recommendations for the variance of the new business and
its correlation with the existing business.
To check the robustness of the conclusions that the standard
deviation of B and the correlation coefficient between A and B have ambi-
guous effects over the market value, a limited exploration is conducted
with a truncated normal distribution. The results presented in Tables 16
and 17 confirm the conclusions obtained with the log-normal. The first
one of these tables shows that decreasing the variance of B improves the
situation for 0% slack and deteriorates it for 90% slack. The second
Remember that this variance and correlation coefficlent are referred to
the non-systematic variations in cash-flows.
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TABLE 16: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate truncated normal
distribution: Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A 1= 00
B = 10
ab = 1
I = 100
cvb = 1
(Reference value)
(P = 1)
cv = 1
a
A/B
Pr (M')
A/B
Pr(M')
81.7
21,2
0.2
99.9
These are.the parameters of the distribution before truncation.
S
I cv = 1a cvb = .1
100
0
0
100
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TABLE 17: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate truncated normal
distribution: Values for (A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%)
A = 100 (Reference value)
= 10
cv
ev
a
= 0,5
= 0.5
I = 40
Pab = 0.7
99.9
2.3
0+
100-
These are the parameters of the distribution before truncation,
A/B
Pr (M')
A/B
Pr (MI )
S (%)
s (z Pab = 0
92.4
7.7
0.1
98.4
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table shows the different impact that an increase in the correlation
coefficient has over the loss due to insufficient slack.
A final numerical analysis performed in the pure equity case is
obtaining the loss due to insufficient slack under a more intermediate
combination of parameters, to assess an order of magnitude for this
phenomenon in a more standard situation. The conditions and results
of the experiment are presented in Table 18. The value of A is arbi-
trarily fixed in 100 as a reference level. To estimate the other para-
meters, it is necessary to have a notion of the real time elapsing
between instants 0 and +1 in the model. This lapse has been assumed to
be around 4 years. It is not unusual to find firms growing from 40 to
50 percent in this period of time, so the investment requirement is fixed
at 40, and the net present value at 25 percent of the investment, or
B = 10. The new project is assumed to be very much related to the
existing business, as represented by a correlation coefficient of 0.7.
Finally, the standard deviation of the market value has been estimated
at 50 percent of the expected values A and B.
The conclusion from this analysis is that slack availability plays
a very important role in the market value of the firm, because it may
reach 63.2 percent of the net present value of the new project if slack
is zero. In general, for 0 and 25 percent slack availability the loss
is high; for 75 and 100 percent, it is low, and around 50 percent it is
not insignificant.
TABLE 18: Pure Equity Case
Sensitivity Analysis with the bivariate log-normal distribution:
(A/B) (%) and Pr(M') (%) for intermediate values of the
parameters
A = 100 B = 10
cv = 0.5 cv = 0.5
a b
Pab = 0.7
I = 40
S (%) A/B (%) Pr(M') (%)
0 63.2 48.0
25 29.7 78.0
50 7.1 95.0
75 0.2 99.8
100 0.0 100.0
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5.6 Some Notes on the Proposed Model
Many valid questions have been raised on the assumptions and implica-
tions of this model. The purpose of this section is to try to answer some
of the issues that seem to be the most controversial.
1) If slack is important, why not issue shares just to get slack, rather
than for project investment?
There is no gain for current stockholders when following this
strategy. This case is equivalent to a situation where the net market
value of the investment opportunity is always zero (see case b=0 in section
5.4.5). It was shown in there that the firm never issues shares unless
the implicit value of existing assets is at its minimum. If the probabi-
lity distribution for the value of this asset is assumed to be continuous,
this event has probability zero.
2) Why not issue shares at time -1, when everyone has the same information?
As stated in section 5.4.4, if the firm and the public have the same
amount of information, there is no loss for insufficient slack. This
condition is assumed to exist at time -1, so the question is, why not
issue shares at that moment and avoid the signaling impact of the decision?
In the context of this model, time 0 is defined by the decision of
the firm to issue or not to issue shares. So, the way in which the
question is presented is not an appropriate one. We are concerned with the
case in which there is a difference in information between the firm and the
public at the time the decision to issue or not to issue shares is taken.
We have to thank Prof. Fischer Black for his careful reading and valuable
commentaries.
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An important assumption made in the presentation of this model is that it
is a normal thing to have this difference in information. In the special
case of identical information in the public and the firm, the loss due to
insufficient slack goes away.
3) A strategy always available to a firm is
selling part of its existing assets and repurchasing
its own shares. Does introduction of this alternative
change our analysis?
This question forces us to clarify an assumption that has not been
explicitly stated in the formulation of the model; namely, that the
existing asset is illiquid. The concern
expressed is if by relaxing this assumption signaling
effects go away.
What in fact happens is that the signal transmitted to the market
by the decision of the firm is a more complex one, because it incorporates
both the investment decision, and the decision related to the sale of
the existing assets.
To properly address this problem, it is convenient to analyze first
the situation of a firm with no investment opportunity and holding two
assets. One of these assets can be sold for an amount R, while the
other is not sellable. Let:
A1 = Market value of the non-sellable business at time +1
A2 = Same for the sellable business
R = Sale value of the second business (value of its assets).
There are two alternative decisions for the firm: do nothing, or sell
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the second business. The question is what to do with the money in case
the second business is sold. Two situations will be explored; first,
the money is used to repurchase shares; and second, the money is kept
by the firm as cash.
In the first place, suppose that whenever the second business is
sold, the money collected must be used to repurchase shares. In this
case, it is possible to derive the equilibrium conditions for each one
of the two alternative decisions of the firm (do nothing, and sale-
repurchase). Without going into the details of the derivation, Table 19
presents the close resemblance of this case, with the model presented
in this chapter.
The alternative scenario for this analysis is assuming that the
decision to sell an asset is not linked with the repurchase of shares.
That is to say, the firm may keep the money obtained from the sale.
Table 20 shows the comparison of this situation with the model in
Chapter 5, when issue is not linked to the investment decision. The
important conclusion from this comparison is that most of the symmetry
observed in the previous case, when cash could not be retained by the
firm, is lost in this more realisitic case. Briefly explained, a good
sale opportunity for a firm is invariably linked to the retention of
the cash obtained, and not with the repurchase of shares (there is no
"negative" stock issue). A good project undertaken by a firm with
insufficient slack is always linked with the issue of new shares and the
investment of the cash obtained in the project (there is a "positive"
stock issue).
What this analysis shows is that restructuring the pool of existing
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TABLE 19: Equilibrium conditions when the sale of an asset is linked
with the repurchase of shares. Comparison with the model
in Chapter 5 when issue is linked to the investment decision.
(Cash retention is not allowed.)
Firm with two existing businesses,
one being sellable
(Sale-Repurchase/Do Nothing)
Case
a2 < R An interior equilibrium is
always attained.
Repurchasing shares cannot
reduce the market value.
a2 R Negative sum game for the
firm. No equilibrium
solution exists.
a2 = R Interior equilibrium solu-
tion is possible but not
guaranteed.
Firm with one existing business
and one investment opportunity
(Issue-Invest/Do Nothing)
Case
b > 0 An interior equilibrium
is always attained.
Issuing shares cannot
increase the market
value.
b < 0 Negative sum game for
the firm. No equilibrium
solution exists.
b ~ Interior equilibrium
solution is possible but
not guaranteed.
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TABLE 20: Equilibrium conditions when the sale of an asset is not
linked with the repurchase of shares. Comparison with the
model in Chapter 5 when issue is not linked to the investment
decision.
(Cash retention is allowed.)
Firm with two existing businesses,
one being sellable
(Sale-Repurchase/Sale-Keep Cash/
Do Nothing)
Case
Firm with one existing business
and one investment opportunuty
(Issue-Investment/Issue-Keep Cash/
Do Nothing)
Case
a2 < R Sell and keep cash is always
an optimum strategy.
Repurchase is justifiable
only if a2 is at its maximum
possible value, event occur-
ing with probability zero
for continuous distributions.
a2 > R Negative sum game for the
firm. No equilibrium solu-
tion exists.
a R Sell and keep cash when
a2 < R. Do not sell when
a2 > R.
b > 0 An interior equilibrium is
always attained.
If the firm issues shares,
it always invests when b > 0
and it is indifferent between
investing and keeping cash
when b = 0.
b < 0 Negative sum game for the
firm.
b 0 Equivalent to b > 0. When
issuing with b < 0, the firm
keeps cash.
-189-
assets via sales and repurchases of shares is a strategy that can be
pursued only under certain very special conditions. This strategy
cannot be viewed as a general mechanism to absorb the variability in
the market value of all existing assets. Therefore, it cannot eliminate
the signaling impact of a future investment opportunity.
To properly analyze the problem of signaling in the presence of
both existing assets that can be sold and a future investment opportu-
nity, a more complex model is required to represent the market value of
the firm. This model should include:
Al =,Market value of thenon-sellable business at time +1
A2 = Same for the sellable business
B = Market value of the investment opportunity at time +1.
The set of decisions available to the firm is not the simple
issue/no-issue dichotomy. In this case, it is necessary to distinguish
the following alternatives:
Sell the asset - Keep the cash- Issue (if needed) and invest
Sell the asset - Keep the cash - Do not invest
Sell the asset - Repurchase - Issue and invest
Sell the asset - Repurchase - Do not invest
Do not sell the asset - Issue and invest
Do not sell the asset - Do not invest
Do nothing
Some of these alternatives may be eliminated at the outset if they
are dominated by others, but the important point is that more than one
signal may be implicit in the decision of the firm. Therefore, the
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analytical and computational effort required to derive the equilibrium
solution increases accordingly.
4) Another way of getting cash is by selling an existing asset.
As shown in the previous case, this strategy is easily justifiable
when the value of the assets if sold is larger than the market value of
the business. If the sales value is equal to the going concern value this
is just like having extra slack. In other circumstances, the situation is
not at all clear, because the signal generated by the decision of the firm
is a complex one.
5) Investment and financing decisions should be considered separetely.
If the firm does not have sufficient slack, there is no way to
separate these decisions under the assumptions of this model. Some of
the alternatives that come to mind to disengage the investment and
financing decisions are discussed below.
- Issue shares just to create slack. (This has been discussed in point
1) above).
- Issue stock when the firm and the market have the same information.
(Discussed in point 2) above.)
- Sell an existing asset, (Discussed in points 3) and 4) above.)
- Borrow money. (Discussed in Chapter 6.)
- Have a private line with shareholders. (Discussed at the end of
section 5.2.)
- Spin off the new project into a separate corporation. If there are
no technological constraints, this is a viable course of action. But
most investment opportunities are not costlessly separable.
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- Delay the investment. If internal cash can be generated, this may help
in the solution of the problem. But, there may be costs associated with
the delay; most important, the competitive advantage and the whole
project may be lost.
If no cash is generated, no problem is solved with the delay,
because the difference in information between the firm and the market
is understood as a "normal" situation in the context of this model.
- Issue rights. If the signal implied by the rights issue is equivalent
to a private line with shareholders, the problem is solved. If it is
equivalent to a normal issue of shares, the signaling impact of the
investment decision does not disappear, so it cannot be viewed as
independent of the financing decision.
6) How does the dividend decision affect the signaling impact of the
investment decision?
The full study of the dividends question is beyond the scope of
this thesis, and it is proposed in the last chapter as a fruitful line
of future research. Nevertheless, it is possible to advance some
conclusions regarding the impact of a dividend policy.
Consider the description of a firm with an existing business and an
investment opportunity in terms of the parameters defined many times in
Chapter 5: (A,B), S, I, E = I-S, and f(a,b). The firm has an option to
issue or not to issue shares. Suppose that if shares are not issued, the
firm pays an amount u of dividends, while if shares are issued, this
payment is v.
The net worth of current shareholders in terms of the market value
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at time +1 is:
- If shares are not issued:
Dividends + Market value of the firm = u + (S+a-u) = S + a
- If shares are issued:
P'Dividends + Market value of the firm = v + (I+a+b-v).P'+E
It may be seen that shares should be issued whenever:
P'
v +p- (I+a+b-v) > S + aP'+E
This relation is equivalent to:
E + b i- (S + a- v)
If v, the dividend payment when shares are issued, is a constant known to
the market, the payment of dividends can be understood as a net reduction
of the firm's slack from S to (S-v), this having a negative impact over the
market value. If, on the other hand, v is positively correlated to a, the
impact of dividends over market value is ambiguous, because the negative
impact originated in the reduction of slack is opposed by a positive impact
of a smaller variance in the market value of existing assets.
This simple analysis made of the dividend decision ignores the possi-
bility of a change in the a priori distribution of (a,b) produced by the
announcement of dividends. This effect can be incorporated in a more
complete analysis. To put the model presented in Chapter 5 under a proper
perspective, A and B must be interpreted as the market values after the
dividend decision is made, f(a,b) their a posteriori joint probability
distribution, and S the slack net of dividend payments.
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CHAPTER 6: MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM WITH DEBT-EQUITY FINANCING
The previous chapter shows that, under certain circumstances, reject-
ing a good investment opportunity may favor current shareholders of a firm.
This proposition has been proven to hold in a perfect maket when public
and insiders information are different, the firm has insufficient slack
resources to cover the investment needs, and the only external source of
funds is equity issues. This chapter extends the validity of this proposi-
tion when two external sources of funds are available: debt and equity.
The interaction of slack insufficiency, and difference in public and
insiders information, generates a signal jointly with the investment deci-
sion of the firm. Inescapably, managers disclose to the market part of
their internal information with the decision to invest, because a
rational behavior on their part presupposes that current shareholders are
not being hurt. Consequently, the market reaction to the announcement
of a new investment, narrows down the set of states of the world to a
subset in which current shareholders are not worse off with the under-
taking of the new project.
The same basic signaling effect is also present when the sources of
external financing are debt and equity instead of pure equity. But, as
might be expected, this signal grows in complexity when debt is added as
an alternative source of financing. A general treament of this signaling
effect in a debt-equity case is not included in this study. What is given
instead, is a sequence of progressively more complete representations of
the problem, to illustrate the characteristics of this signal, gain some
intuitive understanding, and show how an optimal capital structure may be
derived from it.
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In a debt-equity situation, the public announcement of the firm's
plans seems to convey two signals: the investment decision (the firm indi-
cates if the project is or is not taken, just as in the pure equity case),
and the financing decision (debt-equity composition in case the project
is taken). In this chapter, the financing composition is assumed to have
no informational content whatsoever. The market is supposed to know
in advance the financial policy to be pursued by the firm in case the
project is taken.
Some fundamental differences remain between the debt-equity and the
pure equity cases, notwithstanding the apparent similarity between them
when the financing composition is assumed to have no informational content.
A most important difference is the addition of a new equilibrium condition
required by the introduction of debt. Also, debtholders' claims depart
in some crucial ways from shareholders' claims; namely, their claim has
priority, their compensation cannot exceed the face value of debt, and
there is a deadline for debt repayment.
When putting all these conditions together, the choice between
debt and equity financing is not clear cut. There are some situations in
which debt seems to be preferred (most notably when risk-free debt can
be issued), and others in which equity seems to be better. The signaling
impact of debt varies from situation to situation, and it is not always
simple to gain an intuitive understanding of a case, until the equilibrium
conditions are visualized.
In the analysis of the impact of debt over a longer planning horizon,
two opposing effects emerge. In general, debt financing in the short run
has a positive effect as a result of the reduced reliance on new equity;
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while in the long run, the higher level of debt oustanding may damage
subsequent investment opportunities of the firm. An optimum capital struc-
ture may be explained from the trade-off between these two effects; but,
as in the previous case, the signals under different situations are not
simple to visualize at a first glance.
This chapter presents the situation of a firm confronted with one or
two sequential projects. An effort is made to separate the impact of "old"
debt (previously oustanding debt) and newly issued debt. Also included are
some qualitative properties of debt financing and a limited numerical ana-
lysis.
6.1 One Project, New Debt Only
The case presented in this section assumes that a firm is confronted
with only one investment opportunity. The model is developed within the
same time framework used in the pure equity case, which is designated by
the instants -1, 0, +1. The evaluation of information through time is in-
dicated in Figure 20, and it is explained in what follows.
At time -1, the market and the firm have the same information. This
information is designated by ý, and may be summarized in the following set
of parameters:
- The firm owns an existing line of businesses and a new investment oppor-
tunity whose market values at time +1 are represented by the random
variables (A,B).
- The investment required to undertake the new opportunity is I.
- The slack available is S, and it is less than I. (Slack is not included
These values are discounted to the present for time and risk.
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MARKET VALUE
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FIGURE 20: Market Value in a Debt Equity Case
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in the market value A).
- If the firm goes ahead with the project, new debt with a face value F
will be issued. In this case, the market value of debt at time +1
is a random variable which is designated by D.
- The random variable D is dependent on (,iB) and F, but for the purposes
of the presentation, it is easier to assume that the triplet (A,B,D)
has a joint probability distribution f(a,b,d) defined over positive
values of (a,b,d) only. The values (a,b,d) are restricted to positive
values only, because if a is negative, shareholders are better of by
liquidating the current business; if b is negative, the new project is
not attractive, and it is dominated by the strategy of putting money in
the bank; finally, d cannot be negative because debt has limited
liability.
- The market value of the firm at time -1 is V (old), and it is owned
exclusively by the current group of shareholders.
At time 0, managers of the firm get the updated values of (A,B,D),
which are designated by (a,b,d). On the basis of this information, they
decide on the strategy that best serves the interest of current share-
holders.
The market reacts to the announcement of this decision by driving the
old old
market value of current shares to V ld(,issue) or V (4,no-issue), depend-
ing on the project being or not being taken, respectively. As in the pure
equity case, the market value of old shareholders' claims at time 0, after
the firm announces that the project is taken, is designated by P':
These valves are discounted to the present for the time and risk
involved.
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P' = Vold(ý,issue) (6.1)
If the project is taken, the firm issues debt with a face value F,
and its corresponding market value is designated by D. In general, new
equity must also be issued to fill the gap between the investment require-
ment and the funds available. New debt, new equity, and slack must add
up to the total investment, as indicated in (6.2):
D+E+S = I (6.2)
Adding the contribution of new debt and equity holders, the market value
of the firm at time 0 becomes
V(O,issue) = Vold(ý,issue)+D+E
= P' + D + E (6.3)
Debt holders have the first priority claim over this market value, and
old and new equity holders must share the residual amount in proportions
(P'/P'+E) and (E/P'+E), respectively.
At time +1, the updated information (a,b,d) reaches the market, and
the value of the firm must adjust to it. If the new project is not taken,
the market value of the firm changes to V[4,no-issue,(a,b,d)]. This value
is equal to old shareholders' claims, which is designated by
Vold[(,no-issue,(a,b,d)], and must satisfy relation (6.4):
V[4,no-issue,(a,b,d)] = Vold[ý,no-issue,(a,b,d)] = S+a (6.4)
If the new project is taken, the market value of the firm adjusts to
V[ý,issue,(a,b,d)]. The claims over this value are:
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Vold[,issue,(a,b,d)] = old shareholders' claim
D [ý,issue,(a,b,d)] = new debtholders' claim
E [ ,issue,(a,b,d)] = new shareholders' claim.
Relation (6.5) must be satisfied, because all claims must add up to the
total market value.
V[4,issue,(a,b,d)] = V o[,issue,(a,b,d)] + D[L,issue,(a,b,d)] +
+ E[ý,issue,(a,b,d)] = I + a + b (6.5)
By definition, the claim of debtholders at time +1 is equal to d. There-
fore, (6.6) holds:
D[4,issue,(a,b,d)] = d (6.6)
The residual value of the firm after subtracting this claim, is shared by
old and new equity holders as indicated in relations (6.7) and (6.8):
old P'
V d[,issue,(a,b,d)] = P'+E (I+a+b-d) (6.7)
EE [4,issue,(a,b,d)] = P'+E (I+a+b-d) (6.8)
Equilbrium Conditions
The impact of the investment decision over the current group of
shareholders is summarized in the value of their holdings under each one
of the two alternative settings. These values are given by
V old[,issue,(a,b,d)] [relation (6.7)], and Vol [d [ ,no-issue,(a ,b ,d)]
[relation (6.4)], depending on the project being or not being taken,
respectively. Old shareholders are better off by not taking the project,
whenever the following relation is true:
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V old[,issue,(a,b,d)] < V old[,no-issue,(a,b,d)]
By substituting the expressions recently derived for these two quantities
[relations (6.4) and (6.7)], the condition obtained is:
P'P'+E (I+a+b-d) < S + a
Recalling that I = D+E+S [relation (6.2)], and collecting the terms (S+a)
at the right of the inequality, this condition may be restated as:
P' E
P'+E [E+b-(d-D)] < P'+E (S+a) (6.9)
The term [b-(d-D)] represents the contribution of the new project once
the capital gain or loss to debtholders is net out, and it is designated
by bnet as indicated in (6.10):
b = b - (d-D) (6.10)
Replacing this term in condition (6.9) for not taking the new project
produces a more familiar relation:
P' E
PE (E+bnet) < (S+a) (6.11)P'+E net P'+E
This expression is identical to the one obtained in the pure equity
case (5.13), and its interpretation is also the same: the new project
should not be taken when the benefits derived by old shareholders
(expression on the left-hand side) are less than the cost of giving up part
of the existing business to new shareholders (expression on the right-
hand side).
The condition for not taking the new project may be rewritten as:
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E + b < E,- (S+a) (6.12)net P
In the space (a,b net), this condition is identical to (5.14) in the
pure equity case. In Figure 21, two regions M and M' are defined by the
line
E
E + bnet = - (S+a)
An outcome (a,b ne t ) in region M' signals a favorable project, while one
in region M indicates an unfavorable one. Formally, these regions are
defined as:
M = {(a,bnet) a>0, E+b < - (S+a)} (6.13)net net PT
' = {(a,b ) a>0, E+b > - (S+a)l (6.14)
net net -_ P
The definition of regions M and M' in this case is not strictly equal
to the corresponding definitions in the pure equity case. The difference
is that bnet is not restricted to non-negative values. This implies that
there are situations in which old shareholders are better off by taking
a project that, after subtracting the net capital gain or loss of debt-
holders, has a negative net present value. In those particular situa-
tions, the group of new shareholders will take the burden of the loss.
This is not unfair to new shareholders, because in other cases they will
be getting more than their contribution to net out all a priori expecta-
tions of a capital gain or loss.
In a priori terms (when looking from time -1 perspective), it seems
to be an odd behavior to have in the set of alternatives a project with
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FIGURE 21: Regions M and M' in the Debt-Equity Case
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negative bnet , because the market value of old shareholders' shares at
that time is penalized by that inclusion. The firm may be more than will-
ing to declare its intention not to take such a course of action, and the
price of shares should go up immediately. The problem is that if later on
the firm really faces one of those alternatives with bnet < 0, (a,bnet
is in M'], the economic incentives are acting in favor of undertaking the
new project. Therefore, the market determines the value of the firm
according to the assumption that managers will pursue the maximum long run
benefit for old shareholders and this means taking projects with a nega-
tive bnet on some occasions.
Condition (6.12) for not taking a new project may be expressed in
terms of the original variables (a,b,d), by replacing the values of bnet
for [b-(d-D)], as given by (6.10). The result of this transformation is:
(D+E) + (b-d) < E (S+a) (6.15)
The same two regions M and M' may be defined in the three-dimensional
space (a,b,d) or in the two-dimensional space (a,b-d) (see Figure 22).
Formally stated:
M = {(a,b,d) > 0 (D+E) + (b-d) < -E- (S+a)} (6.16)P?
M' = {(a,b,d) > 0 (D+E) + (b-d) > - (S+a)} (6.17)
These definitions do not give any new economic insight but are helpful from
a computational point of view, because the original values of (a,b,d) are
fixed, while the value of bnet depends on the unknown parameter D.
In the framework of this model, the firm maximizes the value of current
shareholders' shares at time +1. It is important to notice that among
the group of shareholders, the actual managerial team is most likely
included.
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The decision to take or not to take the project, conveys to the market
the information that (a,b,d) is on M' or M, respectively, and the market
value of the firm adjusts accordingly. If the new project is not taken,
old shareholders' shares go to V (old(,no-issue), which is equal to the
expectation indicated below:
Vold (,no-issue) = Ex{Vold (,no-issue,(A,B,i)]j(A,B,D) in M}
Using relation (6.4), this expression is reduced to:
V (old,no-issue) = S + X(M) (6.18)
where:
A(M) = Expected value of A contingent upon (A,B,D) being in M.
Consider now that the new project is taken. For market equilibrium,
two conditions must be satisfied. First, the market value of debt must be
equated with the expected value of debt repayment:
D = Ex{D I (A,B,D) in M'} = D(M') (6.19)
Second, the market value of old shareholders' shares must fulfill the
following expectation:
old oldV (0,issue) = Ex{V [o,issue,(A,B,D)]I (A,B,D) in M'}
Using relation (6.7), this second condition may be expressed as:
old P'
V (4,issue) P [I + A(M') + B(M') - D(M')]
where:
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A(M'),B(M'),D(M') = Expected values of A, B, and D, respectively,
conditioned upon (A,B,D) being in M'.
Finally, notice that P' is identical to V old(,issue) [relation (6.1)],
I is equal to D+E+S [relation (6.2)], and D is equal to D(M') [relation
(6.19)]. Therefore, the market value of old shareholders' shares under
equilibrium, when the new project is taken, must satisfy the following
relation:
V (old,issue) - P' = S + A(M') + B(M') (6.20)
Relations (6.19) and (6.20) are a set of two equations in the unknowns
P' and D. As in the pure equity case, this is not a simple system to solve,
because both P' and D participate in the definition of region M'. Nonethe-
less, the existence of a solution can be proven to exist for joint probabi-
lity distributions continuous in (a,b). (The proof of this statement is
given in Appendix 6.)
Once the value of P' is found, the market value of old shareholders'
shares at time -1 is simply determined as a weighted average under the
alternatives of taking or not taking the project:
V () = v old(,no-issue).Pr(no-issue) + Vold( ,issue)*Pr(issue)
Algebraic manipulation of this formula produces the following equivalent
relations for Vold(4). (Algebra is similar to the pure equity case, so
it is not repeated in here.)
vold () S + A + B(M') Pr(M') (6.21)
Vold(0) = S + X + E - B(M) Pr(M) (6.22)
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These relations show that the market value of the firm, prior to the
announcement of the investment decision, fully reflects the current line
of business, and partly reflects the value of the opportunity. The
total loss due to insufficient slack is equal to:
A(4) = B(M) * Pr(M) (6.23)
A summary of the equilibrium conditions is given in Figure 23.
6.2 General Implications of Market Equilibrium in the Debt-Equity Case
Getting a more intuitive understanding of the equilibrium relations
in the debt-equity case is not an easy thing. Even the simple model in
this study displays sufficient variety to make the overall picture not
a simple one. In this section, an effort is made to gain a better under-
standing of some general implications stemming from the equilibrium
relations.
6.2.1 The case of risk free debt
A risk free debt is defined as one paying an amount equal to the face
value of the bond for all possible combinations of (a,b,d); therefore,
the market value of debt is also equal to this face value:
d =D = F
Region M' to take a new project [relation (6.17)] is defined by:
M' = {(a,b,d) > JIE+b > j (S+a)}
-PV
This definition is identical to region M' in a pure equity situation
[relation (5.16)], except for the equity requirement which goes down to
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TIME
FIRM TAKES NEW PROJECT
Vold [ý,issue, (a,b,d) ]= -!-(I+a+b-d) .. (6.7)
FIRM DOES NOT TAKE NEW PROJECT
V ld[ý,no-issue,(a,b,d) ] S+a .. (6.4)
TIME
Definition of Region M' = ISSUE
HM fabd)0 (D+E)+(b-d) (S+a) 1 .. (6.17)
-ýft
with: D -= (M') ..(6.19)
E = I-S-D ..(6.2)
vold(f,issue)EP ' = S+X(M')+B(M') ..(6.20)
Definition of Region M - DO NOT ISSUE
M-{ (a,b,d)>O0 (D+E)+(b-d)<Er (S+a)}..(6.16)
Vold (0,no-issue) - S+A(M) .. (6.18)
TIME
vold( ) = S+A+B(M')-Pr(M') .. (6.21)
= S+A+B-B(M)*Pr(M) .. (6.22)
Loss due to insufficient slack
d(#) = B(M)*Pr(M) ..(6.23)
0
FIGURE 23: Conditions for Equilibrium in a Debt Equity Case
__.__
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(I-S-D) from (I-S). This smaller requirement makes the combination of
risk-free debt and equity more attractive than pure equity financing,
because the loss in market value due to insufficient slack is lower for
a reduced reliance on external equity (see Theorem 2 in Appendix 2).
This situation improves with increasing debt financing.
Another interesting conclusion is that slack cannot be equated with
risk-free debt, because the total claim of shareholders is different for
these two situations. Consider two identical firms, one with an amount
S of slack and no risk-free debt, and the other with an amount S of risk-
free debt and 0 slack. The first one of these two firms is more valuable
to shareholders, because they own more of it. This is no more than a
scale problem, however. The economics of the two cases are basically
similar. The conclusions in this section may be extended to a situation
in which the debt payment in all states of the world is a well known
constant, independent of the face value of debt.
6.2.2 Local approximation for risky debt
A more realisitic representation for the value of risky debt at time
+1, is to assume that it moves jointly with the market value of the firm.
The simpler approximation for debt value is to consider that, between
times 0 and +1, the change in debt value is a fraction of the change of
the overall firm's value. Formally:
(d-D) V [ ý, i s s u e , ( a ,b, d ) ] - V(O,issue)D V(,issue) I
with y constant in (0,1).
Using relations (6.2), (6.3), and (6.5), this condition is rewritten as:
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(d-D) [(D+E+S) + a + b - (P'+D+E)D P'+D+E
or
(d-D) = P (S+a+b-P')P'+D+E
Replacing this difference in the definition of region M' [relation
(6.17)] produces the set of values (a,b,d) for which the project is advan-
tageous under these assumptions:
E0M' = {(a,b,d) > 0 I EO+b >  r (S+a)} (6.24)
- P'
where:
E= --E+tP' (6.25)I-a
E = (I-S) - D (6.26)
= yD = yD (6.27)P'+D+E P'+(I-S)
This problem is equivalent to a pure equity situation in which the
amount of equity required is E', as may be seen in (6.25). The special
condition imposed by the presence of debt, is that EO must satisfy
relation (6.25), which is a function of the market value of debt (D).
Consequently, the equilibrium solution must be found by solving simul-
taneously for P' and D. One way of doing that is presented in Figure 24.
By solving the "pure equity" problem as a function of E0 , it is
possible to find the equilibrium value P'(E*), which is a downward sloping
ap'
curve in the figure, because aE, < 0 (Lemma 1, Appendix 2). On the
other hand, formula (6.25) relating P' and EO must be satisfied too. This
equation is the branch of an equilateral hyperbole asymptotically
approaching the axis EO = yD+E, and P' = [(l-y)D+E], as shown in the
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1(debt constraint)
IEquilibrium
solution
(yD+E)
FIGURE 24: Equilibrium solution for a debt-equity situation when a local
approximation of risky debt is used
·)
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figure.
The equation of this hyperbole may be obtained by replacing (6.27)
in (6.25). This equation is:
[(yD+E) - E°] - {P' + [(l-y)D+E]} = Y(l-y)D2
From here it may be found that there is an advantage in debt
financing, because the hyperbole in the figure moves up when debt is
increased, as may be seen from the differential:
(aP' = (1-y)[P'+(1-y)D+E] + [yD+E-E.]y + 2Dy(l-y)
D E (yD + E - EO)
Both numerator and denominator are positive, therefore,
') > 03D EO
When Y is allowed to go up with D, this result does not necessarily
hold, and the possibility exists for having an intermediate combination
of debt and equity being preferable to pure debt or pure equity financing.
This is due only to the signaling impact of the investment decision in
the presence of debt. No treatment is made in this section of the
variable y case. In that situation, a full model seems to be more appro-
priate than this local approximation for debt payment. A more general
analysis of the impact of debt is made in the ensuing sections of this
chapter.
But still, there is no mention of the long-range impact of debt.
Nothing is said of the difference between the face and market value of
debt. The introduction of the long-range impact of debt is done in two
steps. First, the model with only one new investment opportunity is
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expanded to allow for old debt outstanding; and second, a new model with
two projects in sequence is considered.
6.3 One Project, New and Old Debt
The main objective in this section is to present a model in which
the combined effect of both old oustanding debt, and new debt issues affect
the firm's investment decision. By adhering closely to the steps followed
in section 6.1, it may be shown that, after some parameters are redefined,
this case is equivalent to a situation in which only new debt is considered.
The algebraic detail is omitted because it may be reconstructed from
the previous case. Only the formulation of the problem and the conclusions
are included.
The problem may be stated in terms of the following information:
- The firm owns an existing line of business and a new investment opportu-
nity whose market values at time +1 are represented by the random
variables (A,B).
- The investment required to undertake the new opportunity is I.
- The slack available is S, and it is less than I (slack is not included
in the market value A).
old *
- There is an old debt outstanding with a face value of F . The market
value of old debt at time +1, when the new project is not taken, is a
old *
random variable which is designated by Do . If the new project is
-old *
taken, this random variable is D
- Also, when the new project is taken, new debt with a face value F is
These values are discounted to the present for time and systematic
risk.
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going to be issued. The market value of this new debt at time +1 is
designated by the random variable D.
~ Bold Bold
- The distribution of the random variables (A, B, D0 , D , D) is
assumed to be known.
This problem is identical to the situation with only new debt, if the
following variables are replaced for (A,B) in section 6.1:
oldAO = - old (6.28)
old -old
Ba = B - (D -Do ) (6.29)
AO and B0 correspond to the net market value of the existing business
and the new investment opportunity, when the payment already committed to
old debt outstanding is discounted from them. In this way, the market
value of the existing business (which is A), is reduced by the payment
committed to old debtholders when the new project is not taken (which is
-oldDo ). On the other hand, if the new project is taken, old debt will
old -old
change its value from Do to D This change is subtracted from the
net present value of the new project (which is B ).
The only difference between this case and the situation with only
new equity, is that Ao and B0 are not restricted to non-negative values.
If Ao were negative, it is better for current shareholders to liquidate
the old business before engaging in the new project, if that is a permissi-
ble reaction. In this case, a more proper definition of A0 is:
-old
A0  = max[O, A- Do ] (6.30)
These values are discounted to the present for time and systematic
risk.
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A negative BO implies that a formerly attractive project has been
transformed into a project with negative net present value after payments
to old debt oustanding are discounted. This is a long-range impact of
debt that becomes more important when the face value of old debt exceeds
its market value by a wide margin.
A conclusion from this analysis is that old debt outstanding may
impact the market value of the firm in two main ways: by changing the
signaling effect of the investment decision (A*, BO depend on old debt),
and by forcing the rejection of good projects with negative BO. Some
numerical analyses are performed later on the relevance of these impacts.
6.4. Two Sequential Projects, Only New Debt. The Optimal Capital
Structure Problem.
In this study, a firm has been characterized as having an existing
line of business and owning the option for a good investment opportunity.
At a certain point in time, the firm must announce its decision to go
ahead or discard this opportunity. If the decision is to go ahead with
the investment, the firm must indicate also the financing plans in terms
of new debt and new equity to be raised. In the context of the model
presented, the sources of financing are fully specified by the parameter
F, which is the face value for new debt being issued.
The assumption made in developing the equilibrium relations in the
debt-equity case is that F is well-known prior to the firm's announce-
ment. In other words, when F is announced, it carries no information
content: the value given could have been guessed at time -1.
To justify this assumption it is necessary to observe that the firm
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is a going concern, and that the selection of F will have an impact on
future investment decisions considered by the firm.
When a new bond series is issued, the market must determine its fair
value. This value depends on the firm's current business and future
investment decisions. But those future decisions are going to be condi-
tioned by all debt outstanding at that time, including the future issue
of still more new bonds.
As a consequence, the value of a new bond is dependent on the policy
that the firm follows with regard to its capital structure. If the firm
were to have a very unpredictable capital structure, the market value of
new bonds should be properly discounted, because managers are purusing
the well being of shareholders, and this objective may be in conflict
with debtholders' own objectives. If, on the contrary, the firm announces
its capital structure policy, this extra variability would be eliminated
and the bonds- could reach a higher market value. This digression may
justify the managers' preference for a stable capital structure, as a way
to communicate in a simple and very forceful manner the policy being
pursued by the firm.
Assuming that the capital structure policy has to be declared by the
firm at time -1, what is a sensible selection for F? A proper objective
for this problem is the maximization of shareholders' claims at that time.
To get an adequate representation of the value of these claims it is neces-
sary to expand the model presented in the debt-equity situation. That
model fails to capture the delayed impact of F over investment decisions
taken after the immediate one.
A complete analysis of the capital structure problem falls beyond
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the scope of this study; therefore, what is presented in the rest of
this section is a more limited exploration of the problem to illustrate
that the selection of F is a trade-off between the short-term advan-
tages obtained by the increased financing of the immediate investment,
and the long-term problems created by the higher level of debt out-
standing.
Consider a firm owning an actual line of business, and two sequential
investment opportunities. The two opportunities may be understood as
a short term and a long term investment, respectively. As a first step,
the firm must announce its decision regarding the .immediate project.
Later in the future, a similar decision has to be made with the other
project.
Both opportunities are assumed to have positive net present values;
therefore, if the firm has sufficient slack at the time the decisions are
made, both projects would be taken. The model to be presented assumes
that the firm does not have sufficient slack when the decision on the
short term investment is made. Therefore, if the project is taken, the
firm must select its financing composition.
The slack availability at the time the second decision is taken
is an endogenous variable. To fully specify the model, it is necessary
to introduce some additional assumptions in order to determine slack at
that time. The assumption used here is that slack at the time the second
decision is taken does not matter. Whether the firm is sure to have
sufficient slack later in the future, or it can issue a risk free debt,
or raise new debt and new equity in some proportion to avoid the signal-
ing effect, the assumption made is that there is no situation in which the
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firm will discard the second investment decision due to insufficient slack.
In this way, a model can be formulated to capture, in an exclusive way,
the problem of slack availability with the first investment decision, and
the problem of debt outstanding with the second one. The model is formally
developed around three time instants which are designated by -1, 0, and +1.
As before, the information in the firm and the market evolves at a differ-
ent pace, but the important problem now is the selection of F, which is
assumed to occur at time -1.
The model is expressed now by closely following the steps in Section
6.1, for a debt-equity situation. Special emphasis will be given only to
those features which are characteristic of this problem, mainly the selec-
tion of F.
At time -1, the information available to both the market and the firm
is designated by 4, and it is the following:
- The firm owns an existing line of businesses and two sequential invest-
ment opportunities whose market values at time +1 are designated by (A,B)
and c, respectively. The market value of the second investment oppor-
tunity is assumed to be a well-known number. (It is not random.)
- The investment required to undertake the first opportunity is I.
- The slack currently available is S, and it is less than I. (Slack is
not included in the market value A.)
- There is no old debt outstanding.
- If the firm goes ahead with the immediate project, new debt with a face
These values are discounted to the present for time and systematic risk.
This is not an important assumption, because by redefining variables
(A,B) it is possible to transform a problem with old debt outstanding
to one without it (see section 6.3).
-219-
value F is going to be issued. The market value of this debt at time
+1, when the second project is not taken, is a random variable which is
designated by D. If the second project is taken, this debt is assumed
to become risk-free, and the payment at time +1 is equal to the face
value.
- The triplet (A,B,D) has a known probability distribution.
- The market value of the firm at time -1 is V old(), and it is equal to
the claims of old shareholders.
- The firm must choose F at this time.
At time 0, the firm gets to know (a,b,d), and it must decide if the
first project is taken or not. In case the project is taken, the firm
issues a new debt with face value F.
If the project is not taken, the market value of old shareholders'
claims becomes Vold (,no-issue), while if it is taken, these claims go
to P' = Vold(4,issue). In this last case, the market value of the firm
is;
V(C,issue) = P'+D+E (6.31)
where:
D+E+S = I (6.32)
and
D = Market value of the new debt issue with a face value F.
E = Market value of the new share issue.
These values are discounted to the present for time and systematic risk.
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The claims over this market value are assumed to be as usual: the
first priority is given to debtholders, and the residual is shared
between old and new shareholders in the fractions P'/(p'±E) and E/(P'±E),
respectively.
At time +1, the market gets the updated information (a,b,d) and the
market value must adjust to it. If the project is not taken, the
market value is identical to old shareholders' claims, and it is equal
to;
V old ,no-issue,(a,b,d)] = S+a (6.33)
If the project is taken, the market value aggregates the claims of
old shareholders, new debtholders, and new shareholders, and it is
equal to:
V[P,issue,(a,b,d)] = I+a+b (6.34)
At the same time, the firm announces if the second project is taken
or not, and the market value of the firm should also reflect this new
piece of information. Consequently, the real market values at time +1
are the following ones for each specific situation:
Neither the first nor the second projects are taken:
V old[,no-issue, (a,b,d),no-take 2] = S+a (6.35)
First is not taken, and second is taken:
V ol[P,no-issue, (a,b,d),take 21 = S+a+c (6.36)
First is taken, and second is not taken:
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V[(,issue,(a,b,d),no-take 2] = I+a+b (6.37)
Both first and second are taken;
V[ ,issue,(a,b,d),take 2] a I+a+b+c (6,38)
When the first project is taken, the claims of old shareholders depend
on the decision with the second project.
If the second project is not taken:
V od[ ,issue,(a,b,d),no-take 2] = PE (I+a+b-d) (6,39)
If the second project is taken, new debt is supposed to become risk
free, paying in all states of nature the face value of the new debt (F).
Therefore, old shareholders have the following claim over the market
value.
Vold [,issue,(a,b,d),take 2] = P- (I+a+b+c-F) (6.40)
Equilibrium Conditions
As in all previous cases, managers of the firm use the updated in-
formation (a,b,d) to the benefit of current shareholders. This gives
a signal to the market that affects the market value of the firm, re-
quiring an adjustment to the new situation, It is in the benefit of
current shareholders not to take the second project when the first one
is taken, whenever the following condition is satisfied:
Vold [,issue,(a,b,d),take 2] < Vold #,issue,(a,b,d),no-take 2]
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Using C6.39) and (6.40) for the. two sides of this inequality, this
condition is reduced to:
c < F-d (6.41)
This implies that the second project should not be taken whenever
the gains to debtholders are greater than the gains from the new project.
This is exactly the rationale given by Myers when discussing corporate
borrowing [70]. His observation is that, without taxes, the value of
the firm decreases with the use of debt, because, higher values of F
imply a larger fraction of situations in which the gain to debtholders
derived from the decision to take the project outweighs completely its
total net value.
When the first project is not taken, the decision with regard to
the second project is to take it under all circumstances. This is be-
cause the second project has a positive net present value (c>0), and
the assumption is made that slack availability is not a problem when
the decision is announced. In fact, comparing the pay-off when the
second project is not taken [S+a, given by (6.35)], and when it is taken
[S+a+c, given by (6.36)], it may be observed that the second strategy
dominates the first one.
In summary, the equilibrium conditions imply that the market value
of old shareholders' claims at time +1 has the following values:
If the first project is not taken:
V old[,no-issue,(a,b,d)] = S+a+c (6.42)
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If the first project is taken:
P' (I+a+b-d)
V [4,issue,(a,b,d)] =
+a+b+c-F)(I+a+b+c-F)
P'+E
if c < F-d
(do not take 2)
if c > F-d
(take 2)
At this point, the problem is not different from the debt-equity
situation analyzed in section 6.1. All relations obtained in there apply
also to this case by redefining the variables (a,b,d) as indicated below.
a
° 
= a+co  + c
b - c
b
do = 1 b
F
if c < F-d
if c > F-d
if c < F-d
if c > F-d
(do not take 2 if 1 is taken)
(take 2)
(do not take 2 if I is taken)
(take 2)
An immediate conclusion to be derived from relation (6.21) is that
the market value of the firm is equal to:
V old() = S + Ao + BO(M')*Pr(M') (6.47)
Replacing the values of AO and BO(M') that may be derived from
(6.44) and (6.45), the market value of the firm may be expressed as:
V old() = S + (A+c) + [B(M') - c.Pr(c<F-dIM')]oPr(M')
Substituting B(M')*Pr(M ') for [B-E(M)*Pr(M)], this relation is finally
reduced to:
(6.44)
(6.46)
(6.43)
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V old() = S+A+B+c- [B(M)*Pr(M)+coPr(c<F-dlM')*Pr(M')] (6.48)
The term in brackets is the loss in market value due to insufficient
slack, and it is equal to:
A( ) = B(M)*Pr(M) + c*Pr(c<F-dlM')*Pr(M') (6.49)
The first term captures the loss in the immediate project due to in-
sufficient slack, and the second one represents the loss in the future
project due to the level of debt outstanding. In general, the impact
of insufficient slack is reduced for large values of F, because the
project is better financed. At the same time, the impact of debt out-
standing is increased for large values of F, because it is harder to exceed
the gap between face and market value of debt [which is (F-d) in the rela-
tion above]. The optimal selection of F is the one that minimizes the
total loss, and this selection is a compromise between these two opposing
effects.
In this way, it is possible to define an optimal capital structure
as one that balances the short-run negative effects of not using sufficient
debt ("the signaling problem"), with the long-run negative effects of
using too much debt ("the mormal hazard problem").
These two names were suggested by Prof, Myers in the course of our
discussions, and they capture very nicely the issue of the two
problems. Too little debt in the short run implies that the firm
cannot avoid giving a signal when announcing its decision with re-
gard to the first investment, (This is the signaling problem.) Too
much debt in the long-run implies that there are situations in which
a good project will not be taken, because too much of the benefits
accrue to bondholders, If these situations could be avoided by some
sort of contract; shareholders would be benefited; so, in a priori
terms, they are willing to sign it. But, if a situation like that
arises, managers will lack the incentive to satisfy their commitment,
and the contract could hardly be enforced (see Myers 170]). This is
the moral hazard problem.
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6.5 Sensitivity Analysis in the Debt-Equity Case
This section presents a limited numerical analysis of the debt-equity
case. This analysis is focused on issues which are peculiar to the
prescence of debt. In the first term, the joint probability density func-
tion for all random variables is specified, and then an algorithm is
proposed for solving the system of two equations in the unknowns D (market
value of new debt at time 0), and P' (market value of old shareholders'
shares, after the firm announces its decision to take the project).
6.5.1 Joint probability density function, and the market value of debt
at time +1.
In the case presented in section 6.1, a firm with insufficient slack
is faced with only one investment opportunity. If this opportunity is
taken, the firm issues new debt with a face value F. From today's perspec-
tive, the market value at time +1 of the existing business, the new project,
and the new debt, are designated by the random variables (A,B,D). The
probability density function of this triplet is f(a,b,d).
In this study, the value d is supposed to be a well-knwon function
of the pair (a,b). The reason for this assumption is that (a,b) deter-
mines the market value of the firm at time +1, and that the market value
of debt can be computed with this information and the face value of debt
(F), under fairly general assumptions. Formally stated, the specification
of the joint probability function is done in terms of:
f(a,b) = Joint probability density function for (A,B)
d(a,b) = Market value of debt contingent upon the updated
information (a,b).
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For the numerical analysis, f(a,b) is assumed to be a bivariate log-
normal distribution, and d(a,b) is the following function:
d(a,b) = Ex{min(V,F)} (6.50)
where V is log normal, with mean V = (I+a+b), and coefficient of variation
cvd'
In Appendix 7 it is shown that this debt value may be computed as:
d V ,(hF - - a) +Fi-( nF - u (6.51)
u u
where:
- n V (6.52),
/1+c 2'd
a2 = Rn(l+cv2) (6.53)
u d
D(Z) = Distribution function for a standardized normal random
variable = Pr(Z < Z)
In section 6.3, when old and new debt are considerd, similar assump-
tions are made for the numerical analysis. For the pair (A,B), a bivariate
log-normal is also assumed. The market values of old and new debt are
computed with relation (6.51) for the following values of the parameters
V and F (the coefficient of variation cvd is assumed constant):
dod Market value of oUd debt if the new project is not taken
Relation (6.51) withkV = (S+a), and F = Fold.
dold Market value of old debt if new project is taken
= Relation (6.51) with V ~ (+a+b), and F = Fold
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dn ew  , Market value of new debt (new project is taken). It is
old
computed jointly with do
dold+dn ew = Relation (6.51) with V = CI+a+b), and F = (Fold+Fnew).
Finally, in section 6.4, when t.; sequential projects are considered,
the market value of debt when the first project is taken and the second
one is not, is computed also with relation (6.51).
6.5.2 Algorithm for finding the equilibrium solution.
A general algorithm for finding the equilibrium conditions in a
debt-equity case, can be derived on the basis of relations expressed in
terms of (a*,bo) (the market values net of old debt payments). The
basic steps in this algorithm are get started by assuming an initial
configuration of region M' (new project is taken) to find a first
estimate of D, then solve the "pure-equity" problem obtained when D is
known, and finally check if the assumptions done with regard to MI are
correct or need to be modified.
In more detail, the ateps of the algorithm are described below
and summarized in Figure 25.
Step I: Get Data:
I,S,Fold Fnew,Distribution of f(a,b) : {ai,b ,p j },
and parameter cvd
Step 2: Compute (a9,bP ) and d for all pairs (a,b)
[Relation (6.28)]a olda -ad .
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Get:
D (6.19)
E (6.2)
Jil
FIGURE 25: Algorithm for Finding M' and P' in the Debt-Equity Case
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b* = b-[dold-dol d ]  [Relation (6.29)]
old r·aw old
d = [relation (6.51) with 7 = (I+a+b), F = (F +F - )]-d
Step 3: Initialize region MW as
M1 = All pairs (ao,bQ)
start
Step 4: Get D,E as:
D =  Ex{D1M1 start) [Relation (6.19)]
E = I-S-D [Relation (6.2)]
Step 5: Get bnet for all pairs (a*,bo):
bnet = bo-(d-D) [Relation (6,10)]
Step 6: Solve the "pure equity" problem with parameters S,E,
Distribution of {a,b . In this step a new M' (named M' )
net end
and the corresponding P' are obtained.
Step 7: Check if M' and M' are equal.
start end
- If M' = M' , then PRINT results and STOP
end start
- If M' B M' , then define
end start
M' = M'
end start
and go back to step 4.
The convergence properties of this algorithm are discussed in
Appendix 8.
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6.5.3 Results obtained
The first issue examined in this numerical analysis is observing the
total loss in market value when debt is made available in a situation with
an intermediate set of parameters, and comparing those results with the
pure equity situation. The set of parameters chosen and the results ob-
tained are presented in Table 21. The conclusion is that debt-equity
financing is dominated by pure equity financing in the two examples
presented.
The observation above cannot be generalized to conclude that, in
general, pure equity is preferred to debt-equity financing. In fact,
the second issue examined is determining the total loss in market value
for different combinations of old and new debt. The conditions and
results of this experiment are present in Table 22. Three conclusions
may be derived from here: first, the impact of debt in the long-run
appears to be detrimental for the market value of the firm. (Observe
in Case 1 that increasing old debt enlarges the loss in market value.)
Second, the impact of debt in the short-run appears to be favorable
for the market value of the firm, (Observe in Case 2 that increasing
new debt reduces the loss in market value.) Third, a stable debt-
equity financing policy may be better or worse than pure equity
financing. (Observe in Case 3 that moving toward debt financing in-
creases the loss in market value in the first two examples and reduces
it in the last one.)
The first two conclusions may be explained in terms of the "moral
Remember that no tax shield advantages are included for debt.
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TABLE 21: Debt-Equity Case
Market Value Loss for Intermediate Value of Parameters
(A,B) log-normally distributed with parameter
WA 100
cv a  .5
Pab .7
B = 10
cvb = .5
I = 40
Debt policy:
F old Fnew
= = .5
(S+A) (I-S)
cvd = .5
Debt-equity situation
A/B(%)
100
14.2
Pr(M') (%)
Pure equity situation
A/1 (%)
63.2
89.5 7.1
Pr(M') (%)
48.0
95.0
A represents the loss in market value of the firm and it is computed
as (M'))*Pr(M').
S ()
s__(z
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TABLE 22: Debt-Equity Case
Market Value Loss for Different Combinationi of Old and New Debt
(A,B) log-normally distributed
"A 100
d = 0
'd"
Pab = 0
Case i: Fnew = 100% of I
cva cvb
I B F l d (% A)
1 1 100 10
1 .1 10 10
F new(% of I)
100
100
100
100
100
100
Case 2: F ld = 10% of
Fold
I B F (% of A)
1 1 100 10
1 1 10 10
Fne w ( % of I)
90
100
10
100
A/B (%)
70.8
18.2
0.03
15.4
0.03
Pr(M') (%)
26.4
72.4
99.9
75.8
99.9
Case 3: F ld/A = Fnew/
CVb B F ld(% of ) = Fn e w ( % of I)
.5 100 10
.3 .3 100 10
.1 .1 100 10
A/B (%) Pr(M') (%)
66.3
67.6
70.1
71.9
48.3
48.3
53.8
3.0
2.9
2.4
0.4
32.0
30.6
28.4
26.9
50.5
50,5
45.2
97.0
97.0
97.6
99.5
0.03
18.2
0
7.4
45,7
CVa CVb
100
99.9
75.1
100
96.9
54.0
cv
a
.5
A/B (%) Pr(M') (%)
- -
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hazard problem" created by old debt outstanding, and the "signaling
problem" generated by the insufficient slack availability. Nonetheless,
this model is inadequate to explain the existence of an optimum capital
structure, because it considers only the long run effect of old debt
with the short-run effect of new debt.
The last set of experiments have been designed to gain some further
insight into the problem of a firm capital structure. In the first
place, Table 23 presents some numerical analysis to measure the level of
magnitude of the moral hazard and signaling losses, for different
combinations of slack availibility and old debt outstanding. The moral
hazard problem alone is 1.mportant only at very high levels of old debt,
especially when slack is low. This is the loss obtained when the
expectationa for the future are that new projects will be 100% debt
financed without any problem, Vf on the contrary, projects in the
future musat be 100% equity financed, the total loss in market value
increases in a very tignificant way when old debt is outstanding for
all levels of slack. Therefore, though raising debt is helpful in re-
ducing the equity required for the immediate project, its future impact
may go between "midly negative" (if forthcoming projects are pretty
much financed), to '"very negative" (if those projects can only be
financed via new equity issues). The important conclusion for the
purposes of this thesis is that slack availability is an important
determinant of the loss in market value.
The final exploration of the capital structure problem is done with
the very simple dynamic model introduced in section 6.4. The main
See section 6.4 for the description of these two problems.
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Debt-Equity Case
A Measure of the Long and Short Run Impacts of Debt
(A,B) log-normally distributed with:
A - 100
eVa - .5
pab - .
I = 40
B - 10
evb = .5
CVd = 0
The long run impact of debt outstanding (the moral hazard loss):
Fnew - 100% of (S-I)
Loss in market value as percentage of B
S (z)
0 0
old/i (%)
50
3.2 16.5
1.0 10.0
0.1
0
5.1
1.9
0.4
100
36.7
28.0
20.2
13.5
7.4
The short run impact of debt unavailability (the signaling loss):
Fold = Fnew = 0 (pure equity situation)
Loss in market value as percentage of B
63.2
29.7
0.2
0.0
The long run impact
pnew = 0
of debt (both signaling and moral hazard loss):
Loss in market value as percentage of B
S (1)
0
25
50
75
100
0
63.2
29.7
7.1
0.2
0.0
25
97.1
57.7
14.8
0.6
0.0
old/ (
50
100
100
41.8
2.3
0.0
75
100
100
100
901
0.4
100
100
100
100
31.0
This loss is computed as the reduction in market
new project is not taken because its net present
increase in the value of old debt.
value obtained when the
value is less than the
In general, when Fold # 0 and Fnew # 100%, the signaling and moral
hazard losses cannot be separated.
TABLE 23:
25
50
75
100
Sy ()
100
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feature of that model is considering a short-term and a long-term invest-
ments decision, to capture the impact of new debt in its immediate and
delayed effects. The conditions of the analysis and the results of the
experiments are presented in Table 24.
The results obtained for a coefficient of variation of .5(cvd = .5)
follow exactly the a priori expectations for the total loss in market
value; namely, when Fnew is increased, the loss in market value in
the immediate project goes down (because the project is better financed),
and the loss in the future project goes up (because the level of debt
outstanding increases). In the examples presented, the total loss has
an interior minimum.
The regultg obtained for a cqeg icient qf variation of 1 (cvy 1)
are somewhat surprising but not unexpected, The short-run impact of
new debt completely dominates the situation. This loss goes down
initially (as expected), but then it turns around and climbs up to 10
(which is 100% of the value of the immediate project). That is to say,
in the signal transmitted for -very high values of new debt, the clean
statement of extra funds availability is overshadowed by the heavy loss
incurred in the future. The market conclusion is that the immediate
project cannot be taken at tht high level of debt. This example
shows that the distortion of the signal introduced by the presence of
debt, may escape our intuition of the problem. Further analysis is
certainly required to gain a deeper insight on the market signals
generated by the combination of debt and ecuity in an on-going business,
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TABLE 24: Debt-Equity Case
The Optimal Capital &StructLre for a Firm with Two Sequential
Investments
(A,B) log-normally distributed with:
parameters
Fold
50
50
50
75
75
50
50
50
50
50
60
60
A = 100
cv = .5
a
Pab
Net present
S = 0
I = 100
and policy
Fnew
B = 10
cv = .5
value of second project: c = 10
Short-run
B(M)'Pr(M
3.79
0.725
0.045
3.06
2.515
6.44
5.70
6.59
10.00
10.00
5.34
10.00
Loss in Market Value
Long-run
') cPr (c<F-d M')-Pr(M')
0.000
0.225
2.235
0.000
2.315
0.00
0.00*
0.66
0.00**
0.00*
0,00"
0.00"*
TOTAL
3,79
0.95
2.28
3.06
4.83
6.44
5.70
7.25
10.00
10.00
5.34
10.00
The total loss in the long run project is zero, because that project can
always be taken at the level of debt outstanding shown.
The total loss in the long run project is zero, because the immediate
project cannot be taken at the level of &abt shown. Therefore, by the
assumptions in the model, the second project is always taken.
Debt
cv d
.5
.5
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CHAPTER 7: A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF MERGERS: A MERGERS RATIONALE
The theoretical development pres •nted in this study opens the possi-
bility of specifying conditions favoring merger. As was stated
at the beginning of Chapter 4, The basic idea has been to find a
way of explaining the merger p':h omenon without violating fundamental
assumptions in the theory of finance; namely, market equilibrium and
rational maximization of sharehlders' well being pursued by the managers
of the firm.
The mechanism suggested rests on the idea of financial slack. The
concept of slack and the way in which slack availability may affect
the market value of the firm has been presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The
fundamental conclusion is that the macket value of a firm with insuffi-
cient ýlack may not capture the total value of future opportunities.
When the full value of future opportunities is not recognized
in the market value of a firm, there is room for an abnormal gain by
injecting resources into the firm. If the drop in market value is A (the
loss due to insufficient slack), and the amount of resources injected is
(I-S) (to insure that the investment requirenrent I is available),
then the market value of the firm has to jump in (I-S)+A. There is a
net capital gain by the amount A in this operation.
This mechanism is a very powerful incentive for merging. In general,
if a "cash rich" firm (a firm with excess slack) merges with a "cash poor"
firm (a firm with insufficient slack), the consolidation automatically
generates a capital gain when the excess slack in the cash rich firm can
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fully satisfy the need for slack in tne other firm. This gain stems from
the market recogniuion of the full value of f.uture opportunities owned by
the cash poor firm, and it is equal ro A.
Mergers understood as a procedurý for transferring cash from cash-
rich to cash-poor firms can exolain many mergers episodes. The actual
mechanism by which this transfer of resources may occ...r is the tender-
offer route. According to the assumptions used in the development of this
model, there is sufficient public information to know if all potential
opportunities that a firm has are being represented in the market value.
When slack is insufficient, it is clear for everybody that there is an
expected positive gain by buying the firm at its market value at time 0,
before the firm declares its intention regarding the new project. Con-
sequently, the unexpected tender offer is a form of merging that can be
justified within the scope of this m del. WIat may require some further
analysis is the negotiated merger. This is done in section 7.5 at: the
conclusion of this chapter.
The transfer of resources to fully cover the cash needs of the
acuired firm is not the only situation under which a merger may be poten-
tially advantageous. The me:hodology for determing the market value of
slack exposed along this study, can be used also to explore many different
situations in which mergers can make sense. The procedure is to determine
the market value of the firms as independent entities, and as a combined
business concern, and choose the strategy with the highest value. Notice
that the arguments are identical to justify the merger of two firms, or
the separation of them. The choice depends on the condition
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that renders the best value, as indicated in the following decision table:
Marlket Values
Current State Indeednt >jered Independent < Merged
Firms are Independent Do nothing Merger
Firms are Merged Divest Do nothing
In general, nothing can be said about the best course of action in
a particular situation. It all depends on the conditions prev:.iling on
the firms participating in the deal at the time the decision to merge
(or dive·,t) is being considered.
This section develops a methodology for determining the equilibrium
market value of two firms that merge, in cases where the total slack is
insufficient to cover for the needs of the two firms. (The analysis
corresponds to the case of one firm with two investment opportunities
instead of one.) Three cases must be distinguished: first, total slack
is inFtifficient to cover the investment requirements for any one of the
two firms separately, but not for both of them; second, slack can cover
only the needs of the firm with lower requirement; and third, slack cannot
cover the need for any one of the firms.
The slack availability and the investment requirements are designated
by S1 and S2 , and I and I2, for firms 1 and 2, respectively (with I > I2)
The formal definition of the three cases above is:
Case 1: 1 < I < SI+S0 < T +1
2- 1- 1 2e 1 2
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Case 2: I2 < SI+S 2 < I1
Case 3: SI+S 2 < 12 < I1
The three cases are analyzed when only equity is available as an external
source of cash.
7.1 Case 1 (Slack is sufficient to cover any one of two investment
requirements): I2 I < S +S2 < 1 +I2
A firm in this situation has the choice of going ahead with either
of the two projects. Also, if it appears advantageous, it can raise in the
market an amount E = (1+1 2) - (S1+S2) of new equity and go ahead with
the two projects. It is always advantageous t. invest in at least one
project, because their net present values are non-negative.
The nomenclature and methodology used is similar to the pure equity
case. Firm 1 has market values at time +1 B•~1 } for current business
and future opportunity. For firm 2, the corresponding market values are
A2 B21. These market values have a joint probability distribution
f(al,b!,a2,b2)
, 
and the actual outcomes are designated by (al,bl ) and
(a2,b2) , respectively.
The firm gets to know (al ,bl,a2 ,b2) at time 0, and announces its
decision, which may be:
- Take only project 1
- Take only project 2
- Take both projects.
Case 2 is defined for I2 < iL only.
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The market response in these three situations is to drive market
values to the following levels, respectively:
V old(,take-l) = P1  (7.1)
V (old,take-2) = P2  (7.2)
V old(,take-both) = P12  (7.3)
The market values of old shareholders' shares at time +1, when
(al,bl,a2,b2) become known in the market are, respectively:
V old[,take-l,(al,bl,a2,b2)] = Sl+S 2+a+aa2+b 1  (7.4)
V old[,take-2,(al,bl,a2 ,b2)] = S1+S2+al+a2+b2 (7.5)
old 12
V l,take-both,(al,a2,bb 2)] E+P (E+S1+S2+al+a 2+bl+b 2 ) (7.6)
12
Three regions are defined in space (albla2,b2): M' M2 , and M124
In the first region, the best strategy is to take project 1 only; in
the second, take project 2 only; and in the third, take both projects.
The three regions are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Their formal definition is the following:
For each 4-tuple (al,b 1 ,a2 ,b2) define the following term:
mx = mx(al,bl,a2,b2) = max [Sl+S2+al+a2+bl; Sl+S2+a+a2+b2;
P1 2E+P 2 (Sl+S2+al+a2+bl+b2)] (7.7)
E12
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Then:
M1. = ((albl,a 2 ,b 2 ) Imx = S1+S 2+al+a2+bl} (7.8)
M1  = {(al,bla2,b2) mx = S1+S2 +a l+a2+b2 }  (7.9)
P12
M 2 2  {(a l , b l ,a 2 ,b 2 )  = E+P (S1 +S2+a1 +a 2+b+b2) (7.10)
12
The equilibrium conditions that may be derived from here are the
following:
If project 1 is taken:
P1 = Ex {V d[,take-l,(A1,B,A, 2 ,B 2 )1M }
= 1 + + S + A(M 1 ) + A2 (M1 ) + Bl (M ) (7.11)
If project 2 is taken:
P2 Vold
P2 Ex oldp,take-2,(A1,B1,A2,B 2)] M2}
= Sl + S2 + Al(M2 ) + A2( 2 ) + B2 (M2 ) (7.12)
If both projects are taken:
P12 Ex Vold f[,take-both(A1 ,B1 ,A2,B 2)] IN1 2
P2
E+P12 [E+S1 +S2+A(M 1 2 )+A2 (M1 2 )+B1 (M1 2 )+B2 (M1 2
= 1 + S2 + AI (M 1 2 ) + A2 (M1 2 ) + B1 (M1 2 ) + B2(M1 2 ) (7.13)
This case looks more complicated than the pure equity case with one
If a 4-typle (al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 ) belongs to more than one of the MP, M2 ,M1 2 , it has to be assigned to only one of them in any arbitrary way.
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investment opportunity, but in fact it can be reduced to it without any
problem. This is possible because there is only one degree of freedom
in the system, and this is the variable Pi2. Once this variable is found,
all three sets (Ml, M2 , and M12 ) are determined, and the other two
equilibrium market values (PI and P2) are also determined.
The one project situation equivalent to this case may be defined
in terms of the following parameters:
S = S1 + S 2
I = Il +12
E = I -S
a = al + a 2 + max(bl,b 2)
b = min(bl,b 2 )
P12 is the equilibrium market value when project b is taken.
Without going into the details of the derivation, it is not hard
to see that the loss for insufficient slack becomes:
A12(ý) = B1(M 2 ) * Pr(M 2 ) + B2 (M1 ) - Pr(M1 ) (7.14)
This loss should be compared with the sum of the two losses when
firms are independent:
AS() = A(ý)+ A2 () = B(Mo) Pr(Mo) + B2 (M2) * Pr(12) (7.15)
No general statement can be made from comparing these two expressions.
The loss A12 () in the merger may be larger or smaller than the loss
AS( ) of the two individual firms aggregated. For example, consider
The superscript o has been added to indicate that these regions are
defined for each firm considered separately.
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that firm 1 is a firm in a mature industry, in which all new investment
opportunities have a net present value close to zero (bl small). On the
other hand, firm 2 is in a rapidly growing market with the net present
value of investment opportunities very high (b2 large). The convenience
of merging or not depends on where slack is initally located. If most
of the slack is in the aging firm, the merger is good, while if the
situation is the other way around, individual firms look more attractive.
7.2 Case 2 (Slack is sufficient to cover only the lowest of two invest-
ment requirements): 12 < S1+S2 < I I
In this case, the firm always has sufficient slack to take project 2,
but if project 1 is taken, it must raise E1 = I1-(S1+S2 ) in new equity,
while if both projects are taken, the need for new equity is
E = (1 1+1 2 )-(S 1 +S2 ).
The parameters P1, P2, and PI2 are defined just as in the previous
case, as the market values at time 0, after the firm announces it is
going to take project 1 only, project 2 only, or both projects,
respectively [see (7.1), (7.2), (7.3)].
At time +1, when (al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 ) becomes known to the market, the
values of old shareholders' shares are the following under each one of
these alternative decisions:
Vold[ ,take-l,(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 )] E 1+P (E1+S1+S2+al+a2+bl) (7.16)
vold[ý,take-2,(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 ) ] = S1 + S2 + al + a2 + b2 (7.17)
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V old,take-both,(al,b,a 2,b2  E+P12 -(E+S+S 2+a+a 2+b+b 2 ) (7.18)2d2)o, blP 12) 1 2 1 2 1 212
As before, three regions may be defined in space (al,bl,a 2 ,b2), and
they are called M1 , M2 , and M12. The best strategy is to take project 1
only in the first region, two only in the second, and both projects in
the third region. These regions are mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive, and their formal definitions are:
For each 4-tuple (al,bl,a2 ,b2) define the term:
mx = mx(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2) = max [El+P1  (E1+S1+S 2+al+a2+bl); Sl+S2+al+a2+b 2
12E+2P (E+S1+S +al+a2+bl+b2 )  (7.19)
12
Then:
M1  = {(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2) mx = (El+S1+S2+al+a2+bl)} (7.20)
M1 = {(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 ) mx = S1+S2+al+a2+b 2 } (7.21)
P12
M12 = {(al,b 1 ,a2 ,b2) mx = E+P (E+S +S 2+al+ a2+b +b2)} (7.22)12
The equilibrium conditions imply the following relations in this-
case:
If project one is taken:
S =Ex {V°old ( , t a k e - 1,(AlB,A2,B2)
EI+PI [E +S1+S2+A1 (M1 )A 2 (M1 )+B (M1
If (al,bl,a2 ,b2 ) belongs in more than one region, the tie is broken
arbitrarily.
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P1  = S1 + S2 + A (M . ) + A2(M i ) B 1 ) (7.23)
If project 2 is taken:
P2 = Ex {Vold[p,take-2, ( 1,l',A 2 ,B 2 )IM 2 2
= + S2 + Al  2 (M ) A 2( 2 ) + B2 (M2 ) (7.24)
If both projects are taken:
ldoldPi2  Ex {VOd [,take-both,(Ai,B1,A2,B2 ) IM1 2}
Pi12
E+PE [E+S 1+S2+A (M12)+A2 (M1 2)+B1 (M12)+B 2 (M1 2)]
SS 1 + S2 + Al(M12) + A2 (M12 ) + B1(M12) + B2 (M1 2) (7.25)
Solving for P1 , P2 ', and P12 is more laborious than in the previous
case, because there are two degrees of freedom instead of one. It is
necessary to solve simultaneously for P1 and Pl2, the value of P2 being
dependent on the other two.
The loss for insufficient slack may be expressed just as in
relation (7.14):
A2() (M2 ) * Pr(M 2 ) + B2(M 1 ) * Pr(M1 )
This value may bear any relation with the sum of individual losses when
firms are independent. Therefore, no general statement can be made on
the convenience or inconvenience of mergers.
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7.3 Case 3 (Slack is insufficient to cover any one of two investment
requirements): S1+S2 < 12 < 11
This final situation finds the firm unable to undertake any of the
two projects with its own resources. If a project has to be taken, the
firm must turn to the market, and the amount of equity required in
each one of the three alternative situations is:
To take project 1 only:
E1 = 1 - (S1+S2)
To take project 2 only:
E2 = 12 - (S1+S2)
To take both projects:
E =  (11+12) - (S+S 2 )
In this case, the firm also has the option of not taking any
project. This option was not considered before, because the firm could
always take project 1 or 2, and that decision strictly dominates the
decision of not taking any project (net present values of new projects
are assumed non-negative).
Consequently, the market value of the firm after it announces its
decision may have the following values: Pl if only project 1 is taken
[relation (7.1.)], P2 if only project 2 is taken [relation (7.2)], Pl2
if both projects are taken [relation (7.3)], or PO if no project is taken,
where:
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PO vold ,no take) (7.26)
At time +1, when (al,bl,a2 ,b 2 ) becomes known, the values in the
market are:
Vold [,no-take,(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 )] = S1 + S2 + a + a2  (7.27)
Vold [,take-l, (al,bl,a2,b2)] -- (E51 +S12+a1+a2+bl) (7.28)
Vold [,take-2,(al, 1 ,a 2 ,b 2 )] E= 2p2  (E2 +S1+S2+al+a2+b 2 ) (7.29)
old[,take-both, (bla2b 2)  12V take-both,(a,bl,a2 b2  E+P12 (E+S+S+ 2+al+a2+bl+b2) (7.30)
12
Depending on which one of these four values is higher, it is possible
to define four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive regions
in the space (al,bl,a2,b2). These regions are designated by Mo, M9' M2'
and M1 2, and they represent the set of values of (al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 ) for
which the optimal strategy is to take no project, take project 1 only,
take project 2 only, and take both projects, respectively. Their
formal definition is:
For each 4-typle (al,bl,a2 ,b 2 ) define the term:
Pi
mx = mx(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2) = max [S1+S2+al+a 2; E+P1. (E+S1+S2+a+a2+b );
22 a12
E2 P2  (E2+S+S 2+al+a2b 2 ) E+P1 2  E+SS2+al+a2+b+b2) (7.31)
Then:
If (al,b,,a2,b2) belongs in more than one region, the tie is broken
arbitrarily.
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M = {(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 ) I mx = S1 +S2+al+a2 } (7.32)
M1 = {(al,bl,a 2 ,b 2 ) j mx = E+P (E 1+S+S 2+al+a2+bl)} (7.33)
M2  = {(al 9 bl,a 2 b2 ) mx -- (E2+S1 +S 2+a+a 2 +b 2 )} (7.34) ,  = 12+F2  (72
S12 1((ablba 2lb2) MX= E+P12 (E+S1+S 2+al+a 2 b +bl2)} (7.35)
12
The equilibrium conditions, in this case, can be shown to be:
P =  S1 + S2 + A1 (M) + A2 (M) (7.36)
Pl  = S + 2 + Al(M1 ) + A+2(M ) + B1(Mi ) (7.37)
P2 S + S2 + A1 (M2 ) + A2(M2 ) + B2(M2 ) (7.38)
P12 = S1 + $2 + A1 (M1 2) + A2 (M1 2) + B(M1 2 ) + B2(M12) (7.39)
To find these equilibrium values, it is necessary to solve simulta-
neously for P1 , P2 , and P12" The value of PO is dependent on these
three equilibrium values.
The loss for insufficient slack can be expressed as:
A2(•) = Bl(Mo)'Pr(Mo) + B1 (M2 )'Pr(M 2) + B2 (Mo)'Pr(Mo ) + B2 (M1 )'Pr(M 1)
= B1(Mo or M2 )*Pr(Mo or M2 ) + B2 (Mo or M1 ) Pr(MO or Mi) (7.40)
No general statement can be made from comparing this expression with
the losses for insufficient slack for the two individual firms when added
together. Under all circumstances, these losses follow the same basic
pattern; namely, they aggregate the expected market value of projects 1
and 2, for all cases in which they cannot be taken, times the corresponding
-250-
probabilities of those events. Nevertheless, comparisons are hard,
because the set of (al,bl,a2 ,b2) values for which projects 1 and 2 should
not be taken are defined by different rules. Also, they depend on the
values of parameters for slack and investment, and on the joint probabi-
lity distribution of (al,bl,a2 ,b2).
7.4 Some Numerical Examples
To illustrate the models presented in this chapter, two examples
of merger analysis are presented in Tables 25 and 26. The two examples
correspond to a case 1 situation, in which the combined slack of the two
firms is supposed to be sufficient for taking any one of the two projects.
The conclusion is that when at least one of the firms does not have
sufficient slack, the possibility exists of deriving a net capital gain
from the realization of the merger.
The two examples address the merger of firms of different size.
Consider example 1, in which firm 1 represents the "large" one, and firm 2
the "small" one (1/5 the size of the other firm approximately). Firm 1
has an investment opportunity with a net present value of only 5% of the
investment (a "mature" firm). The investment in firm 2 has a net present
value of 12.5% (a "growing" firm). If the total slack is equal to 40,
the optimum strategy is merging.always, because the loss due to insuffi-
cient slack for the merger is always less than the losses added for
individual firms for all combinations of slack in each firm. This conclu-
sion is not true for some higher values of slack. For example, if total
slack is 50, it is better not to merge when the slack in firm 1 is 40, and
the slack in firm 2 is 10 (the total loss is 1.926 for the two individual
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TABLE 25: Changes in Market Value When Two Firms Merge. Example 1.
Description of Firm 1
(,11i) approximately truncated
normal
A1  100.4 B 1  2.1
al 49.1 1 = 1.54
al blI
Pabl 0.697
I, = 40
Description of the merger
Description of Firm 2
(2,' 2) approximately truncated
normal
A2 = 20
a2 = 9.36
Pab2 = 0.365
12 = 40
B2 = 5.0
Cb2 = 2.18
Conly when total slack > 40)
A = 125.5
a .= 58.55
a 0751
Pab m 0.751
S= 2.055
Ub = 1.55
1) Total Slack = 40
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR
Slack Slack Loss in
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
2,098
2.098
2.098
2,096
2,000
THE MERGER = 2.007
INDIVIDUAL FIRMS:
Loss in
Firm 2
0.000
0.000
0.016
1.926
3.410
Losses
Added
2.098
2.098
2.114
4.022
3.410
2) Total Slack = 50
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR
Slack Slack Loss in
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
2.098
2.098
2,098
2.096
0.000
0.000
THE MERGER = 2.007
INDIVIDUAL FIRMS:
Loss in
Firm 2
0.000
0,000
0,000
0.016
1.926
3.410
Losses
Added
2.098
2.098
2.098
2.112
1.926
3.410
Optimum
Decision
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
Optimum
Decision
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
No Merge
Merge
- ------------- ·II~···-· ·  ----- ~--·II~ ~llp·l111^ -·n~------·-· .~----~----II~ ·~i~l~p·
I~------~-----__·__I~_____· ~---·---~I_-~ · Ip-- -·1~·~-·-··111~·-···-··-·- -·---
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TABLE 25: Continued.
3) Total Slack = 60
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR THE MERGER m 2.007
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRMS:
Slack
Firm 1
Slack
Firm 2
Loss in
Firm 1
2.098
2.098
2.098
2.096
0.000
0.000,
0.000
Loss in
Firm 2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.016
1,926
3.410
Losses
Added
2.098
2.098
2.098
2.096
0.016
1.926
3.410
4) Total Slack = 70
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR THE MERGER = 2.007
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACY FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRMS:
k Slack Loss in Loss in
I Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
2.098
2.098
2.098
2,096
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.016
1.926
3.410
Optimum
Decision
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
No Merge
No Merge
Merge
Slac
Firm
Losses
Added
2.098
2.098
2.098
2.096
0.000
0.016
1.926
3.410
Optimum
Decision
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
No Merge
No Merge
No Merge
Merge
- i --1--~--~11 ~-- II-- I -~I~---·- ·-------- ·- Ui-·4·-- · ·~i·---·--·IP·-·l)~-·~
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TABLE 25: Continued.
5) Total Slack a 80
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR
Slack Slack Loss in
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1
2.098
2.098
2.098
2.096
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
THE MERGER
INDIVIDUAL
Loss in
Firm 2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000+
0.016
1.926
3.410
=0
FIRMS:
Losses
Added
2.098
2.098
2.098
2.096
0.000
0.000+
0.016
1.926
3.410
Optimum
Decision
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
Indifferent
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
6) Total Slack Between 70 and 80
DETAILED ANALYSIS FOR TRE CASE SLACK IN FIRM 2 IS 40
(LOSS FOR INSUFFICIENT SLACK IN FIRM 2 IS 0)
Slack in Total
Eirm 1 Slack
Losses Loss for
Added* Merger
2.096
2.095
0.390
0.035
0.002
0.000
2.007
1.398
0.083
0.011
0.001
0.000
Optimum
Decision
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
Merge
Indifferent
This is equivalent to the loss in Firm 1.
_I ~-"
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TABLE 26: Change in Market Value When Two Firms Merge. Example 2.
Description of Firm 1
(A1 ,B1 ) approximately truncated
normal
Al - 100.01 81 - 10.02
a1 =35.7 o =4.53
Pabl - 0.274
1 ;= 100
Description of Firm 2
(A22 ) approximately truncatednormal
A2 = 10.03
aa2 4.72
Pab2 = 0.144
12 = 20
B2 = 2.11
Sb2= 1.40
Description of the merger (only when total slack > 100)
A = 120.07
c a = 38.8
Pab = 0.204
B = 2.09
rb = 1.39
1) Total Slack = 100
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR THE MERGER
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR INDIVIDUAL
Slack Slack Loss in Loss in
Firm 1 'Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
70
80
90
100
.30
20
10
0
0.225
0.051
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.157
1.432
2) Total Slack = 110
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR THE MERGER
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR INDIVIDUAL
Slack Slack Loss in Loss in
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
70
80
90
100
110
0.225
0.051
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.157
1.432
= 1.649
FIRMS:
= 0.199
FIRMS:
Losses
Added
0.225
0.051
0.159
1.432
Optimum
Decision
No Merge
No Merge
No Merge
No Merge
Losses
Added
0.225
0.051
0.002
0.157
1.432
Optimum
Decision
Merge
No Merge
No Merge
No Merge
Merge
---
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TABLE 26: Cobitinued.
3) Total Slack w 120
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR THE MERGER = 0
LOSS DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SLACK FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRMS:
Slack Slack Loss in Loss in
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
70
80
90
10o
110
120
0.225
0.051
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.157
1.432
Lo
Ad
sses
ded
0.225
0.051
0.002
0.000
0.157
1.432
Optimum
Decision
Merge
Merge
Merge
Indifferent
Merge
Merge
I,
- ---
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firms, vis-a-vis, 2.007 for the merger). Similar cases arise for slack
of 60, and 70. When total slack is 80 or more, the merger is convenient
again always, because the total slack allows the undertaking of both
projects, without recurring to themarket (there is no signaling effect).
Mergers appear as a mechanism for transffering slack from one firm
to another. In general, if this transfer could be completed without
merger, opportunities for capital gains should be available until the
marginal value of one extra unit of slack is identical for all firms.
This clean transfer of funds does not occur with a merger, because at
the same time the slack resources are pooled together, the interest of
the two firms are brought under a unique group of shareholders, and this
changes the information content of the investment decisions taken by
the merged firms. The combined effect of slack resources transfers and
information changes may or may not be in favor of the merger completion,
this depending on the parameters defining each particular case.
This analysis presented in the pure equity case can be generalized
to a debt-equity situation, and to the case in which any finite number
of projects is available for the firm to take. These generalizations
are not presented in the context of this thesis, because they do not add
a great deal to the basic conclusion that the amount of slack held by
firms affects their market value, and that this mechanism opens the
possibility of justifying mergers in terms of the capital gain that they
can generate when part or all the value of future opportunities that
was not being valued in the market is recognized in the joint value of
participating firms.
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7.5 Negotiated Mergers
All previous sections in this chapter have explored the conditions
under which a tender offer may be an attractive strategy for a firm to
follow. Broadly speaking, whenever there is a positive expected payoff
from the merger, there are clear incentives for immediate take over at the
prevailing market price or at a premium up to the amount A (the loss in
market value due to insufficient slack).
This section analyzes the negotiated merger under the assumptions of
this study; that is to say, superior internal information and insufficient
slack in the firm being acquired. The conditions in Chapter 5 are assumed
to be descriptive of the prevailing situation: the firm has an existing
business, a good investment opportunity, and the only source of external
funds, aside from merger, is a new equity issue.
Assume that this firm is approached by a prospective buyer, and it
is offered an amount Q' for the whole firm. The expected payoffs for
current shareholders depend on the decision of the firm, as indicated below:
If the firm accepts the merger (and it goes ahead with the project):
V old[,merger,(a,b)] = Q' (7.41)
If the firm does not accept the merger (and it does not go ahead with the
project):
oldV [old,no-merger,(a,b)] = S + a (7.42)
The merger route appears to be convenient whenever Q' exceeds (S+a). This
condition defines a region N' in which the merger is convenient. Formally
stated:
-258-
N' = {(a,b)> 0 1 Q'>(S+a)} (7.43)
The equilibrium value of Q' must satisfy the condition:
Q' = S + X(M') + E(N') (7.44)
It is not hard to show that this merger offer is totally unsatisfac-
tory for the firm, because it can always do better by going directly to
the market and issuing stock. In fact, by methods similar to the ones
used in Appendix 1, it may be shown that this equilibrium value Q' is a
lower limit for the value P' which the firm would obtain by issuing stock.
The intuitive reason for this result is that the decision to issue stock
carries some negative information with respect to the current business.
This makes new shareholders discount the market value of the firm by a
certain amount, in order to make the expected payoff identical to their
contribution. In this case, current shareholders still have some fraction
of ownership; but, if the firm is sold, they are completely disengaged from
the firm. That makes the prospective buyer discount the market value more
heavily for having the expected payoff equal to the price they offer.
Given that this one shot negotiation procedure is not available as
an alternative, the only way to understand a negotiated merger under the
premises of this study is by assuming that there is a partial or total
disclosure of the internal information during the negotiation process.
The firm being acquired may get a full recognition of its intrinsic value
in this process; or, at least, it may get more value than through the
normal channels in the market. In this way, there is a potential gain for
the seller, because it can exceed the valuation performed in the market
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with less updated information. There is also a potential gain for the
buyer, if it can force the other firm to accept less than its intrinsic
value. The actual equilibrium price for the merger would depend on the
supply and demand equilibrium in the market for the acquisition of firms.
A more complete analysis of the negotiated route for mergers is not
included in this study, and further exploration of the subject is certain-
ly necessary. Nonetheless, it is clear that accepting the notion of
superior information inside the firm, the merger negotiation may be seen
as the transfer of this information, and the agreement in a merger price
between two firms. What is not sufficiently clear are the rules driving
this negotiation process.
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Mergers are not a new phenomenon, but rather an on-going process in
the business environment. They correspond to the combination of two (or
more) firms into a unique business concern. This study presents a review
of some interesting issues in the study of mergers, and proposes a finan-
cial rationale to explain mergers in general and conglomerates in
particular.
As an overview of the overall study, each one of the previous chapters
is summarized in this section, and the most important conclusions are
restated.
Chapter 1 looks at mergers from an historical perspective, and
analyzes the characteristics of the three waves in merger activity:
those peaking at the turn of the century (1899), the late twenties (1929),
and the late sixties (1968). Important elements in this analysis are
the evolution and enforcement of antitrust legislation, and the new
concern for superconcentration (which is the accumulation of economic
power in a few hands), for the political implications it may have.
Chapter 2 discusses some of the most popular arguments given to
explain mergers. Among them may be mentioned: acquisition of monopoly
power, the synergistic effect, tax and other economic incentives, diver-
sification of risk, the empire building motive, and the search for promo-
tional and speculative profits. It is a widespread belief that most of
these economic incentives played a fundamental role in the first and
second waves, but their importance is doubtful in the last wave.
Chapter 3 presents the results of a bibliographic search on the sub-
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ject of mergers. The studies reviewed are classified in four main groups:
Empirical Determination of Merger Profitability, Mergers as Result of
Managerial Decisions, Financial Explanations for Mergers and Conglomerates,
and Studies on Merger Waves,
Studies that measure directly the profitability of mergers are very
abundant, but their conclusions on the profitability for the acquiring
firm are mixed. In general, all authors conclude that the acquired firm
gains on average; but, for the acquiring firm, older papers tend to report
a loss, while more recent papers find a neutral or even positive impact.
Studies looking at mergers as a result of managerial decisions assume
that managers are pursuing their own aims rather than the satisfaction of
shareholders' objectives. Financial explanations for mergers explore the
issues of diversification, increase in debt capacity, and imperfections
in the capital markets as potential inducement for mergers. Finally,
the section on merger waves presents some insights on this periodical
outburst of merger activity. The main conclusion from this chapter is
that many alternative avenues have been explored to explain the merger
phenomenon, but an acceptable paradigm has not been proposed yet.
Chapter 4 introduces the notion that looking at mergers from a
financial point of view may provide a valid platform for analyzing the
current expression of the merger movement. The main objective in the
study is to build a model to explain the merger phenomenon within the
existing financial framework. This chapter presents a brief review of
some important issues in finance.
Chapter 5 develops a model to obtain the market value of a firm with
insufficient financial slack to undertake an investment opportunity.
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The only external source of funds assumed in this chapter is new equity
financing. The conclusion obtained is that, in general, the full value
of that opportunity is not captured in the market value of the firm,
because there are situations in which, by taking the project and bringing
in new shareholders, old shareholders lose (from the dilution of their
holdings in the firm) more than what they get from the extra value added
by the new project.
The fundamental assumption that gives value to the availability of
financial slack is the difference between public information and internal
information held by managers of the firm. When the decision to raise
new funds for a project is taken, the firm is sending to the market the
signal that old shareholders are not worse off under this investment/
financing choice, and this piece of data must change the value of the firm
to maintain the market equilibrium.
A sensitivity analysis performed to determine the impact of different
combinations of the situational parameters over market value, shows that
firms should try to increase their slack, reduce the variance of the exist-
ing business, and look for new investment opportunities which have both a
high return on investment, and a low investment requirement. What is some-
what surprising is that no clear recommendations for the variance of the
new business and its correlation with the existing business seem to emerge
from the analysis.
The impact of slack for an intermediate situation, under roughly
realistic assumptions, is determined in a separate numerical analysis.
The loss in market value due to insufficient slack is 63.2 percent of the
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net present value of a new project when slack is 0. This percentage goes
to 29.7 percent when slack is equal to 25 percent of the total investment,
to 7.1 percent for 50 percent slack, to 0.2 percent for 75 percent slack,
and to 0 percent for 100 percent slack.
Chapter 6 develops a similar model to determine the market value of
the firm with a good investment opportunity but insufficient slack to
undertake it. It is also assumed that the firm holds information that
has not reached the market at the time the decision regarding the new
project is taken. The important addition in this chapter is to assume
that both debt and equity are available as external sources of financing.
The extension of the pure-equity model to a debt-equity situation
is done step by step, from very simple to more general situations. When
debt is assumed to be risk free, there is a clear advantage in the use
of debt. This advantage is maintained when assuming that debt is risky,
as long as no more than one period is considered in the analysis.
Numerical analysis performed under these conditions conform exactly with
these conclusions.
Going somewhat beyond the scope of this study, a tentative explora-
tion on the optimal capital structure of a firm is also presented. This
is done extending the time horizon of the model, in order to include two
sequential investment decisions instead of one. The idea developed is
that there are two counterbalancing effects in the acquisition of debt that
must be traded-off to derive a capital structure for a firm. In general,
debt has a short run effect which is beneficial, because it augments the
funds available to undertake a new project. On the other hand, in the
long run, debt has a negative impact on market value, because when the
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level of debt outstanding is increased, the possibility to reject new
projects is also increased (all benefits derived from the project are
channeled to debtholders).
A limited numerical exploration of a two-period model detects in
a clear way that an optimal capital structure may be derived from the
trade-off between short and long run effects of debt. What is somewhat
surprising, is that there are situations in which the signaling problem
by itself can justify the existence of an optimal capital structure. In
fact, in experiments with a "high" future uncertainty, the immediate
project is initially benefited by the better financing provided by an
increasing level of new debt. But, after a certain point, this positive
signal is reversed because the future loss is so high if the immediate
project is taken, that the actual signal received in the market is that
this project must be abandoned. This signal is opposing the initial
expectation that better financing availability is always good for the
immediate project.
One sure conclusion to be derived from the various debt-equity
models presented, and from many numerical analyses, is that our intuition
of the signaling impact under this setting is, at the moment of this
writing, very limited.
Chapter 7 uses the dependency of market value on the availability of
slack to show that when a firm with excess slack can satisfy the need for
cash of a firm with insufficient slack, the merger has a value over and
above the sum of market values of the two individual firms. -The difference
corresponds to the loss in the value of the second firm due to insufficient
slack. Under the assumptions in this study, this profit opportunity can be
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exploited by the tender-offer route.
Expanding the analysis to a more general situation, it may be shown
that tender offers may also be justified when the combined slack of the
two firms is insufficient to fully cover their investment needs. In this
case, the merger profitability is dependent on each particular set of
circumstances. A model to determine the market value of a merger is
obtained as an extension of the model developed in Chapter 5 when only
equity financing is considered. In this case, there is an extra degree of
complexity, because the signals given by a merger with its investment deci-
sions do not have a strict correspondence with the signals given by indi-
vidual firms.
The numerical exploration of merger cases is very limited, but it
shows that merging may or may not be advantageous. An interesting obser-
vation is that the profitability of a merger depends, among other things,
on the distribution of slack between individual firms. Therefore, the
merger of the same two firms can make sense when one of those firms holds
most of the slack, but not vice versa.
The negotiated merger is harder to justify under the assumptions in
this study. To understand them, it is necessary to assume that part or
all of the internal information is being disclosed in the negotiation
process, and that the equilibrium price depends on the overall equilibrium
in the market for the transaction of firms.
Recommendations for Further Research
The study presented seems to open some new alternatives for exploring
important topics in finance theory in general, and in the merger phenomenon
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in particular.
The basic observation made in this study is that the investment deci-
sion taken by a firm with insufficient slack has an informational content
that the market must consider in the valuation of that firm. This result
is obtained with a simple model in which only one future investment oppor-
tunity is being considered. It seems to be interesting to extend this
analysis when more than one opportunity is available. The case in which
two opportunities are available has been presented in Chapter 7, and the
same technique can be used with a firm owning a finite number of discrete
projects.
An alternative approach for studying the informational content in an
investment decision is assuming that the firm has a continuum of projects,
and that the choice is determining the amount to invest, rather than taking
or discarding an opportunity.
The information content of the financing decision has been addressed
in a very limited way; in fact, the financing decision is taken as given
(or without information content) in developing a model for finding the
market value when debt and equity financing are available. This assumption
is partly relaxed in a two period model, but much more can be done.
As a first thing, a more precise statement of the investment options
in a multiperiod setting is required. A complex problem that needs to be
addressed is the availability of slack over time (note that the dividend
decision is crucial in this setting).
The other important point is the timing of the financing decision,
and its relation to the evolution of internal and public information. If
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internal information can have an important impact on the selection of the
financing strategy, the problem becomes much more complex, because the
market would be receiving the investment and the financing signals at the
same time.
Another line of analysis is the selection of a capital structure,
which should come out as a consequence of studying the signaling effect
of financing decisions indicated in the previous paragraph. Gaining a more
thorough intuition of these signals in a debt-equity context, seems to be
a most urgent need to better understand some behavior observed in the
financial policies of firms.
A subject which has been touched very lightly in the comments at the
end of Chapter 5, and that must be addressed in a more general model, is
the selection of a dividend policy. There is a clear link with market
value via the impact of dividends on slack availability and on the variance
in the value of existing assets, but another kind of signal given by divi-
dends is not out of the question.
Empirical studies could try to determine if slack is, in fact, an
important explanatory variable of market value. The empirical analysis
of mergers under this new perspective may yield some clues to this issue,
and at the same time test the strength of a rationale given to explain
mergers in terms of slack availability.
If the difference between internal and public information in the
presence of insufficient financial slack appears to be an important element
in the valuation of firms, it may be necessary to review some public poli-
cies regarding the disclosure of information by firms. It is clear that
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firms tend to maintain the secrecy of their strategic information, but
this may penalize the market value of a firm with insufficient slack.
In this context, mergers appear as a viable mechanism to fully exploit the
investment opportunities of a firm not having enough resources on its own.
The possibility of further regulating the transfer of information to the
market, or the transfer of funds to firms having need of it, are open
questions of public policy analysis.
Closing Comments
When looking in retrospect at the basic conclusions of this study,
the notion of having situations in which firms may be unwilling to take an
investment opportunity with positive net present value, is a very disturb-
ing one. The immediate consequence is that the normal operation of the
capital market does not guarantee a socially optimal policy. Under this
setting, mergers may be understood as a corrective mechanism for this
socially undesirable distortion.
The conclusions in this study may be reinterpreted in a more
encouraging way, however. Suppose that the capital market actually cap-
tures the full value of current business and future investment opportuni-
ties. This assumption has some implications on the presupposed behavior
of managers of the firm. It is necessary that managers adhere to at least
one of the three courses of action indicated below:
- Stock issues should be unconditional;
- The firm should not fight take-overs; or
I have to thank Prof. Fischer Black for suggesting this reformulation of
the conclusions of this study.
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- If risk-free debt is available, this should be preferred over equity
financing.
The assumptions of insufficient slack and difference in information
between the public and the firm are maintained. But, if the total value
of current business and future opportunities are captured in the market
value of the firm, the managers are not following a strategy that depends
on its superior information. This strategy must be known in advance, and
it must be determined by institutional constraints or informal rules. One
such strategy is the unconditional stock issuing. This means that stock
should be issued whenever it is needed, regardless of the extra informa-
tion held by managers. Therefore, the first proposition is "Stock issues
should respond only to investment opportunities". Managers deviating from
this policy would be penalized by a reduction in the market value of the
firm (for an amount equal to the loss due to insufficient slack).
An important deterrent for managers is the threat of a merger. If
a firm deliberately chooses to deviate from the rule of issuing uncondi-
tional stock only, it may still have the full value of the current business
and its future investment opportunities represented in its market value,
by having a policy of never fighting take-overs. This leads to the second
proposition: "A firm which issues stock contingent upon its superior infor-
mation should not fight take-overs".
The third proposition is obtained from the one period model with both
risk-free debt and equity as sources of external financing. "A firm which
does not follow any of the two previous rules should use one hundred
percent debt financing".
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It may be observed that the merger threat, institutional constraints,
or informal rules, may be sufficient inducement for managers to act in a
value maximizing way, regardless of the incentives to use their superior
information. But there is no reason to neglect the possibility that a
perfectly rational behavior is the use of all internal information in the
firm, and this may imply a deviation from the value maximizing strategy.
This closing section opens an intriguing question regarding the actual
behavior of managers. Do they follow an issuing policy contingent upon
their superior internal information, or they neglect the incentives to use
their special information and follow an unconditional policy?
There is no sufficient information to asnwer this question. It can
only be added that the empirical studies of mergers performed by Halpern
[34], Mandelker [56], and mainly Ellert [18], strongly suggest that there
is a net gain in mergers. There is no synergy or special economies, but
the quick recovery of a value that could be fully detected in the market
value eight years prior to the merger, then gradually eroded, and finally
was regained in only seven or eight months prior to the merger. These
empirical observations strongly suggest that the market value of a firm
may, under certain circumstances, not be fully representative of the
actual potential in the firm. This observation has been crucial in the
selection of the point of view chosen in this study to present the model
for the market value of a firm with superior information. This model has
been intended to be descriptive of an observed situation. The reformu-
lation of the conclusions in this final section points more to the
normative implications of the model: What managers ought to be doing.
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APPENDIX 1: EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A PURE EQUITY CASE
This appendix shows that an equilibrium value can always be found if
the firm decides to issue shares for undertaking a project. This value
corresponds to the solution of equation (5.18):
P' = S + A(M') + E(M')
The solution of this equation is shown to be in the interval
S < P' < S+A+B. The only assumption being made is that (A,B) Ž 0; that
is to say, the market value of individual business cannot go negative.
Lemma 1
Consider partition M'-M of the positive quadrant in space (a,b). If M
is non-empty, all pairs (a,b) in M satisfy the following relation:
S+a+b > P'
Proof:
M is defined as:
M = {(a,b)>0I(b+E) < ,(S+a)}
Therefore, for all (a,b) in M
(S+a) > P'
b>O
S+a+b > P'
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Lemma 2
Consider partition M'-M of the positive quadrant in space (a,b). If M
is non-empty, the expected value of (S+A+B) in M is greater than P';
that is to say:
S + A(M) + B(M) > P'
Proof:
This is a direct consequence of lemma 1, because if all (a,b) in M
satisfy this relation, their expected value must satisfy it too.
Theorem 1
The market value of the firm when shares are issued, must be in the
following interval under market equilibrium
S < P' < S+A+B
Proof:
For the value P' to be an equilibrium value, it must satisfy the following
relation:
P' = S + A(M') + B(M')
We also know that the expected value (S+A+B) may be expressed in terms of
the partition M'-M as:
(S+A+B) = [S+A(M')+B(M')]Pr(M') + [S+A(M)+B(M)]Pr(M)
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or:
S+A+B = P' Pr(M') + [S+A(M)+B(M)] * Pr(M)
By lemma 2, we know that [S+A(M)+B(M)] > P'. Replacing this in the above
formulation, we get:
S+A+B > P'[Pr(M')+Pr(M)]
or:
P' < S+A+B
If region M is empty, we will have P' = S+A+B, therefore, in general,
we can write:
P' < S+A+B
This relation establishes the upper limit for P'.
The lower limit may be established in a more direct way. We know that
a and b are greater or equal to 0. Therefore:
X(M') + B(M') > 0
and
S + A(M') + B(M') > S
or:
P' > S
This statement completes the proof of the theorem.
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Theorem 2 (Existence)
The equation for P' indicated below always has at least one solution
in the interval S < P' < S+A+B:
P' = S + A(M') + B(M')
Proof:
Consider the way in which the right-hand side varies with P', and call
this function:
p(P') = S + A(M') + E(M')
In graphical terms, the solution being sought corresponds to the intersec-
tion of p(P') with the 45* line in Figure Al.
S P S+
equil.
FIGURE Al: The function p(P') = S + A(M') + B(M')
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The proof that this intersection always exists is done by showing first
that for P' = S we have p(P') > P'; and for P' = S+A+B we have p(P') < P'.
In the first place, take P' = S. By the definition of p(P') we know that
p(P') > S because A(M')+B(M') > 0 always. This implies that p(P') > P'
for P' = S.
Now consider P' = S+A+B. We know that, in general, we can express the
expected value (S+A+B) in terms of the partition M'-M as:
S+A+B [S+A(M')+B(M')]Pr(M') + [S+A(M)+B(M)]Pr(M)
In this case, this relation may be rewritten as:
P' = p(P')Pr(M') + [S+A(M)+B(M)]Pr(M)
But, by lemma 2, we know that [S+A(M)+B(M)] > P'. Replacing this in
the above formula we get:
P' > p(P')Pr(M') + P' Pr(M)
or
P'[I-Pr(M)] > p(P')Pr(M')
or
P' > p(P')
By noticing that if M is empty for P = S+A+B we have P' = p(P'), the
general relation will be P' > p(P') for P' = S+A+B.
In this way we have bounded the solution to the region indicated in
When P' = S+A+B, we must have Pr(M) < 1, because if Pr(M) = 1 we would
have S+a+b > S+A+B for all (a,b) (lemma 21. This is a contradiction with
the fact that the expected value of (S+A+B) is (S+A+B).
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Theorem 1, and we can ascertain that:
for P' = S
P' = S+1+B
p(P') P'
p(P') < P'
It is clear that if p(P') is a continuous function [the probability
density function (a,b) is continuous], then there is at least one solution
to the equation P' = p(P') in the range S < P' < S+A+B.
For a discrete probability distribution, p(P') is a discontinuing function
as indicated in Figure A2.
P'
FIGURE A2: The function p(P') = S+A(M')+B(M') when (A,B) are discrete
variables
One could think that the 450 line might never intercept this function if
it goes without crossing the horizontal segments. This would imply that
For some special discrete probability distribution, the function p(P')
may be nowhere continuous. The proof to be given is not applicable
in those cases.
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the equation P' = p(P') has no solution. In fact, it is shown below
that always there is at least one intersection.
The proof is done by showing that if p(P') is above the 45* line and
it jumps (up or down), it cannot go below this line. Given that we know
that p(P') is above the line for P' = S and below it for P' = S+A+B, the
only way to go from one side to the other is for a horizontal segment
to intercept the 450 line.
Consider p(P'-c) > (P-'e) for some (P'-c) in the interval
S < (P-'c)< S+A+B. Suppose that if (P-'e) is increased to P', a new
outcome (A,B) is included in region M'. This will make the value of
p(P') different from p(P'-e). The relation between these two quantities
may be expressed as:
p(e,) _ p(P'-E)*Pr(M')+V*Pr(E)
Pr(M')+Pr(s)
where:
Pr(M') = Probability of being in region M' defined by (P'-E)
V = (S+a+b) for the new outcome included in region M' when
(P'-0) is increased to P'
Pr(E) = Probability of getting this new outcome.
We have assumed that p(P-'e) > P'-E and we also know that V > P'-6 (by
lemma 1). Therefore, we can state that
p(P') > (P'-0)
By letting e go to 0 we can conclude that p(P') > P'. This means that the
function p(P') remains over the 450 line, or that P' is an equilibrium
solution.
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APPENDIX 2: CHANGES IN THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM WITH DIFFERENT
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS (ONLY EQUITY FINANCING)
This Appendix shows that for a fixed amount of slack, the market
value of the firm deteriorates when the investment required goes up,
because a larger new equity issue is required to fill the need for funds
(remember that E = I-S).
The proposition is shown by stating that the loss due to insuffi-
cient slack has to go up when the equity required goes up.
Lemma 1
For S fixed, the market value of old shareholders' shares after the
announcement of a new issue goes up when the equity required goes down
(P' goes up when E goes down).
Proof:
Consider two equity requirements E1 and E2 such that E > E2 . Call P'
and P' the market value when a share issue is announced for each one of2
these two cases. What we want to show is that P' < P'; that is to say,1 2'
that P' is a lower bound for P2'1 2-
The market value P2' is the solution of the equation:2
P' = p(P')
where:
p(P') = S + A(M') + B(M')
and
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E2
M' = M'(P') = {(a,b) > 01(E2+b)> - (S+a)}
To prove that P1 < P', it is sufficient to state that P1 < p(P'), because
this will imply that a solution of equation P' = p(P') can be found in
the range (P{, S+A+B). (See arguments presented in theorem 2, Appendix 1.)
Consider regions M' and M' in Figure A3.
Conside regios MI M
ET
I13·
/
4--~
<4- S-i
\b
Region M' Region M'
--P; a
FIGURE A3: Definition of regions M' and M2
Region M
' 
corresponds to the equilibrium situation for E = E1 . Therefore:
P S + A(M') + B(M')
When E1 is changed to E2 (with E2 < E1), and P' is maintained equal to
P', the new definition of region M' becomes the union of M' and M2. The
value of the function p(P') under these circumstances may be written as
a weighted average of [S+A(M')+B(M')] and [S+A(M')+B(M2)], as indicated
below:
S[S+A(M')+B(M')]Pr(MI ) + [S+A(M')+B(M')]Pr(M')
-- h CI 
A / I 1D.L"' -- Pr(M1) + Pr(M2)
i
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The term in the first bracket is P', while the term in the second bracket
is greater or equal to P' (see lemma 2 in Appendix 1). Therefore,
p(PI) > P1
Lemma 2
Consider the equilibrium values P' and P' defined by the equity require-
ments E1 and E2, respectively, where E1 > E2 . Region M defined by the
pair (E1,P{) (call it Ml) fully contains the equivalent region defined by
the pair (E2,P') (call it M2); that is to say M1 DM2.
Proof: (see Figure A4 for a graphical proof)
Ab
P' 2
FIGURE A4: Graphical Proof that M1 D M2 when E1 > E2
The definition of region M is:
M = {(a,b) > 0 (E+b) < -p (S+a)}
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M = {(a,b) > OIP' < +a}
1+-
E
For (a,b) in M2 we have
p? < S+a
2 b1+-
E 2
F2
Also E > E Therefore:By lemma I, P' I P" Then:
1 2
, < P < S+a S+aP1 2 b1+-
E2
Also E1 > E2 . Therefore:
S+a S+a
1 2 b b
E 2  E1
Consequently, if (a,b) belongs to M2, it also belongs to M 1 (M! contains
M2).
Theorem i
For S fixed,regions over which the loss due to insuff ient slack (defined below), goes up
when the e=uity required goes up:
A = B(M)Pr(M) = C b*Pr(B=b)
(a,b) in M
Proof:
Consider two equity requirements El, E 2 with E1 > E2 . Call M I and M 2
the corresponding regions M over which the loss for insufficient slack is
defined. By Lemma 2 we know that MI Z>M 2 .
The loss A when E = E1 may be expressed as:
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AI = C b·Pr(B=b)
(a,b) in M1
The summation may be broken down into the two regions M2 and (M1-M2) as
follows:
AI = C b*Pr(B = b) + E b*Pr(B=b)
(a,b) in M2  (a,b) in (M1-M2)
The first term after the equal sign is the loss due to insufficient slack
when E = E2, which is designated by A2 . Then:
S = A2 + E b*Pr(B=b)
(a,b) in (M2 -M1 )
The sum to the right of the equal sign cannot be negative. Therefore:
A > A1 2 6
Theorem 2
For a fixed amount of slack, the market value of the firm goes down when
the investment required goes up; that is to say, when the new equity
required goes up (E = I-S).
Proof:
According to relations (5.20) and (5.21), the market value of the firm may
be expressed as:
V S +A++-A
According to Theorem 1, for El > E2 we have A > A2 . This implies that
V < V1 ý 2
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APPENDIX 3: ALGORITHM FOR FINDING THE EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION IN A PURE-
EQUITY CASE
This Appendix shows that the algorithm defined in Figure 17, for
finding P' in a pure-equity case converges monotonically to the equilibrium
value of P'. The proof is built on the idea that starting with an upper
limit for P', the new value of P' generated by the algorithm has to be
between the equilibrium solution being sought, and the value for P' in
the previous iteration. Formally:
let P' = Initial value of P'0
= S+A+B (it is always an upper limit by Theorem 1,
Appendix 1).
for iteration h, define P' as:
h
Ph = S+ A(M )+B(M)
where:
Mh= {(aib) > OI(E+bj) > P-E (S+ai)}
h-i
We have to prove that P' < P' < P-' , where P' is the equilibrium solutionh - h-1 *
being sought.
The proof is done in two steps: first, prove that P' < P' (P' is an
- h h
upper limit for P'); -and second, prove that P' < Ph-' (P is a non increas-
ing function).
Step 1: Prove that P' < P'
We know that P1 < P1. Assume that, for some h, the following relation is
satisfied: P' 1< (?h-l is an upper limit for P'). Then, the following
conditions must prevail (see Figure A5):
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N'
h-ii
* --- L-S~
FIGURE A5: Relation between region M' (defined for P_l) and the
equilibrium situation (defined for P')
M' C
where: M' is region M' defined for P' = P'
Moreover:
MI = M' + L
Consider the definition of P':h
P1 = (S+a.+b )p. / p.]
h (ai,bj ) in M 1 j (ai.,b) in M 1
The numerator in this expression may be decomposed in two sums:
O (S+a i+b )p =
ai,bj) in ~
ab) (S+a i+b..)p a) in .+ (S+a .+b .)p(a.,b.) in M' (a,b) in L
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The first sum to the right of the equal sign is equivalent to the follow-
ing expression:
P' 1 E pij
*L(ai,b ) in M' J
The second sum is greater than the
P'L b E piji
L(a.,b ) in L
The conclusion is that P' > P* (if
empty; which implies M = M'). In
(by definition of P')
expression below (unless L is empty):
(by Lemma 2, Appendix 1)
L is non-empty) and P' = P' (if L is
general, P' > P'h= *"
Step 2: Prove that P' < P1'-h= h-1
Suppose that P' < PO (otherwise P' = P = P). Take now any three values
of the sequence generated by the iteration procedure, and call them;
P P P' . Assume that P-I < Ph-2' and show that P' < P'h h-1 -2 h- h-2" h = h-1
Consider the sets N' and M,- that define the values P' and Ph-1'
respectively.
M' = {(a,b) > 0 I (E+b) > 9 (S+a)}
h-2
Mh = {(a,b) > 0 (E+b) >,E (S+a)}
h-I
Consider also the definitions of P' and P':h-1 h
P'h-1 = Ex{S+A+BIMh 11
Pr(M~ 1 ) = Probability of (A,B) being in Mh 1'
Similarly:
Ex = Expected value.
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P = Ex{S+A+BIMh
Given that P < Ph-2' it must be true that;' C M-i. Therefore, Ph-
may also be expressed as:
Ex{S+A+BI14}*Pr(Mh) + Ex{(S+A+BiMh 1-M'}*Pr(Mh 1-Mh)P1h-1 Pr(M~ + Pr(M 1-M
This is equivalent to:
P' Pr(M') + Ex{S+A+B Iz 1-Mh}*Pr(Mh_ 1 -Mi)
h-1 . Pr(Mý) + Pr(Mh_1-Mý)
If (M;-,- ) is empty, then Ph- 1 = P because Pr(M-_ 1 -M) = 0.
If (M_1-~) is non-empty, then: Ex{S+A+BIjM 1-M} > Ph-I (Lemma 2,
Appendix 1). Also:
Pr(M~ 1-M, ) > 0 and Ph-1 P '
The general conclusion is that Ph-> P'
Conclusions:
If P' is always decreasing, and bounded below by P', it has to con-
verge to an equilibrium solution in a finite number of steps, because the
number of (ai,bj ) pairs is finite (P decreasing means that at least one
pair (ai,bj) is shaved out of region Mh in each iteration).
The other conclusion is that when more than one solution exists for
P', this algoirthm picks the largest one, because it starts from an upper
limit. (PO = S+A+B).
In this case, P' used in this proof may be any valid equilibrium
solution.
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APPENDIX 4: PARAMETERS IN THE BIVARIATE LOG NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
This Appendix shows the relations between the parameters of the bi-
variate log normal distribution of (A,B), and the bivariate normal distri-
bution of (X,Y), where X = £n A and Y = kn B. More specifically, if
(X,Y,x ,P y xy) are assumed known, the problem is to find (A,B,GA,2B,'AB).
The relations between (A,B) and (X,Y) may be inverted to: A = eX
and B = e . Therefore, to find the parameters of the distribution of (A,B)
it is necessary to determine the expectation for the following functions
of (X,Y):
= Ex{eXY B = Ex{eY }
= Ex{eX} Br Ex{e2Y}
AB= Ex{eX+Y
Then, we can compute:
2 =2 2 2 2
A B
Cov(A,B) = AB - A B
There is no problem in computing all the expected values above, from the
density function for (X,Y) which may be expressed as follows in terms of
the standardized random variables (U,V):
f(u,v) = i exp i- 1 (u2 + v 2 - 2p uv (A4.1)
(27r) 2(1-p ) xy
xy xy
where:
U X-X Y-YU a V =
a a
x y
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or: X=X+x U Y=Y+ V
x y
Therefore:
= ExU Ex{e x U e Exe
A = Ex{e1 = Ex{e X= eX Ex{eX} x
Y u
= e ff ex f(u,v)du dv
This expression is equal to:
= e x (A4.2)
Similarly
B = e
To compute VA, a similar procedure is followed:
2 = Ex{e 2• = Ex{e
2(+a xU) 202X xUx } = e Ex{e
20 u
= e ff e x f(u,v) du dv
Solving the integral we get:
2X+2 2
A e
Similarly:
x (A4.4)
2Y+2a2
= 
e (A4.5)
From these results it is possible to find the variances for A and B:
AA - e
2 eB3
2X+0c2  a2
X (ex -1)
2 (e2 -1)2
Y (e y -i)
(A4.3)
(A4. 6)
(A4.7)
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Finally, the expected value of the product A B has to be obtained for
getting their covariance:
AB ExlV ~AB x{e X+Y= Ex{e } Se U(+) V= e (X+Y)Exe x Y
a u+a v
= e ff ex y f(u,v) du dv
Solving the integral we find:
X+Y-ý+(o'2+ a2+2p r a )
x y xy xyAB = e x XYX
Therefore:
Cov(A,B) = AB - A B
(+y)+k(a 2 2) p2 C a a2
e x y (e xy x y -1)
The correlation coefficient is:
P(AB C= ov(A,B)
aAB
p aa
e Px y • x  -
(2 2
e X-l)(e Y-1)
(A4. 8)
(A4.9)
(A4.10)
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APPENDIX 5: COMPUTER PROGRAM TO GET THE EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION IN A PURE-
EQUITY CASE
e.
C4
a x
o .
4 rN 1
S t,
r -
* tn
Hr
H
'4.
Ha
H
HI
Ni
I-
H,
Hl
N
I-3
H
H'
H
a-
C,
N
i-i
H;
C-
I-
-4.
-a:
L HT
'4.
H '
'4
an
0C
4
N¢I-
x
K
!
4.
x,,HC-
4-
N
h
I-,
H
'4 N4 m~ -T an
L- I-- %- I- L L
N ..4 1
C14
4- H -
1-t'4 0 0
i ti+ S
+ iti
Na-, 5-,
H H
H --
H3 a
H - *
K ~ +
4-
H H H
H 'O a .
+ C. O
rLO
- ' u N
4-
+ tr.
x '4
+ H
N. H
4 H?
C K
N N
x r-75
0 n Co3 H
o H,
K a~
II-
- -
H K~
o QX
N, tr:
H ..
H -'
5- +
0 0
a-
'C
14
'4.
H
K
H
'4.
+
H
He
4-
HF
-.
H
0
a)
H
S.4:
'4-Z
4-
.4:
H
K
4-
a-)1
H~
-4
r-4
-9 0
co cl 1.
ý '4j "
Hi
H
H, H
I,
a' H
atz
H
a;
9:
a
~51
4
96
rn f
'4
-299-
APPENDIX 6: EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A DEBT-EQUITY CASE
In Appendix 1, the existence of market equilibrium in a pure-equity
situation is shown to exist always for any joint probability distribution
f(a,b), as long as (A,B) is defined in the positive quadrant. To establish
the existence of equilibrium in a debt-equity situation, it is necessary
to relax the assumption of non-negative B, because in the range of permis-
sible values for (A,B et), negative values of Bne t are allowed.
The proof that an equilibrium exists in a debt-equity situation is
done in this Appendix for all joint probability distributions which are
continuous in the half-space {a>O}. (b can take any value.)
net
The proof is done in two steps: first, the existence of a solution
for the equilibrium equation below is established (similar to "pure equity",
but allowing negative values for b).
P' = S + A(M') + B(M') [Relation (6.20)]
Second, this equation is shown to have a solution also when the equili-
brium constraint for the new debt issuing is imposed:
D = Ex{DIM'} [Relation (6.19)]
Theorem 1
The equation below has at least one equilibrium solution in the range
S < P' < o0, when the pair (A,B) has a joint probability distribution
The subscript net will not be carried in the rest of this Appendix,
unless there is some possibility of ambiguity.
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defined in the half-space {(a,b)a>Ž0} which is continuous for a > 0:
P' = S + A(M') + E(M')
M' = {(a,b)Ia>.0; E+b >_p- (S+a)}
Proof:
The basic idea in the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 2 in
Appendix 1.
Given a value of P', it is possible to find M' and the corresponding
A(M') and E(M'). For all values of P', define the function p(P') as:
p(P') f S + A(M') + B(M')
In graphical terms, the value of P' being sought corresponds to the
intersection of p(P') with the 450 line in Figure A6.
,)
FIGURE A6: Function p(P') in a debt-equity situation.
The proof that this intersection exists in done by showing that for P' = S,
the value of p(P') is above the 45* line, and that for P' sufficiently
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large, p(P') is below this line.
First, take P' = S. It is clear from Figure A7 that region M' only
contains non-negative values of (a,b). Therefore: A(M') + B(M') > 0 and
S + X(M') + g(M') > S or p(P') > P'.
a
FIGURE A7: Definition of region M' when P' = S
On the other hand, if P' is sufficient large, S + A(M') + B(M') < P' (or
p(P') < P'). because the three terms in the left-hand side are bounded
(there are no real situations with expected net present values being
infinity).
Consequently, at least one value of P' must exist for which the condition
p(P') = P' is satisfied.
Note
If the joint probability distribution is not strictly continuous in the
half-space a > 0, the existence of this equilibrium solution cannot be
guaranteed. Figure A8 offers an example in which no equilibrium solution
can be found.
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F .
(0,10)1
S = 0 E= 10
1b.12
b. 12
(A,B) (3,4)
Note that for P' = S = 0
Pt = 10
p(P') = 10 > P'
p(P') = 7 < P'
But there is no situation for which p(P') = P'.
A (P')
7.5
FIGURE A8: Example of a situation with no equilibrium solution
(negative values of b are allowed)
)
I-~-~lllp-"----"l--3---"_·_1~
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Theorem 2
For a fixed face value of debt (F constant), the system of equations below
has at least one equilibrium solution in the range S < P' < co, 0 < D < F,
when the pair (A,Bnet) has a joint probability distribution defined in
the half space {(a,bnet) la > 0 which is continuous for a > 0.
P' = S + A(M') + Bnet(M')
D Ex{DIM'1
M' = {(a,bnet)Ia>0; E+b E> E(S+a)
with:
bnet = b- (d-D) [Relation (6.10)]
E = I - S -D [Relation (6.2)]
O<d<F
Proof:
Given that the value of F is assumed fixed, the value of bne t may be
expressed as bnet = (b-d)+D where the expression in parentheses is a
known quantity.
If the market value of the debt issued is assumed to be equal DO, the
full value of bnet becomes known, and it is possible to solve for the
equilibrium conditions in the pure-equity problem defined by the follow-
ing parameters: Distribution of {a,b net, S, E = I-S-DO. Theorem 1
guarantees the existence of this solution, and a value of P'(D*) and a
region M'(DO) can be obtained from the exercise. For this solution to be
valid in the debt-equity situation, it is necessary to satisfy the addi-
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tional relation:
Do = Ex{DIM'(Do)}
To prove that this relation can always be satisfied, it is shown that
for Do = 0, Ex{DIM'(Do)} > D0, while for a sufficiently large DO
Ex{DIM'(DO)} < DO. Given that the distribution of (a,b) is continuous,
a value of d must exist for which the equality between DO and Ex{DIM'(Do)}
is achieved.
First, if Do = 0, and the region M' (DO) is non-empty, (which is always
the case with continuous distributions), then Ex{DIM' (DO)} > 0 because
d > 0 always.
Take now DO = F. If the equilibrium region M'(DO) is non-empty, then
Ex{DIM'1(DO)} < F because d < F always.
This argument should be somewhat refined, because E(DO) = (I-S-DO) should
not be allowed to go negative. This is always the case for F > (I-S).
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APPENDIX 7: MARKET VALUE OF DEBT WHEN THE MARKET VALUE OF THE FIRM IS
LOG-NORMAL
This section develops a relation to compute the market value of debt
when the market value of the firm at the time the debt is due is a random
variable V, with a log-normal distribution, expected value V and coeffi-
cient of variation CV.
V being log-normal implies that U = £n V is normal with expected
values and variance given by (see Appendix 4):
a' = £n (1+CV2)u
Also, Z defined below has a standardized normal distribution:
U-UZ =
u
The market value of debt is defined in terms of its face value (F) as
follows:
D = Ex{min(V,F)}
Replacing V = e e , t
D Ex{min(e
D = Ex{min(e U
his relation is equivalent to:
F)}
£n F-U
D = f au
-s
U+o z
e u (z)dz + F
kn F-U
CTU
4 (z)dz
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where:
1 - z
, (z) = -e
This debt may be rewritten as follows, after some algebraic transformations
are performed with the first term.
4+,- 2 an F-U
u [ ou  1 -_(z-ou) 2D e e dz +
+ F F-U (z)dz
An F-UJ
ou
Define O(Z) = Pr(Z<Z) = cumulative probability distribution for a
standardized normal random variable.
Note also that e + u = V.
Then:
Sn F-U n F-U)
u u
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APPENDIX 8: ALGORITHM FOR FINDING THE EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION IN A DEBT-
EQUITY CASE
This Appendix informally shows that the algorithm defined in
Figure 24 for finding P' and D in the debt-equity case converges monotoni-
cally to the equilibrium values under some circumstances. The existence
of an equilibrium is proven in Appendix 7 for continuous distributions
of (A,B) in the semi-space {a > 01. This assumption is maintained here.
Given that convergence cannot be fully proven without making some
additional assumptions with regard to debt, no formal treatment of this
subject is included in here. If the algoirthm were to fail in being
convergent, it is always possible to turn to a direct search of the solu-
tion by progressively narrowing the set of possible values of D. In all
numerical cases the algorithm was convergent, so the use of this direct
search was not required.
convergent
- -~---~--- -
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convergent
DO = assumed D
non-convergent
1 - C 0 2 ULiLIL £."
FIGURE A9: The function Ex{D M'(DO)} vs. DO. Some examples.
